

Emergency Response to Terrorism: Strategic Considerations for Command Officers

ERT:SCCO-Student Manual

2nd Edition, 2nd Printing-August 2001



**Homeland
Security**

DHS/USFA/NFA
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August 2001
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE

UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL FIRE ACADEMY

FOREWORD

The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), an important component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate, serves the leadership of this Nation as the DHS's fire protection and emergency response expert. The USFA is located at the National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in Emmitsburg, Maryland, and includes the National Fire Academy (NFA), National Fire Data Center (NFDC), National Fire Programs (NFP), and the National Preparedness Network (PREPnet). The USFA also provides oversight and management of the Noble Training Center in Anniston, Alabama. The mission of the USFA is to save lives and reduce economic losses due to fire and related emergencies through training, research, data collection and analysis, public education, and coordination with other Federal agencies and fire protection and emergency service personnel.

The USFA's National Fire Academy offers a diverse course delivery system, combining resident courses, off-campus deliveries in cooperation with State training organizations, weekend instruction, and online courses. The USFA maintains a blended learning approach to its course selections and course development. Resident courses are delivered at both the Emmitsburg campus and its Noble facility. Off-campus courses are delivered in cooperation with State and local fire training organizations to ensure this Nation's firefighters are prepared for the hazards they face.

In recent years the growing threat of terrorism has given greater urgency to the need for up-to-date training on tactical considerations when dealing with a possible terrorist situation. The major focus for the U.S. fire service is to learn how to prepare for, identify, and respond to terrorist incidents, such as the Tokyo Sarin attack and the bombings at the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City. To this end, several training initiatives are underway at the National Fire Academy. The focus of this course is on fire service response to terrorism from the Command Officer's perspective.

This course addresses the special needs of Command Officers responding to incidents that have been caused by terrorist action. The response builds upon the firm foundation provided by the curriculum offered at the NFA and adds specialized information concerning such topics as:

- defining and recognizing terrorism/weapons of mass destruction;
- emergency response: strategies and tactical options;
- multiagency response;
- intelligence and planning; and
- documentation and evidence issues.

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OVERVIEW

COURSE GOAL

The goals of the course are to

1. Increase a Command Officer's ability to anticipate potential terrorist incident targets.
2. Increase a Command Officer's ability to respond effectively to a terrorist incident through coordinated planning, training, and exercising.
3. Increase a Command Officer's skills level to work in a team setting to address terrorist incidents.
4. Increase an emergency response department's ability to integrate local, State, and Federal resources to address a terrorist incident.

The activities included in the course account for approximately one quarter of the class time. There are also limited supplemental readings.

SCOPE OF THE COURSE

This course is designed to introduce the experienced Command Officer to emergency response to terrorism. This course should give the Command Officer the ability to focus on the global strategic considerations and unique aspects introduced into emergency operations by the nature of terrorist events. It has a planning emphasis, and includes recognizing clues that a terrorist incident is in progress. Material presented in this course includes the Incident Command System (ICS) and details of Unified Command, Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and Multiagency Command (MAC). It is assumed that the student has an understanding of these systems.

If you are unfamiliar with the ICS, it is recommended that you use the NFA's ICS Self-Study CD-ROM available from the National Emergency Training Center's (NETC) Learning Resource Center (LRC) to refresh your memory.

TARGET AUDIENCE

The primary target audience for this course is individuals (chief officers, emergency managers, shift commanders, etc.) who hold command-level positions in their organizations. These people should have command and control responsibilities on incidents involving terrorism, and be familiar with operating in an incident management structure.

COURSE METHODOLOGY

PRESENTATIONS

Presentations are interactive lectures that, in some cases, include skill-based activities. Word slides have been used only for main points and, where possible, are accompanied by illustrative photos and graphics.

COURSE SCHEDULE

UNIT	TITLE
Unit 1	Introduction
Unit 2	Defining Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Unit 3	Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents
Unit 4	Planning and Intelligence Gathering
Unit 5	Factors Influencing Strategic Decisions
Unit 6	Integrated Response to Terrorist Events
Unit 7	Incident Documentation and Evidence Preservation
Unit 8	Federal Response

TIMETABLE OF EVENTS

<i>When</i>	<i>Student</i>
Prior to class	<i>Complete <i>Emergency Response to Terrorism: Self Study</i> (ERT:SS) and/or <i>Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts</i> (ERT:BC) course(s).</i>
Day before class begins	Travel.
Day 1 Sunday	AM: Units 1 to 4. PM: Unit 5. FRP and PDD-39 readings. Select evidence and scene control readings.
Day 2 Monday	AM: Units 6 and 7. PM: Unit 8.

HOW TO USE THIS STUDENT MANUAL

Use this Student Manual (SM) as a reference document for topics listed in the Table of Contents. It includes upfront material describing the length and purpose of the course as well as a content outline section including activity directions. Extensive Appendices follow the text.

The Appendices are a very useful part of this course. Appendix B is from source material provided in the *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts* (ERT:BC) course. Use these to develop greater depth from the course. Appendix C is the Glossary for the Student Manual (SM) and selected readings. The Bibliography, another way of introducing you to a resource for greater depth, is found in Appendix D. For your convenience, this includes all the references from the Bibliography in the ERT: BC course as well as new entries we have identified.

Another way to achieve greater insight into issues surrounding first responders and terrorism is to consult other existing courses. Additional courses in this series are *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts* (ERT:BC), *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Self-Study* (ERT:SS), *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Incident Management* (ERT:IM), *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations: Emergency Medical Services* (ERT:TC:EMS), *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations: Company Officer* (ERT:TC:CO), *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations: Hazardous Materials* (ERT:TC:HM). An *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Job Aid* is also a part of this series.

We recommend using the text material as a review outside class and as a reference when you return home. Only the activity section is intended for use in class. You will be directed to use it at various parts of each unit and will be expected to follow instructions and use the data displayed as part of an activity. The Glossary and Bibliographies can be used as long-term resources as well as a ready reference in class.

Whether you are looking for a ready reference or a way to get greater depth, become acquainted with this SM as your personal guide.

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
Student Manual**

**Unit 1:
Introduction**

WELCOME TO ERT:SCCO

This 2-day course is intended to build upon your existing skills as an Incident Commander (IC) and your knowledge of terrorism from professional experience or from the *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts* (ERT:BC) course or the *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Self Study* (ERT:SS) course.

Class Requirements

You will be expected to participate actively in class activities.

Course Background

The first needs assessment for this course was conducted at a meeting hosted by the National Fire Academy (NFA) in October 1996. Attendees represented a broad spectrum of the community, including Federal agencies, State and local firefighting and/or emergency response organizations, U.S. military organizations, and professional trade groups. The group sought and received input from experienced emergency professionals in Israel, Northern Ireland, and Tokyo.

During the meeting, participants engaged in a number of small and large group exercises designed to highlight performance deficiencies and offer solutions. They were asked to identify training needs and cross-reference those needs to various categories of the overall target population. Since that time various development groups have met to refine the interventions to be introduced by the NFA.

This product was the result of a determined effort by a number of experienced professionals both on and off the development team. The common thread among contributors was a commitment to an effective and safe response by first responders to terrorist events. This course is but one of a series of interventions developed by the NFA, with Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funding, fulfilling that commitment.

Learning Outcomes

Understanding the challenges presented to the Command Officer during a terrorist event is critical to a successful management of these types of events. During this class we will identify areas of concern for the Command Officer, including

1. Understanding the strategic considerations of the Command Officer at terrorist events.
2. Working effectively with other local, State, and Federal response agencies.
3. The Command Officer's role in the community's ability to maintain a "state of readiness" through the development, review, and evaluation of preincident response plans.
4. The early recognition of visual indicators, clues, and interaction with crisis management teams during terrorist threats/events.
5. How to identify, acquire, and manage resources effectively.
6. Understanding local response plans and their operation within State and Federal response plans.
7. The ability to make informed and knowledgeable strategic decisions.

SUMMARY

It is expected that upon the conclusion of this course the Command Officer will have obtained an improved knowledge of the importance of early recognition and the impact of a terrorist event on a community.

The Command Officer needs to think, plan, and react in a strategic manner. From preincident planning, training, the actual incident Action Plan (AP) through termination and recovery, emergency response managers must not lose focus of the "big picture." From first recognition of a terrorist threat, the Command Officer must act quickly, but be mindful of the broad and far-reaching impacts of all decisions. The first goal is life safety of responders and the public, followed by property and environmental/infrastructure protection. The simple-sounding priorities will involve multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and disciplines. It is up to the first-responding fire, rescue, law enforcement, public health, and emergency management agencies to set in motion the response mechanism to defeat one of the terrorist's goals: to cause the population to lose faith in its government's ability to protect public safety, health, and the environment.

By a well-planned, organized interagency response not only will we protect life and property, but neutralize terrorism's broader goals of fear, threats, coercion, and intrusion.

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Unit 2: Defining Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to identify the fundamental nature and attributes of the terrorists' motivation and methods of achieving their objectives.

Enabling Objectives

- Define terrorism and its types based on the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) criteria.
 - Describe terrorist ideology.
 - Describe the weaponry or agents used in terrorist incidents.
 - Explain how weapons used by terrorists can affect first responders.
-

TERRORISM DEFINITIONS AND TYPES

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defines terrorism as "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of criminal laws of the United States or any segment, meant to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." In short, terrorists are willing to use violence to create fear in order to achieve their objective(s). This means that not only the target, but more importantly, the motivation, defines an act of terrorism.

It is important to recognize that weapons used in conjunction with a crime do not automatically make it a terrorist incident. You must consider the motivation of the perpetrator(s). In order for an incident to be considered terrorism, its aim must be to intimidate or coerce a government or some segment of the population. For example, one person trying to poison another as an act of revenge would not constitute a terrorist attack, even if the poison used were one such as Ricin, an agent sometimes used by terrorists. In this case, the motive would not be to intimidate a government or the civilian population at large.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) takes the definition of terrorism one step further. The FBI recognizes two categories of terrorism: domestic and international.

Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population without any foreign direction. The Oklahoma City bombing is an example of domestic terrorism.

International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend national boundaries. The World Trade Center bombing is an example of international terrorism.

While individual definitions of terrorism may vary slightly, all sources agree that a terrorist incident almost always will comprise two elements: criminal activity and technological hazard(s).

Criminal activities are any illegal actions, such as robbery, arson, murder, extortion, hostage-taking, kidnapping, etc. Technological hazards are the weapons used by terrorists. Haz mat incidents involve technological hazards, as do incidents that potentially could occur at a fixed nuclear site.

Even when criminal activity and technological hazards are involved, it is still vital to consider the motivation of the perpetrator(s) before labeling

the incident as terrorism. Some incidents, such as environmental crime, industrial sabotage, and many bombings, may include both elements, but still would not be terrorist in nature.

As stated previously, knowing the individual's or group's motivation is the key element to understanding what is and isn't terrorism. Studies, both past and ongoing, have focused on terrorist methodology and motivation in attempts to better understand and, it is hoped, to predict and prevent terrorist incidents.

While understanding terrorist motivation and preparing for response to, and the consequence of, terrorist events are the key reasons for this course, emergency responders also may apply lessons learned from this course in other situations. The number of generally violent acts occurring throughout the United States that are not technically or legally defined (per DOJ or FBI) as terrorism require Command Officers to be aware of these dangers, which may factor into their strategic decisionmaking.

TERRORIST IDEOLOGY

What makes terrorists tick? Why do they do what they do? How can all these different causes lead to terrorism? There are three criteria that must be met for an ideology or activity to be considered terrorism.

The first criterion is the cause--an extremist viewpoint and the perspective that anyone who does not believe in the "truth" is the enemy. An extremist viewpoint starts with the belief that the individual, movement, or group knows the one truth. This truth commonly involves a social, political, or religious belief system or a perceived ill or injustice.

One extremely important aspect to understand is that not all people who believe that they know the one truth are extremists or terrorists. For example, most religions, political parties, and special interest groups believe they know the one truth. In some instances, these beliefs are extreme, but in most cases they are not.

The Heaven's Gate cult is an example of an extremist belief system. The members of the cult believed a spaceship was located in the tail of the Hale-Bopp comet and that they could go to the spacecraft if they committed suicide. More than 40 members of the cult followed through and died. By any measure, these people were convinced that they knew the one truth, and they were willing to die for that truth. However, even though this was an extremist viewpoint, it was not terrorist in nature.

The transition toward terrorism begins with a fundamental intolerance of other viewpoints and perspectives. In other words, there is an inability to accept differences of opinion.

The second criterion is character, when those who hold other beliefs not only are considered the enemy, but also are deemed worthless. All enemies are "evil," etc., and thus become a hindrance to accomplishing the belief, correcting the ill, or relieving the injustice. Once this shift in thinking occurs, the enemy loses all value. The enemy is thus worthless, and any means necessary to defeat or overcome the enemy is acceptable. In other words, the end justifies the means.

The third criterion is crime and involves implementation of the viewpoint (i.e., actually taking, or planning to take, violent action). The action (or planning), not the extremist viewpoint, is what makes the person a criminal.

The most dangerous situation is when this perspective is taken to the extreme. In such a case, even those who are not the enemy are also worthless because they are not fighting actively to destroy the enemy. This allows attacks on anyone regardless of age, gender, or relationship to the enemy.

Obviously, only a very small number of individuals, even in extremist groups, will descend into this completely fringe belief system. It also explains how terrorists can show so little concern for their victims and why the cause is the central focus of their beliefs.

TERRORIST WEAPONS

Terrorism is a form of warfare in which attacks are carefully designed to meet a specific goal. In terrorism, inflicting actual damage is a secondary concern after the psychological impact of the attack. The psychological effect may be even more profound than the physical damage, and it may last long after all signs of the attack are gone.

Because terrorists are so intent on achieving their objectives, they choose their weapons for specific reasons with a distinct purpose in mind. Terrorists want to use weapons that will instill fear. Many terrorist weapons (such as radiation and some biological and chemical agents) are undetectable without special equipment and do not affect the victims immediately. Even the threat of such an attack can send the general population into panic. They feel they have no way of defending themselves against a weapon they cannot even see.

Those feelings of fear help terrorists achieve another goal, convincing the public that the government is unable to protect it. In time, the public becomes angry and loses confidence in the government. The government, in order to appease an increasingly disapproving public, is coerced into complying with the terrorists' agenda.

Terrorists also choose weapons that will attract the public's attention quickly. Any large explosion quickly draws emergency response, news crews, and a crowd of onlookers. Should they claim responsibility, terrorists know that such an attack ensures rapid and wide exposure for their cause. Because these attacks attract such attention, terrorists know these weapons make excellent diversions to cover up other crimes (such as robberies to fund additional activities).

Weapons of Mass Destruction

B-NICE

The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) generally can be categorized as:

- **Biological;**
- **Nuclear;**
- **Incendiary;**
- **Chemical; and**
- **Explosive.**

This is referred to as the B-NICE acronym.

(Armed attack also can be considered as a terrorist weapon.)

Biological Weapons

Biological weapons are organic in nature. The pathogenic effects may be caused by the actual organism or by its spores, which are protected reproductive packets. Toxins produced by living organisms also may be used as weapons, many with lethal results.

Bacteria and viruses are both organisms that cause direct pathogenic effects. Bacteria which are dangerous to humans (and hence, possible terrorist weapons) include anthrax, the plague (bubonic or pneumonic), tularemia, and cholera. Dangerous, sometimes deadly, viruses include viral hemorrhagic fevers, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE), and smallpox.

Ricin is a toxin derived from a plant. It is made from the beans of the castor plant and its inhalation or ingestion can lead to death. Abrin is a similar toxin, but is 75 times more powerful than Ricin. Botulinum Toxin (Bot Tox) is made from bacterial byproducts and is a highly potent toxin. It is 3,000 times more powerful than Ricin and 100,000 times more powerful than Sarin.

Mycotoxins also are dangerous biological toxins. These toxins can be introduced via almost any route, including absorption through skin contact. Their effects are similar to blister (mustard) agents except that symptom onset is more rapid, usually occurring within minutes. Because these toxins are not sensitive to heat or ultraviolet light (unlike viruses and many bacteria), mycotoxins could be used effectively as terrorist weapons.

Nuclear/Radiological Weapons

When many people think of the possibility of a terrorist attack, they think of scenes from Hollywood movies where one man holds a city in siege with the threat of a nuclear device. While the plans for nuclear devices are available, the odds of a terrorist group having the resources, finances, expertise, materials, and time to build a nuclear bomb are very remote. Terrorists must be very secretive about their actions; building a bomb would take a large staff, sizable facility, and years to complete, not to mention being exorbitantly costly. In short, it would be far from the ideal weapon depicted in the movies. For such an attack ever to occur, it would almost certainly have to be carried out by a government-backed terrorist group.

A much more likely occurrence is the use of a radiation dispersal device (RDD), sometimes referred to as a "dirty bomb." An RDD uses a combination of conventional explosives and radioactive materials. The radioactive material is placed around the explosive so that when the device detonates, the material is dispersed. Terrorists may use any type of radioactive matter for an RDD, whereas a nuclear bomb requires high-grade, specially-processed source matter.

A third possible scenario involving radiation is an attack on a fixed nuclear facility. Examples include military bases, nuclear-powered vessels, nuclear power plants, nuclear waste facilities, and fuel reprocessing facilities. Due to security at these facilities, durability of containment vessels, and multiple redundant safeguards, the likelihood of such an attack succeeding is low.

Incendiary Weapons

Incendiary weapons are especially appealing to terrorists for a number of reasons. They are highly flexible in deployment. They make effective and efficient weapons because, while they are inexpensive and simple to construct, incendiary weapons readily produce casualties, property damage, monetary loss, and damage to infrastructure. Incendiary weapons have been used effectively in Northern Ireland, and earlier this century in the United States.

Incendiary devices have a wide range of trigger, delivery, and construction options, so terrorists may tailor a device to their specific needs. Triggers may be chemical, electronic, or mechanical. Delivery options include planted (prepositioned), hand-thrown, and self-propelled. Flammable gases, flammable and combustible liquids, oxidizer-enhanced substances, and hypergolic chemicals (substances which ignite on contact with one another) all can be used in constructing an incendiary weapon.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons are made from inorganic substances that can produce injury or death. Types include nerve agents, blister agents, blood agents, choking (pulmonary) agents, irritants (riot control agents) and industrial chemicals.

Nerve agents all share certain properties. All act on the nervous system and are composed of chemicals similar to those found in commercial organophosphate insecticides.

Like all organophosphates, nerve agents are cholinesterase inhibitors. Cholinesterase is an enzyme that removes the neurotransmitter acetylcholine from the small gap between nerve cells (synapse). As a result of cholinesterase inhibition, acetylcholine accumulates in the synapse and is interpreted as another nerve impulse. This causes muscular tremors and convulsions. Other signs of nerve agent exposure include **S**alivation, **L**acrimation, **U**rination, **D**efecation, **G**astric distress, **E**mesis, and **M**iosis (pinpoint pupils) (SLUDGEM). Ultimately, this may result in death.

Common nerve agents include Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD) and V Agent (VX).

An issue that must be introduced to the class is the effectiveness of NFPA 1971, *Standard on Protective Ensemble For Structural Fire Fighting*, concerning structural turnouts and positive-pressure self-contained

breathing apparatus (SCBA) as self-defense protective equipment. Several reports are available for review concerning the use of the various levels of PPE. These should be reviewed, and SOP's/SOG's developed to establish proper levels of personal protection for responders.

At present, there is extreme controversy as to whether these findings mean that properly protected personnel can perform the rescue of other responders or even victims safely. **There is no definitive answer to this question.**

Blister agents, sometimes referred to as vesicants, are severe irritants with a degree of systemic toxicity. These substances affect skin, eyes, mucus membranes, and the gastrointestinal tract.

Mustards are the most common blister agents. There are several different types, but they all are based on sulfur (distilled) or nitrogen (nitrogen and ammonia-based) compounds. All are liquids that have high vapor densities (from 5 to 6) and low vapor pressures (between 0.3 and 0.01mm of mercury). The initial symptoms from dermal exposure manifest themselves in as little as 2 hours, or as long as 6 hours.

Lewisites, also blister agents, are a series of arsenic-based compounds with high vapor densities (7 to 8) and low vapor pressures (0.03 to 0.08mm of mercury). They are local and systemic toxins. Dermal exposure symptoms are immediate, causing effects ranging from severe stinging to searing pain. If a victim's eyes are exposed, lewisites can cause blindness if the victim is not decontaminated within 1 minute. Lewisite is hydrolyzed rapidly by humidity and water.

Blood agents interfere with the body's ability to process oxygen. These agents commonly are referred to as cyanides, because it is known that many other chemical agents are carried in the blood. Hydrogen cyanide, a blood agent, occurs as a highly flammable liquid or vapor that is lighter than air (vapor density 0.94) and has an extremely high vapor pressure at 68°F (20°C) (over 650mm mercury).

Severe cyanide poisoning causes rapid unconsciousness, convulsions, arrested respiration, and death within 10 minutes if untreated. With prompt medical attention, any victim who still has good circulation has a promising chance of survival.

Many cyanide compounds, including hydrogen cyanide, are used widely by industry. Two other examples of blood agents used by industry are cyanogen chloride and arsine. Both are more than twice as heavy as air and are gases at room temperature (68°F). Cyanogen chloride is nonflammable, while arsine is extremely flammable.

Choking agents are pulmonary poisons. These agents damage the tissue of the lungs causing pulmonary edema (the filling of the lungs with fluid). Because casualties choke, just as if drowning, the symptoms are sometimes called "dry-land drowning." Examples of choking agents are chlorine, phosgene, ammonia, and other industrial chemicals. They are all gases and must be inhaled to cause harm. All have high vapor densities and are extremely toxic.

Irritant agents customarily are employed for riot control activities. They are relatively common and easy to obtain. Common types are Mace (CN), tear gas, and pepper spray. The symptoms they cause (eye, skin, and mucus membrane irritation) generally are nonpersistent and nonlethal. There have been cases, however, where people have died from irritant agents when they were used in high concentrations in a confined, poorly ventilated area. Butyric acid is also used as an irritant weapon.

Some **industrial chemicals** could be used as weapons by terrorists. Examples of such chemicals include sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen chloride, and many cyanide compounds.

Explosives

Of all agents, explosives are by far the top choice of terrorists. Explosives are used in approximately 70 percent of all terrorist incidents. They also can be used to disperse other B-NICE agents.

Experts refer to explosive agents as either high explosives or low explosives. A high explosive is a substance that detonates rapidly, producing enough force to create a shock wave and a large thermal discharge. Examples include dynamite, TNT, C-4, and RDX. A low explosive does not detonate (change form from a solid or liquid into a gas) rapidly enough to create a shock wave unless it is held in some kind of container (such as a pipe). Black powder is an example of a low explosive. Low explosives sometimes are used to detonate high explosives.

Terrorists often use improvised explosive devices, including vehicles, pipes, satchels, and others. When dealing with terrorist incidents where explosive agents are possible (or even probable), responders should keep in mind the time, distance, and shielding rules of protection (covered in more detail in Unit 5: Factors Influencing Strategic Decisions).

Armed Attack

Armed attack is a significant form of mechanical hazard. Armed attacks almost always target locations where large numbers of people congregate. These people may be civilians, racial or ethnic groups, or government employees. In some cases, emergency responders may become the target of an armed attack. Attacks may involve multiple scenarios and weapons. Historically, armed attacks have involved semi-automatic or fully-automatic weapons. Some terrorist weapons of choice include 9 mm semi-automatic pistols, 9 mm machine guns, and AK-47 type assault weapons. These incidents may be mobile, moving from location to location.

POTENTIAL HARM OF TERRORIST WEAPONS

The potential harm that can follow use of B-NICE weapons is referred to as TRACEM: Thermal, Radiation, Asphyxiation, Chemical, Etiological and Mechanical.

- Thermal hazard is the heat from fires, explosions, and some chemical reactions.
- Radiation refers to three types: alpha, beta, and gamma.
- Asphyxiation occurs when oxygen is removed from an area (by means such as displacement by a heavier gas) or when an agent disrupts the body's ability to metabolize oxygen.
- Chemical hazards are nonbiological toxic or corrosive substances.
- Etiological refers to biological organisms (bacteria and viruses) and organic toxins which can harm humans.
- Mechanical hazards are physical objects (bullets, collapsing structure) or forces (the shock wave from an explosion) that cause injury.

In addition to the physical harm of a WMD, the potential for psychological harm is considerable. Few words conjure more fear than "nerve gas," or "radioactivity," "anthrax," and the like. The fear of these agents is warranted, but irrational fears and behavior often accompany the valid, real concerns.

Responders not only must deal with the memory of the horrible sights of WMD effects, but they must worry about the long-term effects on their

own bodies. Survivors are burdened with guilt, as well as the fear of physical effects. From those marginally exposed, to the "worried well," the community as a whole is emotionally affected by a WMD event. Public trust and confidence in certain locations, institutions, and industries may never return. A community-wide feeling of malaise may accompany such incidents. Many cases are cited about rebounding communities and healthful, therapeutic activities, but the realities of depression, suicides, and substance abuse inevitably follow such events.

SUMMARY

To prepare for, defend against, and respond to terrorist incidents properly, responders need to be knowledgeable of terrorists--their motivations, methods, and weapons of destruction.

Based upon what we have learned about the definition of terrorism, weapons used, and terrorist ideology, the following will be affected:

- response strategies;
- planning and implementation;
- documentation; and
- termination.

Activity 2.1

Strategies and Issues at Terrorist Events

Purpose


To begin the team development process and strategic thinking approach taught throughout the course.

Directions

Work in small groups. You will have 15 minutes to read the scenario and answer the questions on the answer form in the SM. Your group should concentrate on addressing the problem as it is presented. There is a time limit, just as there would be at an actual event.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

Plot Plan



Scenario

It's 1030 hours, Saturday, May 15. The wind is out of the east blowing to the west at 5 mph. Engine 4 (E4) is dispatched to a call for "trouble unknown." Upon arrival, E4 requests additional units to assist with 10 to 20 people down inside the Fulton Bank at 12650 U Street.

You're the Command Officer (Battalion Chief (BC) 43) responding to this alarm.

E4 reports that some people have started evacuating themselves to the bank's west parking lot (where E4 is located). They need assistance evacuating the customers and bank employees still inside.

E4 reports that they have opened the west doors for ventilation and have requested that the gas company come to the scene. They also have requested EMS and patient transportation. People are complaining of headaches and dizziness; some seem to be unconscious at their desks.

E4 reports an outdoor concert in the park across the street from the bank, and an art festival in the mall. Parked cars along 33rd Street are making access to the bank difficult. The concert noise also is causing a problem with hearing radio transmissions. 33rd Street has been closed for the concert.

Responding with E4 are Engines 5, 10, and 51, Trucks 5 and 6, each staffed with one officer and 3 firefighters, and BC 43 (you). In addition, Medics 3, 8, and 12 are responding, each staffed with 2 paramedics.

Instructions

1. List considerations for unit placement.

2. List considerations for Command Post (CP) placement.

3. Estimate potential hazards.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

4. Identify appropriate strategies.

5. Request appropriate resources.

Notes

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers**
Student Manual

Unit 3: Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to identify and use appropriate recognition and identification tools needed by initial arriving Command Officers at a terrorist incident.

Enabling Objectives

- Identify and explain the characteristics and indicators available to the arriving Command Officer to detect the potential existence of a terrorist incident.
 - Describe the importance of onscene indicators to strategic decisionmaking.
-

INTRODUCTION

Response to an incident of terrorism will place great demands on all organizations involved. Today's Incident Commander (IC) must be prepared for this type of event and understand the additional impact that it presents. Many of our proven response procedures will assist in allowing the IC to make maximum use of available resources in an effective and efficient way.

This unit will assist the Command Officer in identifying the additional impact on an organization when confronted with a terrorist event. It also will present strategies for dealing with these events and minimizing the impact on all available resources.

Terrorist events almost certainly will require the IC to interact with many agencies and "key players." Some of these agencies are based locally, while others arrive with Federal assistance. The earlier that IC's recognize that they are operating at a terrorist event, the easier it will be to plan for, and interact with, these agencies.

By being aware of all of the indicators of a potential terrorist event, emergency responders should be able to better plan the response to such events. Planning for such a response is covered in Unit 4: Planning and Intelligence Gathering.

PREINCIDENT RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION

Recognition and identification of potential terrorist incidents, as with many other types of incidents, begins before the alarm sounds. At the most basic level, the identification of possible target hazards is a critical step. IC's must become more vigilant to situations or occurrences that could indicate a potential terrorist incident. In that respect, response to terrorism is very similar to haz mat response in that responders must use basic indicators to help identify potential incident types.

Emergency operators and dispatchers are another key to early recognition and identification. The entire dispatch system must be aware of the potential problem of terrorism and use screening questions to gather as much information as possible about potential terrorist incidents, just as with a haz mat incident. These screening protocols must include identification of target hazards, types of incident events, and nature of injuries, in conjunction with the occupancy and location of the incident. Such information must be **communicated to responders** so they are made aware of the need to exercise caution.

Following are three examples of situations, occupancies, and locations that should cue the dispatch system to consider the possibility of terrorism:

1. A report of multiple victims having seizures in a public location such as a shopping mall, transportation hub, etc.
2. A report of multiple people down in an office building, assembly occupancy, etc.
3. A reported explosion at a movie theater, department store, office building, government building, etc.

This is not to imply that every incident described above is definitely a terrorist incident. Rather, such situations should be considered indicators of an **unusual situation** that requires additional caution and investigation before decisive action.

RECOGNITION TOOLS

Occupancy/Location

The occupancy and location of the incident or target hazard are simple indicators of potential terrorist incidents. They include

- symbolic and historic targets (e.g., B'nai B'rith, Liberty Bell, Veterans of Foreign Wars, etc.);
- government buildings (e.g., city hall, public safety buildings, courts, State and Federal agency offices, residence of a government official, etc.);
- assembly occupancies (e.g., offices, shopping malls, schools, etc.);
- places of worship (e.g., churches, mosques, temples, synagogues, etc.);
- controversial occupancies (e.g., fur stores, animal labs, abortion clinics, religious organizations, etc.);
- infrastructure locations (e.g., transportation terminals and hubs, power stations, communication systems, etc.); and
- chemical production, handling or storage facilities (e.g., SARA Title III planning facilities, bulk storage facilities, pipelines, etc.).

Types of Events

The second recognition and identification tool is the **type** of emergency event. This is not to imply that every event listed is always a terrorist

incident; rather, the type of event can provide early warning of the potential. Such events include the following:

- explosions or incendiary fires involving target hazard occupancies and locations of chemical containers;
- incidents involving firearms, especially when mass casualties are involved; and
- nontrauma, mass casualty, or mass fatality incidents, especially at target hazard locations.

Timing of Events

The timing of an event also can provide a clue. Timing issues include the following:

- historically significant days or anniversaries (e.g., conviction or execution of terrorists, previous bombings, socially and politically significant dates, etc.);
- day of the week (e.g., a fire in a government office building that is closed for the weekend, a holiday, etc.); and
- time of day (e.g., fire in a government building at 0500 hours, etc.).

Onscene Situation

The exact occurrences on the scene can provide major clues for the IC. Such situations include the following:

- the unexplained sudden onset of mass illness or death;
- mass casualties with little or no trauma;
- unexplained vapor clouds, mists, or plumes;
- odd or unusual odors (e.g., garlic-like, fruity, onion-like, almond-like, hay, etc.);
- victims with unexplained skin, eye, and mucous membrane irritation and blistering;
- presence of containers, devices, sprayers, trucks that are out of place or in an odd location;
- containers or objects that may hide secondary devices;
- unusual fire behavior; and
- anything else that appears unusual.

Do not be daunted by an apparent lack of skilled staff available to advise you in a terrorist event, especially of a chemical or biological nature. You may have military-trained chemical or biological specialists in your community or even in your department. The mass illness may be difficult

to identify, at least initially. For example, if a biological agent were used, it might take days for victims to become symptomatic. When they do, hospital emergency rooms, private medical offices, and EMS call volume may be the first indicator of a problem. Multiple semiconscious or unconscious victims at an intersection in the heart of town or at the bus terminal would be another indicator.

Another point that deserves mention is the existence of mass casualties or fatalities with little or no trauma. This should be a give-away that something is not right. About the only cause of such a situation is some type of chemical exposure. It will be almost impossible to tell immediately whether the chemical release was accidental, intentional, or an act of terrorism. However, the fact remains that it is a potential terrorist incident.

Victims exposed to chemicals can become unconscious rapidly and thus may receive fall-type trauma. Trauma also could result from the chemical inducement of seizures; however, the ancillary damage is not present. For example, in the Tokyo Sarin attack, some reports indicated that victims had blood coming from their mouths, noses, and ears. This was not the result of the chemical exposure but rather of the fall and seizure activities.

SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR RESPONDERS

The safety and security of responding personnel is a responsibility shared by all who respond to terrorist incidents. Responders who become victims only add to the confusion and reduce the effectiveness of the response agencies. At the same time, they decrease the number of resources available for incident mitigation. The effectiveness of one responding unit is diminished for each firefighter who is injured.

The use of secondary devices to injure or kill responders is becoming more prevalent in terrorist incidents. Personnel should be aware of this, as well as a possible secondary attack, during incidents involving terrorism.

Secondary devices may be placed on victims for detonation/dissemination (i.e., weapon, bomb) as responders approach. This situation requires law enforcement intervention, and fire or EMS personnel should withdraw from the area and allow law enforcement to handle the situation.

Responders may, in fact, be the intended targets. Secondary devices have been used to target fire, EMS, and law enforcement responders specifically. Telephone bomb threats may include a time of detonation or release. This may be a ruse to draw responders into a specific area with the intent of an early release or detonation. The Command Officer must be aware of this possibility when making tactical assignments.

Terrorists have been known to become familiar with the operation of the local response community. They may observe our operations, listen to our radio transmissions, and may even have copies of our operational manuals. Many departments post operational information on the Internet/Intranet. This information is obtained easily by terrorists or others who intend to inflict harm. Consider limiting the posting of and access to such information.

Terrorists also may disguise themselves as responders, doctors, nurses, and EMS personnel. All unknown persons should be treated as potential perpetrators regardless of age, gender, or dress. Terrorists have been known to use young children and women to deliver or detonate secondary devices.

Rapid evacuation of victims, with limited treatment in the high hazard area, may be the best way to minimize the potential risk to response personnel. However, the scene may not be entirely risk free before incident mitigation or patient treatment begins. Command Officers should conduct a hazard and risk assessment prior to initiating any action.

Place the safety and security of personnel before the safety and security of vehicles and equipment. Personnel may become separated from their vehicle. If responding personnel or their vehicle(s) come under attack, responders should take action to protect themselves before protecting the vehicle.

Some safety actions to be considered include

- Approach from upwind of the reported area.
- Use protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA); cover as much skin surface as possible.
- If the incident is inside, evacuate victims while keeping responder exposure to a minimum.

The response to terrorist incidents may require extraordinary and unusual measures to protect responders. This may include fire and EMS personnel wearing bulletproof vests or flak jackets. It may mean that **all** personnel inside the scene perimeter are equipped with SCBA, a canister mask, or a respirator. Immediately securing the scene perimeter is critical to increasing personnel safety and security.

Be aware of the following signs of chemical agent use:

- Dead wildlife in the vicinity.

- Lack of insect life.
- Numerous individuals with blisters or rashes.
- Mass casualties: people exhibiting unexplained health problems, ranging from nausea to difficulty breathing to death.
- Casualties distributed in a pattern that may be associated with agent dispersal.
- Illness confined to a specific geographic area; lower casualty rates indoors versus outdoors, or vice versa.
- Unusual liquid droplets, with no recent rain, which may be oily in nature.
- Trees, shrubs, or lawns that are dead with no recent drought.
- Unexplained odors.
- Low-lying vapors or clouds.
- Unusual metal debris, especially if it contains a liquid.

Be aware of the following signs of biological agent use:

- Unusual numbers of sick or dying people or animals. This may not be a good indicator, as symptoms may occur in minutes, hours, or days.
- Unscheduled or unusual spray being disseminated, especially at night.
- Abandoned spray devices.

CHALLENGES TO COMMAND

The initial establishment of Command at terrorist incidents will not differ from normal. The usual branches, groups, and divisions will be established. However, the IC and staff soon may be overwhelmed by the complexity of the situation. The need for a Unified Command will become apparent rapidly. Initially, there may be a joint Command Post (CP) with law enforcement and other agencies present.

Operational Locations

Command personnel at terrorist incidents should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices targeted at the CP and at emergency responders. They should ensure that all responders--fire, EMS, and law enforcement--are made aware of this possibility.

The Atlanta bombing in January 1997, is an example of this. The first units were dispatched to a transformer explosion. One of the responders recognized that a bomb, not a transformer explosion, had caused the incident. The building involved housed a family planning center, along with other doctors' offices. The explosion decimated the waiting room and an operating room and took out the building's outer wall. Almost an hour after the initial dispatch, as the fire chief was being briefed by a battalion chief, a second explosion occurred. The briefing was at the CP that was set up approximately 100 feet from the building.

The second explosion occurred 20 feet from the CP. Six people were injured, including two civilians, one firefighter, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) agent, and an ambulance attendant. Most of the personnel in the CP were shielded by two civilian vehicles.

Terrorists may study a department's normal operating procedures in an attempt to inflict damage on as many responders as possible. Fire departments are predictable in their actions. This is done by design, but what normally works in our favor may work against us in terrorist situations.

Multiple Events

Terrorists may spend a great deal of time selecting their target. Much like a Command Officer doing a sizeup, a terrorist will preplan the attack for maximum effect. The IC quite possibly will be presented with a situation that will stress his/her available resources. This may be due to one large event or a series of smaller events. These events may be designed simply to spread out resources, or may be designed to tie up responders.

IC's must be prepared to adjust their plans constantly to meet these challenges. One key element in dealing effectively with resource depletion is to call early on for assistance. Planning and making agreements with mutual-aid companies must be conducted before any event.

Impact of the Media

At most large or complex incidents the IC or other Command Officers with active roles in the event do not have the time to discuss it with the media. Trying to manage an active event and dealing with the news media at the same time may result in doing both poorly.

Failure to provide a contact point for the media may force reporters to go to secondary sources to obtain information. These other sources may be fire personnel who know very few facts about the incident. Or they may be civilians who are affected emotionally by the event and present a biased opinion of what occurred. Bystanders who represent themselves as eyewitnesses also can offer versions of the incident that are not entirely accurate.

However, strategic Command Officers must recognize that terrorism-related incidents are subject to intense media attention and plan accordingly. Early and regular press briefings should be part of the strategic planning process. It is also one best delegated quickly to dedicated, experienced emergency services public information officers. An early strategic decision of great impact is to coordinate all media information through one source. This is especially critical in multi-agency response to such an emotionally charged issue as terrorism.

As the incident escalates, a Joint Information Center (JIC) staffed by FEMA and other response personnel will be established. Local strategic commanders should anticipate this and coordinate public information releases through and with the JIC.

Crime Scene Operations

Response to an act of terrorism is also a response to a crime scene. While fire departments routinely respond to the scene of a crime (arson, assault, and traffic accidents), response to terrorist activity will place additional concerns on the IC.

IC's must be aware of the needs of law enforcement when conducting operations. Often successful prosecution of the perpetrators will depend on the amount and type of physical evidence available to the evidence technician. Everything at the scene is potential evidence and should be handled only for life safety measures. Fire and emergency responses should be documented early and throughout the incident.

Terrorist events may be spread over a large area. The type of attack and the agent used generally will dictate the size of the crime scene. IC's must call for assistance early on to address the needs to isolate and deny entry, evacuation, and scene security and preservation.

The scene should be secured as rapidly and safely as possible. Entry should be permitted only for responders possessing valid identification. For long-term incidents, an incident-specific badging process should be initiated. The means of restricting entry and mandatory identification should be specified in the response plan.

Effect on Local Health Care Systems

Certain types of terrorist events will be visible to the first responder. Response to a bombing or an incendiary device is very obvious. The IC will be able to recognize these events and plan and deploy units effectively. Other types of events may be noticed by other elements of local resources without the knowledge of the fire department.

The local health department may identify the intentional release of a biological agent. This type of event will inundate the health care facilities and the EMS service. This is especially true if no warning is received or no visible indicators are found. Victims of these types of attacks will not be sick (due to the agent) on the scene. The incubation period for biological agents can be immediate or extend from a few hours to a few days.

Strategic Commanders must recognize early, and plan accordingly, for the massive impact of a large-scale WMD event on the local/regional hospital system. Predisaster planning is a necessity for interaction with the medical community. In the courses *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Tactical Considerations* (ERT:TC), and *Emergency Response to Terrorism: Advanced Tactical Management* (ERT:ATM), issues of patient decontamination, treatment, transport, and disposition are addressed. The tactical efforts must be supported by strategic planning and execution. Early activation of disaster plans, coordination of efforts between local, regional, and Federal medical assets, hospital (and casualty collection point) security, and interface with evidence processing are all essential activities of the strategic manager.

One of the most often overlooked areas of impact is that on the community mental health service. Terrorist events will affect members of the community who may not be involved directly in the event. Families of the responders and the responders themselves will be in need of specialized counseling and debriefing teams such as Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD).

Protective Systems

As responders we are familiar with, and have come to rely on, the fire detection and protective systems found in many structures. Items such as smoke detectors, sprinklers, standpipes, and smoke control devices are used every day to assist firefighters in combating situations in many buildings.

Remember that terrorists become very familiar with our operations. They use our predictable performance to their advantage, and make plans to limit our effectiveness. This includes deliberate attacks on the above-mentioned systems. Responders must plan for the possibility that water supply may be affected, and delay in notification may result.

Infrastructure

Attacks by terrorists on the infrastructure (water supply, roads, tunnels, bridges, etc.) is a possibility that all Command Officers must be aware of. Alternative routes or methods of reaching the reported incident scene must be developed. Planning also must incorporate the impact that the gridlock that will be created during these types of events. Attacks may occur on the command and control facilities of the local agencies. Terrorists may plan to disrupt the communications and dispatch capabilities of responders.

SUMMARY

Recognition and identification is an extremely important aspect of all types of emergency response, including terrorist incidents. Once it is recognized that the incident may be or is a terrorist incident, responders must have a strategic and tactical system under which to operate.

Terrorist events present the IC with a complex array of issues. Certain characteristics are unique to these types of events. Still others are part of the day-to-day issues faced by the IC. IC's must plan for those additional concerns during the preincident planning process and conduct exercises to evaluate their effectiveness.

The impact on a community faced with a terrorist event is far reaching. Long-term issues dealing with recovery will be present long after the emergency is over. The local response community must be prepared to deal with the increased demand placed on them during these types of events.

Activity 3.1

Defining Terrorist Incidents

Purpose

To read and analyze incident descriptions. Using the guidelines, to determine whether the incident could be classified as a terrorist event and to identify four challenges to Command.

Directions

1. The class will be divided into four groups.
2. Each group will read and review an assigned set of incident descriptions.
 - a. Group Readings 1 and 2.
 - b. Group Readings 3 and 4.
 - c. Group Readings 5 and 6.
 - d. Group Readings 7 and 8.
3. Read the descriptions and note the cues that might indicate a terrorist incident as you are arriving on the scene.
4. Identify four challenges to Command that are specific to the incident and develop initial plans to address these challenges.
5. Collate your answers on an easel pad.
6. A spokesperson should present a summary of your group's findings.

Reading 1

October--Police are probing the possible involvement of militant separatists in the derailment of an express train near Sunnyvale that killed 2 people and injured 35 others. Five tourists were among the wounded.

"We suspect it was the work of terrorists but no one has claimed responsibility," said Frances Kumar, the railway police officer, discussing the derailment that occurred near Sunnyvale, about 25 miles east of El Rimo.

The derailment of the first three sleeper coaches of the Frontier Mail, which was traveling from El Rimo to the holy city of Ameristar, occurred 3 hours after two anonymous calls were received that claimed credit for two bombs which exploded in a busy old quarter of the capital, wounding 24 people. It was not clear if the incidents were connected.

Survivors told police one car of the train was lying on its side. A police officer assigned to the investigation told reporters that the remains of a suspicious package were found near the site.

The three events occurred 16 hours apart, Kumar said. One bomb killed two passengers immediately and wounded the five tourists traveling together.

Police found detonators and timers in the home of a suspect in one of the incidents, and preliminary investigations showed RDX plastic explosives were used in the derailment.

Reading 2

October 18--A hidden cache of explosives detonated accidentally as it was being moved, killing three people and seriously injuring two. The blast in Junction City threw the body of one victim 200 feet and inflicted heavy damage on surrounding houses. All the casualties were reported to be immigrants from an unidentified country who were in town to attend religious services.

The *Daily News* originally said an antitank mine had exploded. But according to KSCS radio, a police investigation found that the blast happened as personnel were transferring 1,000 pounds of explosives from a truck into a house.

The radio report said the explosives detonated when a forklift activated a fuse.

The radio said the explosives were hidden in a nearby public building, and that the building occupant wanted to store them elsewhere.

The occupant was among the dead and the purpose of the cache wasn't immediately known.

Reading 3

October 17--Two men died in a shootout with police and a third man escaped following two bank robberies in Vancouver, Washington.

Police were investigating a pipe bomb explosion near a department store trash container when one person robbed a NationsBank at a mall. As officers responded, three or four suspects robbed a second bank.

While searching for the suspects, an officer spotted a Chrysler New Yorker that reportedly was linked to one robbery. During the chase, a person in the other car leaned out of a window and began firing, striking the patrol car in the hood and windshield. The officer was unhurt.

The chase ended when the New Yorker ran off a road and overturned. Three people got out of the car and started shooting and one threw an explosive device at officers. Two of the suspects were killed; the third remained at large.

Police said it was not known if the explosion was some sort of diversion for the robberies, nor did they say if the two robberies were connected.

Reading 4

October 27--A predawn fire damaged the sanctuary and shattered the windows of a Reformed Orthodox Church in Kirby Corner. Recently, the church had begun sponsoring refugee families fleeing violence in their homeland. The inscription "Hezbollah" was found on the church wall. There were no civilian injuries in the fire at the church, but three firefighters were taken to the hospital with heat- and smoke-related injuries.

Cathy Fisher, a police spokesperson, said one corner of the church was damaged and a natural gas line was severed. She called the damage "minor" but expressed concern about structural stability. The fire was centered in an office used to coordinate community outreach programs.

Fisher told *The Daily Sun* that police found the word "Hezbollah" spray-painted on an inside wall. Hezbollah is the name of an Iranian-backed terrorist organization operating in the Middle East and is now believed to have cells operating in this country.

Reading 5

October 30--An explosion occurred today in a British consulate building in New York City a day before the First Lady was scheduled to arrive in the city. No one was injured.

It was the second explosion this week in buildings owned or operated by foreign governments. An animal rights group and a committee of liability lawyers are participating in meetings at local hotels.

Earlier this month a man carrying a handgun and gym bag walked into the same building, warned everyone to leave, and committed suicide by detonating a bomb that he had strapped to his body. The local police and Secret Service were preparing to conduct the final sweep of the building when the explosion occurred. The gas company and public works are still investigating the source of the explosion.

Reading 6

September 4--Ten people were taken to area hospitals complaining of headaches and nausea after shopping at the Brighton Mall. The mall was crowded with holiday shoppers when ambulance crews arrived for a reported medical emergency in the food court area.

Original reports of 3 people feeling ill soon escalated to 10. An additional 15 people reported to area hospitals by other means. First-arriving units reported that employees of the mall had reported an unknown odor to mall management. It was 1 hour after this first report that the first patrons reported ill effects. Police have been investigating complaints by mall officials of groups of gangs harassing mall patrons.

Reading 7

September 5--A Canadian legislator was killed in a building fire that is being labeled suspicious at this time.

The victim was Francois Gaston, 37, a member of Canada's national liberty party, who died when an incendiary device activated as he was placing food into his microwave oven. Neighbors used fire extinguishers to put out the flames and then pulled him from the home. Gaston was airlifted to LifeStar Hospital where initially officials described him as being badly burned and mangled but still clinging to life. He died about 3 hours later.

Gaston was well known in local government circles for introducing controversial issues to the docket during the last two legislative sessions. Recently he was working with local labor groups to introduce a living wage bill for all workers.

Reading 8

September 5--A massive power failure occurred today that forced the shutdown of the Municipal Rail Service. Two workers were reported to have been injured when electricity was inadvertently restored during the investigation of the power failure.

Power was lost to 50 percent of the system around 0700 hours when a computer-controlled switch failed to allow full activation of the electrical system. An attempt was made to switch to backup power, but the generators were down for routine maintenance.

This is the second time in the past year that Municipal Rail Service was forced to shut down the system. Last March a sudden power failure of the system forced a shutdown that lasted in excess of 14 hours. During that incident, 1 person was killed and 75 were injured during the evacuation process. That problem was thought to have been caused by a disgruntled worker who had sabotaged the main electronics on the F line.

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
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Unit 4: Planning and Intelligence Gathering

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to explain the importance of planning and intelligence gathering for a terrorist incident.

Enabling Objectives

- Describe the unique hurdles to planning for a terrorism incident.
 - Describe the basic components needed in a local plan.
 - Explain the importance of intelligence gathering prior to a terrorist incident.
-

INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO PLAN

Preparing an effective response to the consequences of terrorism begins with developing a comprehensive incident contingency plan. Terrorist events where weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been used likely will require a multi-level government response. For the response to be effective, plans must be in place to guide responders in managing the incident. The plan should address command and control challenges that likely will confront fire and EMS personnel during a large-scale criminal event. To build the foundation for such a task, planners first must recognize and evaluate possible threats to the community. Command Officers then would match potential consequences with existing response capabilities. If there appear to be shortfalls between mitigating consequences and local capabilities, then additional specialized planning may be required or existing plans evaluated.

Although the preplanning phase traditionally may not be the responsibility of the Command Officer, the process and its results have a significant impact on operational readiness and the ability to respond to acts of terrorism effectively and, even more importantly, safely. Planning for a response to the consequences of terrorism should consider the following issues.

- Terrorism creates challenges to the fire service that usually are beyond normal operational protocols, tactical considerations, and planning requirements.
- Multiple agencies from Federal, State, and local levels respond to incidents involving terrorism. These agencies may have statutory authority that could influence operational considerations. This raises issues that should be identified, explored, and addressed before an incident occurs.
- Criminal acts that incorporate weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) may generate large-scale incidents involving multiple casualties/fatalities to both civilians and responders.
- Current fire and emergency services tactical operations and equipment may need to be refined to manage a terrorist incident adequately and effectively.
- Existing protocols for sharing information (intelligence) between fire and emergency services and law enforcement may be insufficient to plan effectively for a terrorist event.
- Responders may be the intended target in a terrorist event.

- Occupancies identified as routine fire/EMS target hazards may not be considered prime targets by terrorists. Existing fire service target hazard plans may fail to identify all potential targets available and appealing to the terrorist.
- Target hazard planning often limits its focus to one occupancy, a complex, a location, or, at the most, several city blocks. Weapons of mass destruction have the potential to affect entire communities or regions.
- A Unified Command eventually will be established and activated as the organizational framework within which representatives of local, State, and Federal agencies will operate. This is a concern of the Command Officer in that he/she must be aware of the process and should train to be familiar with its use.
- Identifying critical systems/facilities within the community, assessing their vulnerability to terrorist actions, and identifying mitigation and response capabilities.
- Assessing local and regional resource capabilities in the context of potential terrorist tactics.
- Developing protective actions for response personnel, as well as the general population at risk, to follow in responding to a suspected or actual terrorist event involving a variety of tactics.
- Providing guidance for potential terrorist targets to follow in assessing their vulnerability to such events as well as developing mitigation strategies and response capabilities.
- Coordinating and integrating planning efforts of critical public and private capabilities and facilities to ensure effective response to, recovery from, and mitigation of, terrorist attacks.
- Enhancing and broadening local and regional capabilities by developing a training program that integrates local, State, and Federal resources.
- Ensuring local and regional capability to address effectively mass casualty and fatality incidents involving both uncontaminated and contaminated victims.

- Developing the necessary decontamination, contamination containment, and monitoring procedures to ensure the safety of response personnel, the evacuated population, and the general public in situations involving biological, nuclear/radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive agents.
- Ensuring that mutual-aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions are established to augment local resources.
- Developing the necessary prescribed announcements with the public information office regarding the appropriate protective actions for various terrorist tactics and situations that may confront the jurisdiction.

Although terrorist actions most often occur with little or no warning, in some situations the jurisdiction, target facility, or individual(s) may receive notice of terrorist actions just before to the event occurs. To capitalize on any notice that may be received, plans developed for responding to terrorist events should ensure that:

- Appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies that have the expertise in, and resources and responsibility for, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from such events are notified.
- The public is notified of the threat, the necessary protective actions are taken in the context of the anticipated terrorist event, and the at-risk population is advised of these protective actions.
- Resources are staged out of harm's way and in areas where they can be mobilized and used effectively.

DESIGNING THE PLAN

In order to encompass the full range of possibilities and dangers associated with acts of terrorism, the design of the plan should build on a **graduated** response that incorporates a broad-based, multihazards approach. This will allow responders to select the best response objectives for the incident at hand. The concept of a **graduated** response agrees with incident management principles. As the incident grows in magnitude, the level of response increases to meet the demands of the incident. Fundamentally, by implementing a multihazards approach, responders can function within the dynamic environment of a terrorist incident, safely adjusting to the challenges of unstable conditions. The framework to support incident management and task-level operations will be constructed by the local emergency response organization. Remember that the local structure will

be in place from the initial stages of the incident until well into the recovery phase. The planning effort should incorporate "intelligent" information with hazard and risk analysis in order to identify response needs and support resource management.

To develop a complete response package, planners must realize that acts of terrorism are likely to overwhelm local response capabilities as well as State resources. Historically, such incidents have generated response from all levels of government. The success of the response will depend on how well these resources can be coordinated and integrated to form a unified response effort. Lines of authority must be identified and functional responsibilities need to be clear to all responders.

COMPONENTS OF THE PLAN

Consider the following elements:

- risk analysis;
- development;
- implementation;
- evaluation; and
- review/revision.

In addition to the above, the following issues should be included

- interfacing with the local disaster plan;
- interfacing with the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) plan;
- identifying the lead agencies for every potential incident in the community;
- identifying all terrorism target hazards and preplans for each.

As with any preparedness initiative, the planning process for emergency response to criminal events (terrorism) must include several components. Development of a plan begins with recognizing hazards associated with a type of event, the degree of exposure to the same type event (vulnerability), and risk assessment for personnel. These components should be considered even with existing emergency operations plans, since revision may be warranted. Once the analytical phase is complete, the plan can be developed further and put into a written plan. This may include writing the plan from scratch or revising existing plans. Finally, evaluate the effectiveness of the written plan. To fully assess the effectiveness of the planning effort, each component should be implemented as designed. Once the plan is field tested, revisions can be made to correct any shortfalls identified. As part of the evaluation phase,

planners should identify methods to keep the plan current for the community's needs.

Standard Operating Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines

Fire and EMS services operate under various forms of governmental regulations and authority. The development of Standard Operating Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines (SOP's/SOG's) should take into consideration the governing rules and regulations of the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) over the department. It may be a good idea to address within the SOP's/SOG's specific collection and handling information concerning terrorist-related incidents.

As part of standard procedures, the use of clear text should be considered when communicating orders in response to acts of terrorism. Clear text will provide for effective communications and reduce the potential for misunderstanding when multiple jurisdictions and agencies are involved. Remember that terrorists, the media, and others may be monitoring the communications.

PREPLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Unknown Terrorist Incident

Responding to what is first reported to be a "standard" emergency call, then is recognized--by incident site outward warning signs/indicators or by updated dispatch information en route--to be an actual terrorist act, requires the initiation of preplanned actions to maximize responder safety and survivability. Preplanning and an effective training program are the best tools in preparing for "no notice" terrorist-related incidents and safe movement to the actual incident site.

Known Terrorist Incident

Responding to known acts of terrorism affords the responder an opportunity to initiate preplanned security-related response actions that should include law enforcement participation in all response phases of operations. Knowing that the environment for the response is hostile allows responders to operate at a much higher state of situational awareness when they move in, which significantly enhances responder survivability and minimizes potential losses.

Considerations

Terrorist response planning is conducted to identify and correct organizational and individual responder shortfalls or weaknesses in responding to acts of terrorism. A number of different perspectives or approaches can be adopted in planning. The planning should include all terrorism response issues, including security, personnel, equipment, organizational structure, command and control, interagency relationships, and training-related capabilities and vulnerabilities in responding to acts of terrorism effectively and safely. The assistance of law enforcement is necessary to conduct proper planning as it pertains to security-related issues, particularly in the following areas:

- incident site operations;
- preplanned response routes (primary and secondary);
- command and control sites;
- improvised explosive device (IED) awareness training;
- secondary explosive device/booby trap awareness training;
- multiple incident site operations considerations;
- preplanned and proposed Staging Areas;
- communications plans (primary and secondary);
- medical operations;
- medical receiving facilities;
- casualty collection points;
- mortuary facilities (fixed and temporary);
- evacuation sites;
- personnel and equipment resources;
- resources for resupply;
- security resources;
- mass casualty response resources (transportation, medical, command and control);
- responder knowledge of biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive (B-NICE) threat outward warning signs;
- responder self-protection measures training.

INTELLIGENCE

The fire service plays an important role as first responders to incidents involving terrorism. Because of this, it is imperative that fire service agencies recognize the nature and scope of the risks associated with criminal activity that involves WMD's. To appreciate these dangers and manage a terrorist incident effectively, first responders must plan ahead using all available information and resources.

The time and attention the fire service has invested over many years in preincident planning has proved invaluable during emergency operations. Effective scene control, safety, and management usually fail without adequate planning. Responders must take advantage of experience gained through routine preincident planning and apply the same techniques to counterterrorism initiatives.

First, we must recognize the need to plan by being involved in or performing a risk analysis of the community. This should be a joint effort between the fire service and law enforcement officials, and should include identifying resources needed to achieve anticipated tactical objectives and developing linkages between functional resources and expected responsibilities. A multiagency response plan should include local, State, and Federal assets, and identify how those assets will be used in response.

All responders should understand that information sharing (intelligence) is a vital component of the planning effort. The availability of credible information and the effective dissemination of that information is likely to determine the success or failure of preincident planning for acts of terrorism and confronting the consequences of weapons of mass destruction. Fire and EMS organizations must develop procedures that ensure security of intelligence received from law enforcement agencies. They also must develop mechanisms to ensure opportunities for effective planning. To be effective, the information collected must be

- very specific and detailed;
- constantly revised to reflect new developments; and
- credible, coming from reliable sources such as law enforcement and/or military agencies.

Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are tasked with maintaining a watch for terrorist activity. Traditionally, the CIA has been known for its role in non-proliferation and counterterrorism issues on a worldwide scale. The FBI, on the other hand, takes the lead for investigating both domestic and international terrorism. A potential source for information and/or intelligence is the FBI's local field office which handles WMD response.

Once a plan has been developed, it must be exercised and evaluated. Revision of the plan is an important part of the process and must be continuous. Although Command Officers may not be involved directly in this process, it is incumbent upon them to become familiar with the process and share the information with their subordinates.

IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

At most large or complex incidents the IC or other Command Officers with active roles in the event will be hard pressed to interact with the media. However, media interface is a primary non-tactical consideration.

The best way to deal with the news media at the scene of a terrorist event is to provide a readily available, identifiable spokesperson with whom they can interface.

Assigning a qualified Information Officer (IO) normally is the best approach to serve the needs of the media at emergency incidents. It also may be wise to designate another person as a backup in the event that the primary person is not available.

Failure to provide a contact point for the media may force them to go to secondary sources to obtain information. These other sources may be fire personnel who know very few facts about the incident. Or, they may be civilians who are affected emotionally by the event and present a biased opinion of what occurred. Bystanders who are identified as "eyewitnesses" also can offer versions of the incident that are not entirely correct.

The misinterpretations of emotionally distraught civilians or uninformed bystanders can damage the reputation of the fire department easily if erroneous statements are made and presented to the public. The accounts of secondary sources often are slanted because they lack familiarity with incident conditions and/or fire department activities.

Consider the establishment of a media pool. This will minimize the impact of the media on operations. One of the best methods of dealing with the press, when time and conditions permit, is to issue a press release. This gets the same information out to everyone and minimizes speculation or individual interpretation about the event. The press release should be issued by the IC or by the IO, who reports directly to the IC.

SUMMARY

Effective scene safety and management likely will fail without adequate planning. Key steps include performing a risk analysis of the community and identifying potential resource needs to achieve anticipated tactical objectives and develop linkages between functional resources and expected responsibilities. Resources should include local, State, and Federal assets and identification of how those assets will be used in the response, i.e., emergency operations plans for large-scale disasters.

Information sharing (intelligence) is a vital component of the planning effort.

Fire and EMS organizations should exercise and evaluate the IAP annually.

Activity 4.1

Anticipating Terrorist Targets

Purpose

To use an assessment instrument developed for this program to begin the planning process.

Directions

1. Your instructor will divide the class into four groups.
2. You will identify and then nominate a likely terrorist target in your community.
3. You will rate the target hazards using the NFPA life safety criteria.
4. Your group then must reach consensus on four target hazards that represent a variety of occupancies.
5. Your group will use the process to rate each and list the rating on an easel pad.
6. Your group will use the Terrorism Risk Value (TRV) process, as developed by NFA, to determine if the relative risk changes and list on the easel pad.

Note: The higher the number the greater the risk.

7. Your group will select a spokesperson to present its findings to the class.

Activity 4.1 (cont'd)
Categories and Values

A. Occupancy (per NFPA 13)

Light Hazard	1
Ordinary Hazard	2
Extra Hazard	3

B. Size of Facility (sq. ft.)

Less than 20,000	1
20,000 to 49,999	2
50,000 plus	3

C. People exposed

9 or fewer	1
10 to 25	2
26 to 100	3
101 to 250	4
251 plus	5

D. Life Hazard (per NFPA 101)

Unusual	1
Storage	2
Industrial	3
Business	4
Mercantile	5
Detention/Correction	6
Health Care	7
Residential	8
Educational	9
Assembly	10

E. Terrorism Risk Value

Category 1	3
Category 2	6
Category 3	9
Category 4	12

**Occupancy Definitions,
Category A (per NFPA 13)**

Materials excerpted from NFPA #13
Pages 13-6, 13-59, 13-60

1. Light Hazard Occupancies

Light Hazard. Occupancies or portions of other occupancies where the quantity and/or combustibility of contents is low and fires with relatively low rates of heat release are expected.

Light Hazard Occupancies include occupancies having conditions similar to:

Churches
Clubs
Eaves and overhangs, if combustible construction with
no combustibles beneath
Educational
Hospitals
Institutional
Libraries, except large stack rooms
Museums
Nursing or convalescent homes
Office, including data processing
Residential
Restaurant seating areas
Theaters and auditoriums excluding stages and
prosceniums
Unused attics

2. Ordinary Hazard Occupancies

Ordinary Hazard (Group 1). Occupancies or portions of other occupancies where combustibility is low, quantity of combustibles is moderate, stock piles of combustibles do not exceed 8 ft. (2.4 m) and fires with moderate rates of heat release are expected.

Ordinary Hazard Occupancies (Group 1) include occupancies having conditions similar to:

- Automobile parking garages
- Bakeries
- Beverage manufacturing
- Canneries
- Dairy products manufacturing and processing
- Electronic plants
- Glass and glass products manufacturing
- Laundries
- Restaurant service areas

Ordinary Hazard (Group 2). Occupancies or portions of other occupancies where quantity and combustibility of contents is moderate, stock piles do not exceed 12 ft. (3.7m) and fires with moderate rate of heat release are expected.

Ordinary Hazard Occupancies (Group 2) include occupancies having conditions similar to:

- Cereal mills
- Chemical plants--ordinary
- Cold storage warehouses
- Confectionery products
- Distilleries
- Leather goods manufacturing
- Libraries--large stack room areas
- Machine shops
- Metal working
- Mercantiles
- Printing and publishing
- Textile manufacturing
- Tobacco products manufacturing
- Wood product assembly

Ordinary Hazard (Group 3). Occupancies or portions of other occupancies where quantity and/or combustibility of contents is high, and fires of high rate of heat release are expected.

Ordinary Hazard Occupancies (Group 3) include occupancies having conditions similar to:

Feed mills

Paper and pulp mills

Paper process plants

Piers and wharves

Repair garages

Tire manufacturing

Warehouses (having moderate to higher combustibility of content, such as paper, household furniture, paint, general, whiskey, etc.)

Wood machining

3. Extra Hazard Occupancies

Extra Hazard. Occupancies or portions of other occupancies where quantity and combustibility of contents is very high, and flammable and combustible liquids, dust, lint or other materials are present, introducing the probability of rapidly developing fires with high rates of heat release.

Extra hazard occupancies involve a wide range of variables which may produce severe fires. The following shall be used to evaluate the severity of extra hazard occupancies:

Combustible hydraulic fluid use areas

Die casting

Metal extruding

Plywood and particle board manufacturing

Printing (using inks with below 100°F [37.8°C] flash points)

Rubber reclaiming, compounding, drying, milling, vulcanizing

Sawmills

Textile picking, opening, blending, ginning, carding, combining of cotton, synthetics, wood shoddy or burlap

Upholstering with plastic foams

Asphalt saturating building assemblies (where finished enclosure is present and has combustible interiors)

Open oil quenching

Solvent cleaning

Varnish and paint dipping

**Life Hazard Definitions,
Category D (per NFPA 101)**

Materials excerpted from NFPA #101
Pages 101-7 and 101-8

1. Unusual Structures

Occupancies in unusual structures include any building or structure that cannot be properly classified in any of the occupancy groups, either by reason of some function not encompassed or some unusual combination of functions necessary to the purpose of the building or structure.

2. Storage

Storage occupancies include all buildings or structures used primarily for the storage or sheltering of goods, merchandise, products, vehicles, or animals. Included in this occupancy group are

Barns
Bulk oil storage
Cold storage
Freight terminals
Grain elevators
Hangars
Parking garages
Stables
Truck and marine terminals
Warehouses

Minor storage incidental to another occupancy shall be treated as part of the other occupancy.

3. Industrial

Industrial occupancies include factories making products of all kinds and properties devoted to operations such as processing, assembling, mixing, packaging, finishing or decorating, and repairing, including, among others, the following:

College and university noninstructional laboratories
Creameries
Dry cleaning plants
Factories of all kinds
Gas plants
Laboratories
Laundries
Power plants
Pumping stations
Refineries
Sawmills
Smokehouses

4. Business

Business occupancies are those used for the transaction of business (other than that covered under Mercantile), for the keeping of accounts and records, and similar purposes. Included in this occupancy group are

City halls
Colleges and universities--instructional buildings, classrooms under 50 persons, and instructional laboratories
Courthouses
Dentist offices
Doctor offices
General offices
Outpatient clinics, ambulatory
Town halls

Minor office occupancy incidental to operations in another occupancy shall be considered as a part of the predominating occupancy and shall be subject to the provisions of this code applying to the predominating occupancy.

5. Mercantile

Mercantile occupancies include stores, markets, and other rooms, buildings, or structures for the display and sale of merchandise. Included in this occupancy group are

Auction rooms
Department stores
Drugstores
Shopping centers
Supermarkets

Minor merchandising operations in buildings predominantly of other occupancies, such as a newsstand in an office building, shall be subject to the exit requirement of the predominant occupancy.

6. Detention and Correctional Occupancies

Detention and Correctional occupancies (also known as Residential-Restrained Care Institutions) are those used to house occupants under some degree of restraint or security. Detention and correctional occupancies are occupied by persons who are mostly incapable of self-preservation because of security measures not under the occupants' control.

Detention and correctional occupancies include

Correctional centers
Detention centers
Jails
Penal institutions
Reformatories
Residential-restrained care

7. Health Care

Health care occupancies are those used for purposes such as medical or other treatment or care of persons suffering from physical or mental illness, disease or infirmity; and for the care of infants, convalescents, or infirm-aged persons. Health care occupancies provide sleeping facilities for the occupants or are occupied by persons who are mostly incapable of self-preservation because of age, physical or mental disability, or because of security measures not under the occupants' control.

Health care occupancies include

- (a) Custodial care facilities
 - Nurseries
 - Homes for the infirm aged
 - Institutions for the care of the developmentally disabled
- (b) Hospitals
- (c) Nursing homes

Health care occupancies also include

- (a) Ambulatory care facilities
- (b) Supervisory care facilities

8. Residential

Residential occupancies are those occupancies in which sleeping accommodations are provided for normal residential purposes and include all buildings designed to provide sleeping accommodations.

Exception: Those classified under Health Care or Detention and Correctional Occupancies.

Residential occupancies are treated separately in this Code in the following groups:

- (a) Apartments
- (b) Board and care facilities
- (c) Hotels
Motels
Dormitories
Orphanages for age 6 years and older
- (d) Lodging or rooming houses
- (e) One- and two-family dwellings

9. Educational

Educational occupancies include all buildings used for the gathering of groups of six or more persons for purposes of instruction. Educational occupancies include

Academies
Kindergartens
Nursery schools
Schools

Educational occupancies also include day-care facilities.

Other occupancies associated with educational institutions shall be in accordance with the appropriate parts of this Code.

Exception: Licensed day-care facilities shall include those of any capacity.

In cases where instruction is incidental to some other occupancy, the section of this Code governing such other occupancy shall apply.

10. Assembly

Assembly occupancies include, but are not limited to, all buildings or portions of buildings used for gathering together 50 or more persons for such purposes as deliberation, worship, entertainment, eating, drinking, amusement, or awaiting transportation. Assembly occupancies include

Armories
Assembly halls
Auditoriums
Bowling lanes
Churches
Club rooms
College and university classrooms, 50 persons and over
Conference rooms
Courtrooms
Dance halls
Drinking establishments
Exhibition halls
Gymnasiums
Libraries
Mortuary chapels
Motion picture theaters
Museums
Passenger stations and terminals of air, surface,
underground, and marine public transportation
facilities
Pool rooms
Recreation piers
Restaurants
Skating rinks
Theaters

Occupancy of any room or space for assembly purposes by fewer than 50 persons in a building of other occupancy and incidental to such other occupancy shall be classed as part of the other occupancy and subject to the provisions applicable thereto.

Terrorism Risk Value--Category E

Category 1.....Value 3

- Automobile parking garages (if stand alone)
- Warehouses (private sector; storing ordinary goods)
- Strip shopping centers
- Mercantiles (containing ordinary goods, supplies and services)
- Storage facilities containing ordinary goods and supplies
- Light industrial (dry cleaning, milk)
- Processing (laundries, etc.)
- Health care (nursing homes, care for aged or mentally ill occupants)
- Educational (kindergartens, nursery schools, etc.)
- Assemblies (recreation centers, small restaurants, private clubs, etc.)

Category 2.....Value 6

- Museums
- Assembly halls
- Dance halls
- Libraries
- High schools

Category 3.....Value 9

- Hotels
- Theaters
- Auditoriums
- Bowling lanes
- Exhibition halls
- Large restaurants

Category 4.....Value 12

- City halls
- Detention centers (jails, correctional facilities)
- Courthouses
- Large sport facilities (professional and college sports stadiums, etc.)
- Military installations
- Hospitals
- Colleges
- Petroleum or compressed gas storage facilities
- Power plants
- Doctors' offices (ob/gyn); Abortion clinics
- Shopping malls
- Mass transit facilities
- Churches
- Intermediate and high schools
- Research laboratories
- Dams
- Media (printed or electronic)
- Federal, State, or local office buildings or facilities
- Police and/or fire department headquarters communication centers
- Theme parks
- Celebrity residences
- Airport structures
- Embassies
- Occupancies occupied by controversial or high profile groups or individuals
- Special events (Super Bowl, Olympics, rallies, etc.)

**Preincident Planning Priority Matrix Worksheet
Target Hazard
(Example)**

Name MAIN STREET HOTEL
 Location 100 Main Street
 Occupancy Hotel

CATEGORY	STATUS	VALUE
Occupancy	<u>light hazard</u>	1
Size	<u>125,000 sq. ft.</u>	3
People Exposed	<u>average 500</u>	5
Life Hazard	<u>assembly</u>	10
Terrorism Risk Value	<u>hotels: category 3</u>	9
	TOTAL	28

COMMENTS: Hotel has convention/conference facilities.

**Preincident Planning Priority Matrix Worksheet
Target Hazard**

Name _____

Location _____

Occupancy _____

CATEGORY	STATUS	VALUE
Occupancy	_____	<input type="text"/>
Size	_____	<input type="text"/>
People Exposed	_____	<input type="text"/>
Life Hazard	_____	<input type="text"/>
Terrorism Risk Value	_____	<input type="text"/>
		TOTAL <input type="text"/>

COMMENTS:

**Preincident Planning Priority Matrix Worksheet
Target Hazard**

Name _____

Location _____

Occupancy _____

CATEGORY	STATUS	VALUE
----------	--------	-------

Occupancy	_____	
-----------	-------	--

Size	_____	
------	-------	--

People Exposed	_____	
----------------	-------	--

Life Hazard	_____	
-------------	-------	--

Terrorism Risk Value	_____	
----------------------	-------	--

TOTAL

COMMENTS:

**Preincident Planning Priority Matrix Worksheet
Target Hazard**

Name _____

Location _____

Occupancy _____

CATEGORY	STATUS	VALUE
Occupancy	_____	<input type="text"/>
Size	_____	<input type="text"/>
People Exposed	_____	<input type="text"/>
Life Hazard	_____	<input type="text"/>
Terrorism Risk Value	_____	<input type="text"/>
		TOTAL <input type="text"/>

COMMENTS:

**Preincident Planning Priority Matrix Worksheet
Target Hazard**

Name _____

Location _____

Occupancy _____

CATEGORY	STATUS	VALUE
----------	--------	-------

Occupancy	_____	<input type="text"/>
-----------	-------	----------------------

Size	_____	<input type="text"/>
------	-------	----------------------

People Exposed	_____	<input type="text"/>
----------------	-------	----------------------

Life Hazard	_____	<input type="text"/>
-------------	-------	----------------------

Terrorism Risk Value	_____	<input type="text"/>
----------------------	-------	----------------------

TOTAL		<input type="text"/>
-------	--	----------------------

COMMENTS:

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
Student Manual**

Unit 5: Factors Influencing Strategic Decisions

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to explain response strategies for terrorist incidents.

Enabling Objectives

- Explain the strategies that can be employed by the Command Officer during a terrorist incident.
 - Explain the tactical influences on strategies.
-

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Managing an act of terrorism will require the Command Officer to focus on a number of nontraditional, nonstandard strategies, tactics, and actions in order to manage the incident site effectively. Responding to acts of terrorism, regardless of the nature of the attack, will require all levels of response to look at response strategies from a very different perspective. Traditional response strategies will be applicable to a certain point, then will need to be broadened outside the standard box. At the least, response management and front-line personnel will need to become more attuned to the likelihood of becoming the primary target of terrorist events.

Terrorist-initiated incidents have inherent contrasts. One side is thinking "self preservation" and "community protection," while the opponent is thinking and planning "injury/death" and "destruction." This is an offense and a defense, or predator and prey situation. The routine fire is not strategically planned for a desired outcome, with the exception of some arson fires. A terrorist incident has been calculated into a master plan that anticipates the responders' actions. Someone has thought about what is going on and thought through the attack. If responders treat a planned event as if it were an unplanned one, they could be walking into an ambush. Responders always must be aware of secondary explosive devices.

Incident priorities at terrorist events are the same as those for routine incidents. Life safety is always paramount. This includes the safety and protection of responders, victims/patients, and civilians. Life safety is accomplished through:

- personal protection;
- scene security;
- isolating hazard areas;
- infrastructure protection;
- evacuation/protect-in-place;
- rescue;
- decontamination; and
- emergency medical care.

Incident stabilization is an attempt to bring the incident under control and reduce the chaos. Factors that will assist in incident stabilization include

- isolating the hazard area;
- controlling entrances and exits;
- controlling patients, contaminated/exposed victims;
- establishing outer perimeters;
- control of active disseminating devices;

- ventilation;
- control of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems;
- "render-safe" operations by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel;
- protecting exposures; and
- controlling utilities.

The last priority is property/environmental protection. While this is an important issue, both life safety and incident stabilization take precedence. The first two priorities probably will require considerable resources during the initial operations at a terrorist event. Along with evidence preservation, general property protection/conservation should not be overlooked.

While not normally considered an incident priority, resource management (i.e., implementation of an Action Plan (AP), implementation of Unified Command, and coordination of local, State, Federal, and private sector resources) during a large-scale multicasualty event remains a critical consideration for the Command Officer.

Managing an act of terrorism requires all levels of response to be looked at from a different perspective.

Terrorism Strategies		
Common	Hazardous Materials	EMS
Isolation Notification Information gathering Protection Security Rescue Evidence preservation Recovery/Termination	Fire control Leak control Spill control	Transportation Triage Treatment Responder health

Incident Risk Assessment

In order for any Incident Commander (IC) to make decisions at the scene he or she needs an effective decision process. This process includes obtaining the facts, weighing the facts to prioritize them, making a

decision, and evaluating the results. A classic five-step risk management includes the following:

1. Identify the risk(s).
2. Evaluate the risk(s).
3. Prioritize the risk(s).
4. Control the risk(s).
5. Monitor the risk(s).

Controlling the risk can be accomplished by using control measures, avoiding the risk all together, or transferring the risk to someone else (transferring handling of the incident).

Factors Influencing Strategies

Climate, physical properties, and the topography are critical considerations when choosing response strategies. Weather has more influence than any other single element at the emergency scene. The strategies and tactics of chemical warfare were first devised in the early 1900's. During World War I, the biggest problem with chemical agent delivery was controlling it. Weather forecasting capability was primitive at that time, which made forecasting unreliable. In many cases, the weather led to friendly casualties--the agent would be delivered, but would come back in an hour.

With today's technologies, weather forecasting is more accurate than ever before. Any hazardous material, because it is a chemical, always will follow the laws of physics, which means reacting to weather conditions. If commanders understand how an agent will react to each element of weather, they can anticipate what is happening or what is going to happen. If commanders understand which weather conditions promote survival, they can plan, select, and complete strategic and tactical decisions better.

Temperature

The law of kinetic energy states that the greater the temperature, the higher the vapor pressure will be in a hazardous chemical, which equates to more parts per million (ppm) released. The likelihood is great that an increase in ppm released will result in an increase in the number of victims.

Humidity

Hygroscopic agents are directly affected by humidity. Humidity adds weight to the atmosphere, which may displace a static product or agent and cause it to move. Humidity may affect vapor production of an agent and cause it to lie dormant until a general atmospheric change occurs. When condensing into fog, rain, or even dew, humidity may act as a camouflage, actually deceiving the investigator and keeping the agent from being discovered.

Inversion

Normally, temperatures decrease higher in the atmosphere. In an inversion, the normal action is reversed--the temperature is warmer higher in the atmosphere. At the altitude that the inversion ends, the temperature will resume its normal level. In an inversion, as a product rises, it will warm (law of kinetic energy) and expand; then at altitude, the sudden change in temperature creates condensation, potentially returning the agent to the ground. The higher the inversion, the farther the product is away from the ground and people; the higher the inversion, the greater the possibility of a more dramatic condensing, and the farther downrange the product may travel. Inversions at lower levels will act in reverse, and the product will have a greater possibility of staying in contact with the ground and people.

Cloud Cover

Cloud cover affects agents in more ways than the obvious one--the presence of humidity. Clouds have an effect on explosions because they reflect the shock wave and, in many cases, cause more damage. Clouds also prevent sunlight from reaching the ground. Some agents, such as halogens, break down in ultraviolet light. Chlorine, for example, being diatomically bonded, breaks down rapidly in sunlight. On a cloudy day, the agent can continue to cause damage, because it will not evaporate as quickly as it might on a cloudless day.

Forecasted Weather

Forecasted weather should be studied and monitored constantly. It is important to be able to anticipate agent/product movement. Present and forecasted weather should be assessed to anticipate potential changes that may affect the site. The weather also has a physical consequence on the responders, causing physical hazards or obstacles.

Controlled Environment

Controlled environment is the manipulation of weather conditions. Manipulation of the environment to achieve objectives is easiest to perform indoors, especially underground. Consider any of the mustard-type agents, which work better in a humid environment. If the body is perspiring, the mustard is more effective, in some cases even becoming lethal.

When possible, responders should change the environmental conditions to increase survivability for both responders and victims. This can include both environmental conditions within structures (i.e., HVAC) or outdoor use of appliances and vapor suppressants.

For example, if an incident occurs indoors and the agent/product works best at 70°F (21°C), make the inside as cold as possible and increase the humidity. The controlled climate will contribute to the survivability of the casualties.

In the event that the incident occurs outside where climate controls are absent, other actions will need to be considered. These actions could include applying water with master streams (i.e., several to elevate the humidity) or using master streams for producing artificial rain, which could, in many cases, protect persons and property and dissipate agents.

Vapor Density

Depending on the weapon used, vapor density (or the weight of the agent compared to an equal volume of air) will affect the strategy or tactic the Command Officer chooses.

For example, all nerve agents share a high vapor density when compared to air (vapor density = 1). The lightest nerve agent, Sarin (vapor density of 4.86), is almost five times heavier than air, while the heaviest, V agent (vapor density of 9.2), is over nine times heavier than air. These agents will sink to the ground rapidly unless there is some mechanical means to push them up (vaporizers, fans, etc.). They will tend to migrate to below-ground locations such as subways, basements, tunnels, etc. Nerve agents also display very low volatility, which means that they produce little vapor, as compared to other substances.

Vapor Pressure

Vapor pressure (or the rate at which the vapors are being produced by the agent) also affect the strategy or tactic employed. It is important to

remember that vapor pressure is dependent on temperature; vapor pressure increases as the temperature increases.

The table below provides a comparison of nerve agent volatility based on vapor pressure. The purpose of the table is to show the low volatility of the nerve agents by comparing them to other common substances. This is not intended to indicate that the substances cannot kill and kill readily. Rather, its intent is to show the low vapor-production rates of these nerve agents. The table is based on comparisons in controlled environments. It does not apply when an agent has been weaponized, mixed with other agents, etc.

Vapor Pressure Comparison (at 68°F (20°C))		
Substance	Vapor Pressure	
Ethyl ether Gasoline Acetone	440 mm of mercury 300 mm of mercury 180 mm of mercury	 High Volatility
Water Sarin (most volatile) Fuel oil #2 V Agent (least volatile)	25 mm of mercury 2.1 mm of mercury 1 mm of mercury 0.0007 mm of mercury	
		 Low Volatility

Example--Gasoline is 90 times more volatile than Sarin.

The vapor pressures listed above are for pure substances; if they are mixed with other substances or materials the vapor pressure may change.

Topography

Topographical features, both natural and manmade, can be exploited by terrorists to increase the effectiveness of their weapons. Shaping an explosion so the blast effect is more pronounced in a particular area, trapping responders in an area with few escape routes, removing cover that could provide protection, and combining topography with weather conditions either to increase the potency of a chemical or to prolong its contact with victims are some of the ways topography can be used to advantage. However, the same features that could be used by a terrorist could also be used by responders for shelter.

Natural characteristics include creeks, rivers, lakes, ponds, hills, and low places. Manmade characteristics include places such as highways, bridges, dead ends, and narrow streets. Buildings on either side of the

street, for example, could restrict vision and access or might cause drafts that help spread a chemical or biological agent. Topography, then, is any part of the landscape that could be used by terrorists to improve the effectiveness of their actions and decrease, if not halt, the response.

Choke points are places that restrict speed and efficient movement. They allow terrorists to take advantage of any responding agency at a choke point and exploit their position. Funneling is the manipulation of access or egress to direct responders to choke points, where an ambush or attack can be directed. Limiting access means choosing a location for the incident that has, by design, few streets or intersections. Limiting access also means limiting egress. Many industrial parks, for example, have limited access, which makes it easier to funnel and choke. Other such locations include dead-end streets.

The recognition of limiting characteristics as they present themselves is an important part of strategic decisionmaking. In effect, this recognition is the initial phase of reconnaissance. Responders should assess the situation constantly, and ask

- Are we being drawn into a trap (secondary explosion, armed attack, etc.)?
- Are we being forced to advance uphill?
- Are we being forced to park at the bottom of a hill?
- Is our approach being forced from downwind?
- Are terrain characteristics forcing us to deviate from our plan so that we are more vulnerable?
- Is this incident going according to someone else's plan?

Because the terrain and the environment play a crucial role in successful terrorist strategies, Command Officers need to be aware and aggressive in observing conditions and choosing response strategies and tactics that will decrease exposure, while focusing on accomplishing objectives.

TACTICAL INFLUENCES ON STRATEGIC DECISIONS

Isolation

Isolation includes establishing a large enough perimeter to isolate the incident site and deny entry, evaluating the positions of emergency

response units in relation to their escape routes, and instituting hazard control zones. When responding to a terrorist incident, security considerations must be a factor in determining the isolation perimeter.

Notification

Begin the appropriate notifications as prescribed by the local Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and Standard Operating Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines (SOP's/SOG's). If the incident is a suspected or confirmed terrorist event, request law enforcement security assistance and command representation at the Command Post (CP). Regard the incident scene as a potential crime scene and consider the implications of terrorist activities on emergency medical operations. If the incident involves multiple casualties, consider activating the local medical plan. Communication must be established among all involved response organizations and agencies. An Information Officer should be assigned to address media and community affairs issues.

Information Gathering

Identification

Identification as part of information gathering may include the weapon/agent(s) involved, magnitude and complexity of the event, and type of incident (terrorist or nonterrorist).

Identification of the weapon or agent involved is critical to safely and effectively manage the incident. Terrorists may employ common industrial chemicals or use more sophisticated chemical or biological agents. Visual cues may include suspicious containers or devices and large numbers of nontrauma related victims. Command Officers must rely on the activities of the first responders to recognize and gather appropriate information early in the event.

Terrorist incidents may vary in magnitude and complexity. Events may be localized and may have the potential to affect entire communities and/or regions. They may also produce large number of victims and will easily begin to deplete available resources. It is incumbent upon Command Officers to recognize their limitations (personnel and available resources) and request assistance from appropriate specialized sources. These types of events may be dynamic in nature as terrorists may employ attacks on multiple targets within a region or community.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is a survey and examination to gather information on the incident. Because of the nature of a terrorist attack, committing personnel to conduct the reconnaissance can be a dangerous strategy. However, it may provide significant information to the IC:

- victims;
- devices;
- hazards;
- affected and potentially affected areas;
- suspects (may still be on the scene and pose potential threat to responders); and
- witnesses.

Reconnaissance teams may be made up of personnel that represent varied disciplines, such as law enforcement, fire, EMS, EOD, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), other response agencies, and/or the private sector.

Protection

Protection concerns will include the standard response considerations and first responder protective measures, which include evacuation or sheltering in place. These decisions must be made quickly, but have normal strategic impact.

Self-Protection Measures

In order to avoid potential harm, responders should exercise **three general self-protection measures**.

1. **Time**--Responders should minimize the amount of time they are exposed to the hazard.
2. **Distance**--Responders should maximize their distance from the hazard.
3. **Shielding**--Responders should try to have some physical barrier (vehicles, buildings, chemical protective clothing, or personal protective equipment (PPE)) between themselves and the hazard.

The decision whether to evacuate those exposed, injured, or at risk of injury/exposure is one of the most difficult that a Strategic Commander ever will face. Whether the incident is outside or inside a structure, transportation facility, open space, or combination thereof, the IC must consider the most basic questions: Where are the people safest? Are they

in greater risk by moving out of an area? Are they better protected remaining where they are? Whether the location in question is an office building, subway car, bridge, sports arena, or shopping mall, the risk assessment process remains the same. Whether the agent is explosive, persistent irritant, or natural gas, the Strategic Commander must rely on expert advice from specialized sources as rapidly as possible.

Whatever the decision, the next question is "How do I accomplish this?" If it is evacuation, what resources will be required to access, move, transport, relocate, care for, and feed those evacuated? If it is protect-in-place, how is this communication-intensive task accomplished? In both cases, how and by what process is the protective action demobilized? Contingency planning and relevant training should have taken place prior to any such incident. The time to ask all these questions is **before** they come up on an incident.

Evacuate means move all people from a threatened area to a safer place. To perform an evacuation, there must be enough time for people to be warned, to get ready, and to leave an area. If there is enough time, evacuation is the best protective action. Begin evacuating people nearby and those outdoors in direct view of the scene. When additional help arrives, expand the area to be evacuated downwind and crosswind to at least the extent recommended in the *North American Emergency Response Guidebook* (NAERG). Even after people move to the distances recommended, they may not be completely safe from harm. They should not be permitted to congregate at such distances. Send evacuees to a definite place, by a specific route, far enough away so they will not have to be moved again if the wind shifts.

Shelter In-Place means people should seek shelter inside a building and remain inside until the danger passes. **Sheltering in-place is used when evacuating the public would cause greater risk than staying where they are, or when an evacuation cannot be performed.** Direct the people inside to **close all doors and windows** and to **shut off ventilating, heating and cooling systems.** In-place protection may not be the best option if (a) the vapors are flammable; (b) if it will take a long time for the gas to clear the area; or (c) if buildings cannot be closed tightly. Vehicles can offer some protection for a short period if the windows are closed and the ventilating systems are shut off. Vehicles are not as effective as buildings for in-place protection.

It is vital to maintain communications with competent persons inside the building so that they are advised about changing conditions. **Persons protected-in-place should be warned to stay far from windows** because of the danger from glass and projected metal fragments in a fire and/or explosion.

Decontamination

Decontamination traditionally is required for people, equipment, and potentially for the environment. The specific decontamination procedures will vary depending on the nature of the incident. However, every terrorist incident will require some degree of decontamination should mass casualties or mass fatalities be involved. This is due to the probability of bloodborne pathogens and the OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1030 that regulates this type of hazard. It is noteworthy that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) require the institution of bloodborne pathogen precautions at aircraft crash scenes.

Incidents involving nuclear, biological, and chemical agents will require some degree of decontamination to prevent cross-contamination or additional spread of the agent. Routinely, decontamination will be required for:

- properly protected responders;
- victims (including improperly protected responders);
- bodies and body parts;
- contaminated evidence; and
- contaminated equipment.

There are two phases of decontamination--gross and technical. Gross involves the removal of the largest (gross) amount of the contaminant. Residual contamination is always considered to be present. Technical decontamination involves more definitive cleaning.

Protected responders go through traditional decontamination involving gross decontamination of the PPE and then its removal. The PPE must either be disposed of or undergo secondary decontamination.

Gross victim decontamination involves the removal of clothing. In a terrorist incident, this presents an interesting challenge in that the victims' clothes may contain extensive evidence of the crime as well as contamination. Therefore, when this clothing is removed, it should be bagged, tagged, and a chain of custody established. Gross decontamination is followed by secondary decontamination that involves flushing the exposed skin with water, a detergent, or diluted household bleach solution (depending on the specific agent involved). After the flushing or washing is complete, the victims will require some type of body coverage. The exact nature of that body coverage will depend on whether the victim is ambulatory or nonambulatory.

Nonambulatory victim decontamination is a slow, laborious process. Under ideal conditions, with specific equipment and performed by well-trained personnel, a maximum of 20 victims can be decontaminated per hour, on each decon line. Ambulatory victims can be processed more rapidly, and far fewer personnel are required to accomplish the task.

In either case, consideration must be given to providing for victim modesty and operational efficiency. This will require some type of large enclosed structure such as an inflatable shelter or tent. The facility must be equipped with containments, water sprays or showers, decontamination solutions, towels, and so on. The larger the number of contaminated victims, the greater the magnitude of logistical requirements.

Overall Security

In order to promote effective and safe response to acts of terrorism, fire service SOP's/SOG's will need to be revised to reflect security-related issues that affect the response. SOP/SOG tactical guidelines in responding to acts of terrorism should include the assignment of law enforcement to provide protection to first responders, response routes, Staging Areas, and all facets of operational and support considerations. ERP's should include an annex that clearly identifies a "local" potential target site list. The target list should be developed in conjunction with local law enforcement. Once the target list is completed, a library of preplanned actions for each specific site can be developed and will serve as an effective response tool in the event of a terrorist related incident. Security precautionary measures and security-related preplans should be considered immediately and perhaps activated if an incident location is identified in the preplans as a locally established potential target.

Dispatchers must be trained to recognize the obvious warning signs of an act of terrorism, including the outward warning signs of each of the B-NICE terrorist agents. Recognizing the warning signs as information is gathered from the caller or, in some cases from the perpetrator, will greatly influence how initial responders approach the incident.

In response to what may be reported or perceived initially as a "routine" incident, responders will move forward without security in mind, and law enforcement support may not be considered. If the incident has been identified as an actual terrorist event, all responders must understand security-related self-protective measures and initiate SOP/SOG security protocols immediately. Law enforcement protocols routinely require a response to fire and emergency service calls regardless of whether an act of terrorism has taken place. Law enforcement services include crowd

control, isolation of the incident, and, in some cases, security as it pertains to the actual incident.

Command Officer's security considerations include

- Command Post (CP);
- Staging Areas;
- evacuation centers;
- communication centers;
- public safety infrastructure; and
- other operational areas.

Rescue

Rescue as a strategy is applicable at a terrorist incident because of the possibility of a high number of casualties. This strategy exposes the entry team to the greatest danger. All the tactical considerations should be studied and a risk/benefit analysis performed to ensure success of the strategy and removal of the greatest number of casualties.

Rescue should be effected as rapidly as possible without loss of rescuers. Because this strategy directly affects life, its priority will be paramount. This is even more apparent when the casualties are responders. A terrorist attack may have been planned to harm responders in order to force other responders to try to effect rescue. The more apparent it becomes that a terrorist attack is unfolding, the more cautious and carefully planned the rescue tactical considerations will need to be. The risk entailed by the rescue team will need to be assessed as acceptable or unacceptable, then compared to objectives. Will the protective measures overcome the hazards and the physical and topographical conditions, and is the risk worth the success of the objective?

The first hurdle in the strategy of rescue is rescue team development. Rescue teams should be trained and experienced in specialized rescue techniques and be able to work and make decisions independently. Teams may be made up of personnel from different disciplines.

Two teams should be developed--the primary entry team and the Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC). The primary team should perform the normal entry rescue effort. The RIC is the primary team's rescue team and should be made up of highly trained, competent individuals. Covering all areas of expertise needed, they must be well disciplined and patient. The team should become well acquainted with the site and what the work team is doing. Knowing what type of work is being done allows the responsible team to preplan the equipment needs to perform a possible rescue.

Developing and deploying rescue teams takes planning and commitment. All these actions are difficult but can be worked through with perseverance. While these rescue operations are outside the normal approach that the fire service has come to embrace, consider that the fire service is responding to an attack, an ambush, which also is outside the fire service "box."

Evidence Preservation

Command Officers must be aware that evidence preservation by first responders is a critical task that enables law enforcement to conduct thorough and complete criminal investigations which, hopefully, lead to convictions of the terrorists. This topic will be covered in detail in Unit 7: Incident Documentation and Evidence Preservation.

Recovery/Termination

Recovery and termination operations traditionally have been considered nonemergency operations. In response to acts of terrorism, recovery can be viewed as two different tactical options: retrieval and restoration. When recovery is viewed as "getting back to normal" or "restoration," it applies to responders and the population that survives. When recovery is viewed as "retrieval," it initiates completely different actions.

Some of the needs that drive recovery are bodies, property, and evidence. It may be necessary to start recovery while rescue operations are underway.

Demobilization of specialized teams and resources is part of the recovery and termination process. Returning units to service and replenishment of equipment and supplies, as well as required documentation, are all considerations of the Command Officer.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Nature of the Incident

By their very nature, terrorist events are designed to create a mass casualty/fatality scenario. Local EMS will be overwhelmed quickly due to the sheer numbers of victims these events produce. Experience also has shown that a large number of people not directly involved will suffer some sort of psychological trauma. Command Officers must evaluate local

capabilities and develop plans for dealing with such events, to include the following considerations:

- weapon/agent(s) effect on EMS;
- use of hazardous materials as B-NICE weapons;
- results in victim, and possibly responder, contamination; and
- may involve a hostile environment.

EMS Limitations and Actions

NFPA Standard 473, *Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents* may be used to provide guidance for EMS operations at terrorist incidents.

EMS personnel may lack appropriate PPE and training to operate in the hot zone and may be unable to treat victims effectively within the inner perimeter. Often the most fundamental EMS procedures are ineffective or dangerous within the hot zone.

This means that EMS should remain within the cold zone unless they are properly trained and protected and until the hot zone has been rendered safe from secondary devices, perpetrators, chemical and/or biological hazards, and other threats. When EMS personnel remain in the cold zone, other responders retrieve victims, bring them through decontamination as needed, and deliver them to waiting EMS personnel in the cold zone.

In the cold zone, EMS works to accomplish traditional EMS strategies such as assessment, triage, stabilization, treatment, and transportation. It is strongly recommended that universal precautions (also referred to as Body Substance Isolation (BSI)) for infectious disease be followed whenever biological agents may be involved. As always, bloodborne pathogens are a consideration.

A significant difference between terrorism and routine mass casualty operations is the information and evidence available from victims. Not only must the evidence be gathered, but information about the patient must be documented as well. First, whenever possible, the location of the victim both before and after the incident should be documented. Other information includes what happened, what they said, heard, smelled, and so on. If their clothing has not been removed already (i.e., decontamination was not required), it now must be bagged and tagged and a chain of custody established, since the clothing may contain evidence.

The nature and extent of injuries also is extremely informative. Photographing or videotaping victims is an excellent way to document


much of this information. It may be beneficial to have law enforcement representatives work with EMS to help in this evidentiary process. Since this is not a routine form of interaction between the two disciplines, it is recommended that planning and cross training be conducted. Again, universal precautions with upgraded respiratory protection would be required for documentation personnel.

The question of quarantining victims is raised often. In general, quarantines are not called for; rather, routine isolation is the management of choice. As long as response personnel have followed universal precautions, isolation of responders should not be required. For example, anthrax requires precautions that include only the use of gloves, gowns, masks, face protection, and hand washing (as of 1996, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) listed these as standard precautions as opposed to universal precautions). These precautions are not much different from those used for tuberculosis or from other infectious disease management principles.

Should personnel not use universal precautions or be exposed to a droplet-transmittable pathogen, it is possible that they would need to be isolated during evaluation and possibly during the initial phase of treatment. It may be necessary to isolate possible victims during the same timeframe.

These types of events may require the operation outside of standard protocols. Specialized anecdotal therapy and medical care may be necessary in order to increase victim survivability.

The Incident Command System (ICS) for EMS during a terrorist incident comes from the multiple casualty module. The following graphic provides a good overview of a large mass-casualty EMS branch operation. The Documentation and Evidence Unit has been added as a possible method of managing that function.



The EMS or Mass Casualty Group/Branch manages all EMS operations that deal with victims at the incident scene. The Triage Unit/Group leader provides triage management and movement of patients from the triage area to treatment. The Treatment Unit/Group leader is responsible for treatment, coordination of patient treatment, preparation for transport and movement of patients to loading locations. The Transportation Unit/Group supervisor supervises medical communications, air and ground ambulance coordination, coordination of patient transportation, and documentation of patient identification, injuries, mode of transportation, and destination. The Medical Supply Unit coordinator acquires and maintains control of appropriate medical equipment and supplies.

The Documentation Unit would be responsible for photographing and documenting the original location of victims and documenting any interviews. Finally, the unit would bag, tag, document, and secure all clothing and evidence found in decontamination, triage, and treatment areas.

SUMMARY

Many variables and tactical options will affect overall response strategies at a terrorist incident. Command Officers must follow the practice of life safety, incident stabilization, property and environmental protection,

infrastructure protection, and evidence preservation while maintaining overall safety.

Activity 5.1

Strategic Options at a Terrorist Incident

Purpose

To review, choose, and implement strategic options that may be available to the Command Officer. You will understand the numerous factors that influence strategic decisionmaking and begin the development process of plans for the overall incident management.

Directions

1. Review Activity 2.1. This activity builds upon the scenario and the actions performed in Activity 2.1.
2. Read the following scenario.
3. You will work in small groups and record your answers on an easel pad.
4. Be prepared to present the activity to the large group.
5. You will have 20 minutes for preparation of your response.

Scenario

Police officers who were working crowd control for the concert approach you and inform you that they were told that a protest group was going to try and disrupt the activities in the park. At the same time, the gas company arrives on the scene and asks what assistance they may lend you. They also inform you that a gas company supervisor will be on site in 10 minutes.

Engine 4 reports that they have a confirmation of 12 people still inside the bank and that they are unable to self-evacuate. A large group is beginning to make its way from the park to the area of the bank. There is a rumor going around the park that the concert is going to be cancelled due to the inability of the performers to gain access to the park.

A construction crew has set up operation at the intersection of 35th and U Streets. They are replacing the road surface and the entire intersection consists of steel plates with a rating of 10 tons. The local third party EMS supervisor has arrived on the scene and is directing EMS units to gain entry into the bank and assist any injured parties.

Local news media are reporting that the bank is contaminated with a possible nerve agent (this is an unsubstantiated rumor), and that the park was sprayed by helicopter with a reported biological agent. They are live on-the-air interviewing witnesses who claim that the fire department is not reacting to the situation and that police officers are ordering people to leave the city.

The local hospital is reporting that in excess of 50 people have self-presented. These people claim to have been in the park and are now complaining of flu-like symptoms accompanied by difficulty breathing. The hospital is requesting assistance in decontamination and the triage of these people.

Questions

1. Using the four incident priorities, identify and list strategic goals.
2. Identify major points that should be included in a press release regarding this incident.
3. Identify and justify the agencies that may be part of Unified Command for this incident.

APPENDIX A

ISOLATION

Establish an isolation perimeter to isolate the incident site and deny entry. Evaluate positioning of emergency response units and escape routes. Establish hazard control zones. Initiate public protective actions as appropriate (evacuation or protection in place). When responding to a terrorist incident, consider security when determining the isolation perimeter.

Security Considerations

The difference between the establishment of the isolation perimeter during a standard response and establishing the isolation perimeter during a response to a terrorist act is the security issue. All incident response zones or perimeters will need to be evaluated or assessed to determine security requirements.

Isolation Perimeter Site Security

The outermost isolation perimeter must be controlled to ensure that only essential personnel and equipment are authorized access to the incident site. Law enforcement will be responsible for providing security for the isolation perimeter.

Responder Security

Responder security issues must be considered aggressively when responding to acts of terrorism. A vulnerability assessment must be initiated to determine responder security-related requirements accurately.

Establish Isolation Perimeters

- Establish outer perimeter.
- Establish inner perimeters.
- Establish hazard zones.
- Determine public safety isolation zones.

Tactical Placement of Assets Within Isolation Zones

Fire service assets should be staged within the isolation zone in a manner that facilitates rapid egress of personnel and equipment in the event that the staging or holding area is threatened. In addition, dispersal of assets is essential when a security threat exists.

Establish Responder Egress Plan

Zone Egress Plan

An incident site emergency egress plan of action should be established within organizational Standard Operating Procedures/Standard Operating Guidelines (SOP's/SOG's). The action plan should allow for the rapid evacuation of responders and equipment from the incident site in the event of a secondary attack threat. Egress instructions should be disseminated during the initial stages of the response and should include specific routes and rally points for personnel and equipment.

Alternate Incident Command Post

Alternate Incident Command Post (ICP) contingencies should be included in all terrorist response preplanning. Command and control assets, both personnel and equipment, are essential in managing any incident. If the primary Command Post (CP) is compromised for any reason, the management of the incident will need to be shifted to a planned alternate (contingency) CP with all of the essential command and control mechanisms in place.

NOTIFICATION

Ensure appropriate notifications are made, as per local Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and SOP's/SOG's. If the incident is a suspected or confirmed terrorist event, request law enforcement security assistance and command representation at CP. Regard the incident scene as a potential crime scene. Consider the potential implications of terrorist activities on emergency medical operations. If the incident involves multiple casualties, consider activating the local emergency medical plan. Communication must be established among all involved response organizations and agencies. An Information Officer should be assigned to address media and community affairs issues.

PROTECTION

Protection concerns will include the standard response considerations and first responder protective measures against attacks directed at the responder. Conducting a vulnerability assessment of all emergency-response-related considerations will provide a checklist of critical life safety factors that will enhance overall responder survivability and supportability. All the assessments are related to the level of physical security protection in place once the response is initiated and throughout the operational phase. Law enforcement agencies will need to be involved in conducting the vulnerability assessment.

Vulnerability Assessment

The purpose of conducting terrorist response vulnerability assessments is to determine organizational and individual responder shortfalls or weaknesses when responding to acts of terrorism. There are a number of different perspectives or approaches in conducting this assessment. The assessment should include all terrorism response issues--security, personnel, equipment, organizational structure, command and control, interagency relationships, and training-related capabilities and vulnerabilities in responding to acts of terrorism effectively and safely. The assistance of law enforcement will be necessary to conduct the vulnerability assessment properly as it pertains to security-related issues.

SECURITY

In order to respond to acts of terrorism effectively and safely, fire service SOP's/SOG's must be revised to reflect security-related issues that affect the response. SOP/SOG tactical guidelines in responding to acts of terrorism should include the assignment of law enforcement to provide protection to first responders, response routes, Staging Areas, and all facets of operational and support considerations. ERP's should include an annex that clearly identifies a "local" potential target site list. The target list should be developed in conjunction with local law enforcement. Once the target list is completed, a library of preplanned actions for each specific site can be developed and will serve as an effective response tool in the event of a terrorist related incident. Security precautionary measures and security-related preplans should be considered immediately, and perhaps be activated if an incident location is identified in the preplans as a locally established potential target.

Response Security

Response Routes and Corridors

Identifying Primary and Alternate Response Routes

Potential target location response routes should be established within the Local Emergency Response Plan (LERP) and organizational SOP's/SOG's. Primary and alternate routes should be identified and, for security reasons, disseminated to responders on a "need to know" basis. Established routes should minimize the possibility of a planned ambush of personnel and equipment assets.

Identifying Response Route Choke Points

A choke point is defined as a specific location along a route where an ambush or delaying action would most likely be launched against the responding units. Response route choke points should be identified along the established response routes. Security at choke points should be provided to ensure that response personnel and equipment can travel safely to the incident site.

Designating Rally Points

A rally point is defined as a specific location within the response locality where responders will assemble or regroup at a preplanned, designated safe area if separated during the initial response phase due to an attack on response assets. Security at the rally points should be established as a precaution, and the location of rally points should be disseminated on a "need to know" basis.

Incident Site Security

Command and Control Centers (CP, EOC)

All command and control positions will require security to ensure continuity in managing the incident. Leadership must be aware that the CP will be a prime target.

Rest and Rehabilitation Areas

An incident site emergency egress plan of action should be included in organizational SOP's/SOG's. The action plan should allow for the rapid evacuation of responders and equipment assets from the incident site in the event of a secondary attack threat. Egress instructions should be

disseminated during the initial stages of the response and should include specific routes and rally points for personnel and equipment.

Isolation Perimeter

The isolation perimeter is the first line of defense and must be staffed diligently to ensure that outside perimeters are not compromised.

Incident Site Perimeter

The incident site perimeter is the secondary line of defense and is close enough to the operating responders to warrant security considerations.

Access Control Points

Access control points into the hazard zones will require security to ensure that only authorized responders/personnel have access to the site. An access identification system should be in place to ensure access security.

Staging Areas (Personnel and Equipment Assets)

All Staging Areas will require effective security and control measures to ensure that vital equipment and personnel are protected and that equipment moving into these areas has been inspected and screened properly in accordance with existing protocols.

Hot Zone Entry/Exit Control Points

Only authorized response personnel should be allowed access to the actual exclusion zone (point of origin). An individual identification system should be implemented to ensure proper identification of authorized personnel. Other unauthorized persons will attempt to penetrate this position in order to ascertain damage assessments, casualty counts, etc.

Leak, Spill, and Fire Scene Locations

Assume that leaks, spills, and fires may be a prelude to the primary terrorist attack and secure the area to minimize potential losses and to increase the survivability of responders. All affected locations of a terrorist act should be secured to ensure limited access to response

personnel only, and to preserve possible evidence in accordance with local protocols.

EMS Resources

EMS resources could be a prime target of the terrorist attack plan. If these resources can be eliminated or attacked effectively, mass confusion and hysteria will ensue. All will be at risk, and the number of both responder and civilian casualties will be affected greatly.

Emergency Response Resources

Equipment and personnel assets pre-positioned in Staging Areas within or outside the incident site will require adequate security at the location of the assets and while en route to forward operating areas.

Reserve Response Assets

Reserve assets prepositioned to respond rapidly to the incident site and/or the exclusion zone must be protected in order to facilitate rapid intervention and rescue of response personnel operating within the exclusion zone.

Decontamination Site

Decontamination sites, both at the incident site location and hospital site locations, will be targeted. If the terrorist can interfere with decontamination operations for any length of time, the effectiveness of the planned attack will be maximized--especially if the attack is of a chemical, biological, or radiological nature.

Offsite Security

Mortuary Facilities

Mortuary facilities, both fixed and temporary, must be secured to protect potential evidence and victim identification. Victims' bodies potentially could host critical evidence that the terrorist may want to destroy to prevent identification of the group.

Hospital Facilities

Hospital facilities are potential target sites primarily because casualties will flood these sites; access will not be challenged during mass casualty crisis situations. In addition, attacking these sites will further the terrorists' goals by causing mass hysteria among the population.

Evacuation Centers

Evacuation sites will require security to ensure the safety of civilians and to minimize the threat of a secondary attack taking place at these locations.

Sheltering In Place Locations

Security considerations for shelter in place locations must be reviewed to ensure protection of civilians against secondary attacks, unexploded materials, and/or secondary devices.

Communications Centers

Communication centers will be targeted in order to eliminate or minimize command and control of response resources. Disrupting communications enables the terrorist to maximize the effectiveness of the planned attack and to more easily initiate additional attacks at multiple locations. Secondary communications procedures should be written into pre-incident response plans. It is likely that terrorist groups will acquire the radio frequencies used by the local emergency responders and will monitor the frequencies for intelligence purposes. It also is possible that the group will attempt to disrupt response protocols by issuing bogus orders to unsuspecting responders. Brevity codes should be used in lieu of the standard 10-code system to maximize secure communications.

Emergency Response Stations (e.g., fire station, police, etc.)

Responders' "home" stations or facilities will be vulnerable to a secondary attack and should be considered when establishing security protocols within the preincident plan. These facilities generally will have a limited number of personnel on site during incident responses, but nevertheless will provide a critical and essential support role in prolonged response operations.

Recovery Operation Sites

Security during the recovery phase of a response to a terrorist act is as essential as during the initial response phase. During the recovery phase, responders are most complacent and therefore most vulnerable to a terrorist action. Alertness and security awareness must be maintained until the recovery phase is completed.

Establishing Security-Related Procedures

Inspection Procedures for Personnel and Equipment Assets

Once personnel are properly identified and are authorized access to the incident site, a personnel and equipment inspection process should be conducted. The physical inspection of personnel and equipment assets will minimize the possibility of secondary devices being introduced covertly into the incident site and will increase overall security awareness and the survivability of the responders.

Responder Identification System

A reliable responder identification system should be established to ensure that only authorized response personnel gain access to the incident site, Staging Areas, rally points, and other vital incident-related sites or locations. The system will need to be flexible enough to accommodate changes as the response progresses. Security and credibility of the system must be evaluated and validated for effectiveness.

Reserve Unit Concept

A reserve response unit should be established to ensure that qualified response personnel and equipment are available and in position to react aggressively to incident site contingencies. Such contingencies include the possibility of a secondary attack being launched against the initial responders. Security of the reserve unit and its vital equipment resources must be adequate to ensure its successful intervention at the incident site.

Diversions or Ruse Tactics Fundamentals Checklist

Establish an understanding of diversionary tactics and evaluate the potential for the possibility of one incident being a diversion for the initiation of the primary attack. Terrorist operational tactics will include "luring" first responders to an incident dispatched as a routine call for

assistance in order to launch the primary attack on the responder. Alertness and awareness to the response surroundings will minimize the possibility of being drawn into a trap by diversionary tactics.

Detailed Checklist to Query Involved Personnel (e.g., Dispatcher, Witness, and First In Responder)

Dispatcher, witness, and first due unit checklists should be established to assist the first responder in determining the nature of the hazard. The checklists should be detailed enough to provide a pattern of unusual incident site outward warning signs and should include specific B-NICE threat recognition indicators. Once the specific B-NICE threat indicators are recognized, the first responder should initiate self-protective measures and inform the appropriate authorities expeditiously in accordance with local protocols.

Reconnaissance

A method of increasing survivability of terrorist acts is to establish a target list of those organizations, establishments, agencies, and other buildings of significance that a potential terrorist may view as a viable target for attack. This in itself will maximize first responder survivability. These actions should be addressed by the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and in each location's ERP or SOP's/SOG's.

Reconnaissance Requirements

Reconnaissance of response routes (primary and secondary), the incident site and Staging Areas should be accomplished during responses to acts of terrorism. Law enforcement resources will be required to conduct the reconnaissance and provide escort security support. However, the first responder should understand the purpose of reconnaissance and proper reconnaissance techniques.

APPENDIX B

HARBOR INCIDENT CASE STUDY

Case Study
The Harbor Incident
Anaheim, California

In April 1995 a threat was made against the Disneyland complex in Anaheim, California. Although other agencies had been aware of this for five days, the Anaheim Fire Department, and Chief Jim Cox were not notified until the day of the incident.

Chief Cox received a phone call at midnight of April 14, 1995, and was told to report to the Disneyland Command Post at 0430 hours. On arrival at the Command Post he noticed military vehicles in a parking lot preparing for a major operation. In the Command Post, Cox was met by officials representing local, state, and federal law enforcement, Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Army Chemical Warfare personnel, and others. Although these agencies had five days notification, the fire and emergency services were not notified until the day of the threat.

Chief Cox was shown a video of an unknown individual threatening to release Sarin (GB) on Disneyland. The attack was planned for that evening at 2100 hours. Despite the fact that all other agencies had five days notice, there was little planning or coordination to that point.

Chief Cox assumed Incident Command, and brought in a Type I Planning group consisting of a plans chief and support staff. Planning meetings took place and an operational plan was organized. The plan established all operational objectives and responsibilities from the initial attack through clean up.

A written plan was developed (See Incident Action Plan Harbor Incident). Chief Cox points out that they established objectives (See Action Plan page 1), and then divided up the responsibilities for the potential incident. All personnel were placed under a unified command, and operated on fire department radios.

It was clearly defined who was responsible for each agency, branch, section, or group (See Action Plan page 2). Each of these had clearly defined tasks and instructions (See Action Plan page 3-7). There was a communications plan (See Action Plan page 8). Maps of the facility and area were included (See Action Plan page 10 & 11). Information on chemical nerve agents was included in the written plan (See Action Plan page 13-18).

An event flow chart was developed, in consideration of the threatened attack materializing. This chart directed operations from the attack to clean up. In worst case scenario planning, they were prepared to treat 30,000 to 40,000 potential victims. Material Safety Data sheets and traffic evacuation plans were even included in the flow chart. (See Action Plan page 12). The use of unified command was imperative according to Chief Cox.

Despite the serious nature of the threat, the Walt Disney Company refused to close the park. Disney did provide logistical support for all personnel. This included providing food, bunks, and other essential services.

They waited three days past the threatened date but no attack materialized. On April 18, personnel were debriefed. An FBI representative stated "This will happen again..."

Throughout the incident, the Anaheim Fire Department was the lead agency. There was no competition among the federal agencies. Although the attack never materialized, Chief Cox emphasized the essential nature of a unified command for preparation. He stated that such an event could occur anytime or anywhere.

It should be noted that although the Fire Department was not notified until the day of the threat, they were the agency that organized, and was placed in charge of the situation. Although there was no incident, there was a written plan and objectives should the event take place.


The target was a high profile target, Disneyland, and yet there was little or no press coverage during the event. This probably has as much to do with the target, as anything else. Note that the Disney Company refused to close the park. This had the potential to place employees and patrons of the park in danger from the attack.

Note: Chief Jim Cox is now Assistant Chief with OES/Fire Rescue in Laguna Niguel, California.

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN





HARBOR INCIDENT



OPERATIONAL PERIOD

APRIL 14, 1995 0630-0130 APRIL 15, 1995

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

INCIDENT OBJECTIVES	1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED
	Harbor Incident	4-14-95	0630
4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME)			
4-14-95 0630-0130 4-15-95			
5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)			
<p>1) Secure perimeters, secure hot zone, warm zone, and cold zone.</p> <p>2) Control, identify chemical release.</p> <p>3) Rescue, decon, triage, treat, and transport.</p> <p>4) Move crowds to safety zones.</p> <p>5) Stabilize incident.</p> <p>6) Provide for rescuers' safety first. Do not become part of the problem.</p> <p>7) Contain contamination to original release area. Do not contaminate ground ambulances or hospitals.</p> <p>8) Secure evidence and crime area.</p> <p>9) Protect against and device or hostile attack.</p>			
6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD			
winds S/W 10-12 mph. Temp. 38°-48° F. Showers expected to arrive late night with increasing wind west 15-25 mph and gusting.			
7. GENERAL SAFETY MESSAGE			
HAZ mat and DoD Site Safety plan - need alternate site safety plan - proper dress for each zone. Decon before treatment.			
8. ATTACHMENTS (✓ IF ATTACHED)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> event flowchart <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LISTS (ICS 204) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MSDS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Nerve gas protocol			
202 ICS 3-80	9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)		10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER)
			 IC

UNIT 5: FACTORS INFLUENCING STRATEGIC DECISIONS

ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT LIST		1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME														
ICS-203		Harbor	4-14-95	0630 hrs.														
5. INCIDENT COMMANDER AND STAFF POSITION NAME INCIDENT COMMANDER Jim Cox DEPUTY SAFETY OFFICER INFORMATION OFFICER Tom Bracato LIAISON OFFICER		4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 4-14-95 0630-0130 4-15-95																
6. AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 20%;">AGENCY</th> <th>NAME</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>FBI</td><td>Kelley</td></tr> <tr><td>APD</td><td>Bryan</td></tr> <tr><td>D-land</td><td>Cora</td></tr> <tr><td>Dmat</td><td>Conrad Salinas</td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>		AGENCY	NAME	FBI	Kelley	APD	Bryan	D-land	Cora	Dmat	Conrad Salinas					9. OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF Bob Hirst DEPUTY a. Fire Rescue BRANCH I DIVISIONS/GROUPS BRANCH DIRECTOR John Andrews DEPUTY DIVISION GROUP Med Group-Butter DIVISION GROUP Standby Rescue-Navak DIVISION/GROUP DIVISION/GROUP DIVISION/GROUP b. Law BRANCH II DIVISIONS/GROUPS BRANCH DIRECTOR Baker - APD DEPUTY Oonckels - FAI DIVISION GROUP FBI HRT - Amerton DIVISION GROUP FBI SWAT - Kane DIVISION GROUP APD OPS - Leitman DIVISION GROUP APD Intel - Mittmann DIVISION/GROUP c. Haz Mat BRANCH III DIVISIONS/GROUPS BRANCH DIRECTOR Austin DEPUTY DIVISION GROUP Haz Mat entry - Shear DIVISION GROUP Decon - Dingillo DIVISION/GROUP DIVISION/GROUP DIVISION/GROUP		
AGENCY	NAME																	
FBI	Kelley																	
APD	Bryan																	
D-land	Cora																	
Dmat	Conrad Salinas																	
7. PLANNING SECTION CHIEF Jim OH DEPUTY RESOURCES UNIT Curran SITUATION UNIT Symmes DOCUMENTATION UNIT DEMOBILIZATION UNIT TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS Joe Iser <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td> </td><td>check-in</td><td>Ron Steele</td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td>E.O.B</td><td>Waterhouse</td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </table>			check-in	Ron Steele		E.O.B	Waterhouse							d. AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH AIR OPERATIONS BR. DIR. AIR ATTACK SUPERVISOR AIR SUPPORT SUPERVISOR HELICOPTER COORDINATOR AIR TANKER COORDINATOR				
	check-in	Ron Steele																
	E.O.B	Waterhouse																
8. LOGISTICS SECTION CHIEF DEPUTY a. SUPPORT BRANCH DIRECTOR SUPPLY UNIT FACILITIES UNIT GROUND SUPPORT UNIT b. SERVICE BRANCH DIRECTOR COMMUNICATIONS UNIT MEDICAL UNIT FOOD UNIT		10. FINANCE SECTION CHIEF DEPUTY TIME UNIT PROCUREMENT UNIT COMPENSATION/CLAIMS UNIT COST UNIT																
203	ICS 1/82	PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">Coman Resat</div>																

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH		2. DIVISION/GROUP		ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME Harbor Incident				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 4-14-95 Night Shift TIME 0630 - 0130 4-15-95					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF Hirst			DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR Butler						
BRANCH DIRECTOR John Andrews			OTHER SUPERVISOR _____						
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE/SQUAD PLATOON RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME				
Triage	Dr. Conrad Salinas	1		Staging 0630					
Treatment	Joe Isler	1		↓					
Transportation	Ana E-21 Hambleton	4							
ANA E-3	Newell	4							
ANA E-6	Garcia	4							
ANA E-4	Chamberlain	4							
ANA E-1	Gutierrez	4							
E-6		3							
E-5		4							
ORCO - 33		3							
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS									
<p>Haz Mat DoD will extract patients from hot zone Decon before triage MSDS and treatment docs</p>									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS									
<p>Dr's. from NOMS Dmat in charge of treatment - Atropine intervention air ambulance request through NorthNet Comm ground transportation see Incident med plan 206</p>									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL		2	L	SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT		2	C		REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL			19 TA		GROUND-TO-AIR				
PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT LDR)			APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)		DATE		TIME		
John Andrews			Joe Isler		4-14-95		0830		

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH		2. DIVISION/GROUP		ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME Harbor Incident			4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE <u>4-14-95</u> <u>dayShift</u> TIME <u>0630-0130</u> <u>nightShift</u> <u>4-15-95</u>						
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF <u>Hirst</u>		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR <u>CAPT Shear DoD</u>							
BRANCH DIRECTOR <u>Austin</u>		OTHER SUPERVISOR _____							
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME				
Haz Mat 8	Randy Goldsmith	6		0800 Staging					
Tech Response	DoD A } LT.	2		0800 Staging					
Tech Response	DoD B } Johnston	7							
ORCO Hazmat 1		4		on Standby					
Santa Ana Haz Mat 1		4		↓					
LA CO Haz Mat		6							
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS Assist and coordinate entry and exit of entry teams - U.S. military bio warfare teams. Develop two plans of operations to address stabilization and control - develop plan to address a large casualty problem. Interface with key military team members to be ready to operate in a state of immediate response.									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS All Haz mat teams and DoD entry teams to carry self autoinjectors IM. (Atropine) FBI SWAT and HRT to provide perimeter control - also carry autoinjectors IM (atropine)									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL REPEAT				SUPPORT	LOCAL REPEAT			
			2	C					
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL		26 18 TA			GROUND-TO-AIR				
PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT LDR) ccorn			APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) JOET		DATE 4-14-95		TIME 0950		

UNIT 5: FACTORS INFLUENCING STRATEGIC DECISIONS

1. BRANCH		2. DIVISION/GROUP		ASSIGNMENT LIST				
3. INCIDENT NAME <p align="center" style="font-size: 1.2em;">Harbor Incident</p>				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE <u>4-14-95</u> ^{day Shift} TIME <u>0630-0130</u> ^{night Shift} <u>4-15-95</u>				
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL								
OPERATIONS CHIEF <u>Hirst</u>		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR <u>CAPT Dingillo</u>						
BRANCH DIRECTOR <u>Austin</u>		OTHER SUPERVISOR _____						
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD								
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME			
ANAT-2	EVANS	4		on call				
ANAT-3	Zuber	4		↓				
ANAT-5	Roberts	4						
ANAT-10	Martin	4						
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS <p align="center" style="font-size: 1.1em;">Set up decon stations - insure zone perimeters Decon team to be ready to deal with large #s</p>								
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS <p align="center" style="font-size: 1.1em;">Decon all patients before sending to med group - have teams ready to decon receiving hospitals</p>								
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY								
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT			
	REPEAT		2	C		LOCAL REPEAT		
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL		26 18 TA			GROUND-TO-AIR			
PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT LDR)			APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)		DATE		TIME	
<u>ccowan</u>			<u>JOH</u>		4-14-95		0930	


EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH		2. DIVISION/GROUP		ASSIGNMENT LIST			
3. INCIDENT NAME <p align="center">Harbor Incident</p>				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE <u>4-14-95</u> <u>dayShift</u> TIME <u>0630-0130</u> <u>nightShift</u> <u>4-15-95</u>			
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL							
OPERATIONS CHIEF <u>Hirst</u>			DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR _____				
BRANCH DIRECTOR <u>Baker APD</u>			OTHER SUPERVISOR _____				
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD							
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME		
FBI - HRT	Jamie Atherton	9		0630 Staging			
FBI - SWAT	Doug Kane	24		0630 Staging			
APD - OPS	Laitmann	30		0630 Staging			
APD - intel	Mittmann						
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS Entry team OPS with haz mat and DOD (FBI SWAT) Secure perimeter of release HRT interior control points ANA Hem police exterior control points							
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS All entry personnel to carry self Auto injectors (Atropine) investigation							
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY							
FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL REPEAT	Fire 800	2	C	SUPPORT	LOCAL REPEAT	
		Police					
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL	Orange north			GROUND-TO- AIR			
PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT LDR)		APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)		DATE		TIME	
<u>ccoma</u>		<u>Jott</u>		<u>4-14-95</u>		<u>0945</u>	

INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN		1. INCIDENT NAME		2. DATE/TIME PREPARED		3. OPERATIONAL PERIOD	
		Harbor Incident		4-14-95 0630		DATE/TIME 0630 - 0130 4-15-95	
4. BASIC RADIO CHANNEL							
SYSTEM/CACHE	CHANNEL	FUNCTION	FREQUENCY	ASSIGNMENT	REMARKS		
Anaheim Fire MHZ Disney MTS 2000	2C A	Command plans Logistics		Command Post			
Anaheim Fire MHZ Radio	2L	Med-Group Transportation		Triage Treatment Transportation			
Orange County Law System	Orange North	APD OPS Intel					
Anaheim Fire MHZ	2G 18TA	Haz Mat entry Secondary DoD					
Haz Mat decon Anaheim Radio	2G 18TA	Decon					
Anaheim Fire MHZ	2G 18TA	FBI SWAT FBI HRT		entry-interior control points			
ICS 205 8-7	5. PREPARED BY (COMMUNICATIONS UNIT) Wright						

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

MEDICAL PLAN	1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED	4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD				
	Harbor	4-14-95	0630					
5. INCIDENT MEDICAL AID STATIONS								
MEDICAL AID STATIONS	LOCATION	PARAMEDICS						
		YES	NO					
Incident Treatment		✓						
6. TRANSPORTATION								
A. AMBULANCE SERVICES								
NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	PARAMEDICS					
			YES	NO				
Caroline	Field Units	909 989 7142		✓				
Medix	↓	73138375		✓				
Medtrans	↓	5643418		✓				
Mercy Air Amb.			✓					
Orco copter 41					✓			
SAR					✓			
B. INCIDENT AMBULANCES								
NAME	LOCATION	PARAMEDICS						
		YES	NO					
Contact North Net Comm						✓		
7. HOSPITALS								
NAME	ADDRESS	TRAVEL TIME		PHONE	HELIPAD		BURN CENTER	
		AIR	GRND		YES	NO	YES	NO
WES Med ANA	1025 S. Anaheim Blvd.		5	536-2900		✓		
UCI	101 City Drive South	2	5	456-5200	✓			
AMH	1111 W. La Palma	2	10	491-1251		✓	✓	
Martin Luther	1336 W. Bonneya	2	12	491-5571		✓		
8. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES								
911 through radio or phone - no cell phones								
C.P. Personnel use central first aid or AED plan trailer								
9. PREPARED BY (MEDICAL UNIT LEADER)								
10. REVIEWED BY (SAFETY OFFICER)								
ICS 206 8-78	Hernandez			Jim Cozart				



FACTSHEET

Chemical Nerve Agents

The Nerve Agents are anti-cholinesterase agents, working by blocking the enzyme that the body uses to destroy one of its nerve signal transmitters after it has done its job. This has two effects: one is that control is lost over the affected part of the nervous system; the other is that large concentrations of the chemical transmitter rapidly build up within the body and the chemical is itself a powerful poison. The body is first incapacitated and then forced to poison itself, all in a Rapid or Very Rapid manner. After exposure to a lethal dose of Nerve Agent, severe convulsions will set in, followed closely by collapse, paralysis, and death.

SARIN, Nerve Agent, ISOPROPYLMETHYLPHOSPHONOFUORIDATE (GB), is a highly lethal colorless liquid or vapor with almost no odor. It may be absorbed through the skin or the respiratory tract and is regarded as Very Rapid in Rate of Action, causing death in as little as several minutes. GB is regarded as nonpersistent because its physical properties allow evaporation and dispersion over several hours. The potential for secondary contamination is HIGH for cases in which liquid GB is present on a victim's skin or clothing, shortly after exposure, and prior to decontamination. The potential for secondary contamination is LOW after decontamination, if all SARIN has been removed from the skin.

VX Nerve Agent, O-Ethyl S-(2-Diisopropylaminoethyl) Methylphosphonothiolate (VX), is a highly lethal, nonvolatile, amber colored, odorless liquid. Liquid droplets do not evaporate quickly, facilitating systemic absorption, primarily through the skin. This nerve agent is 100 times as toxic to humans as SARIN, and is regarded as Rapid in Rate of Action. This nerve agent is regarded as persistent because its physical properties inhibit evaporation, and it may persist for 2 to 6 days. The potential for secondary contamination is HIGH before decontamination, LOW after decontamination, if all VX has been removed from the skin.

SARIN: IDENTIFICATION, EFFECTS, TREATMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERSISTENCE

I. IDENTIFICATION

- a. Agent Class: SARIN (Agent GB) (Military Classification: Nerve Agent)
- b. Other Common Names: Fluoroisopropoxymethylphosphine oxide; GB; IMPF; Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate; Isopropoxymethylphosphoryl fluoride; Isopropyl methane-fluorophosphonate; Isopropyl methylfluorophosphate; Isopropyl methylphosphono fluoridate; o-Isopropyl methylphosphono fluoridate; Isopropyl-methyl-phosphoryl fluoride; methylfluorophosphoric acid; Isopropyl ester; Methylphosphonofluoridic acid isopropyl ester; methylphosphono-fluoridic acid 1-methylethyl ester; MFI; SARIN II; Trilone 46; CAS No. 107-44-8.
- c. Description: SARIN is a colorless liquid or vapor with almost no odor in its pure state.

2. CLINICAL EFFECTS

- a. Common Signs/Symptoms:
 - (1) SARIN is an extremely active anticholinesterase organophosphate compound used as a rapidly-acting military chemical warfare agent. It can be absorbed following inhalation, during inhalation, and through dermal contact.
 - (2) A small drop of the liquid material on the skin may be sufficient to cause death. SARIN exposure has resulted in persistent changes in the electroencephalogram (EEG) in both primates and humans.
 - (3) Organophosphate (OP) compounds produce toxicity due to cholinergic overdrive at MUSCARINIC, NICOTINIC, and CNS cholinergic sites.
 - (a) MUSCARINIC EFFECTS: Sweating, salivation, increased bronchial secretions, miosis, bradycardia, hypotension, vomiting and diarrhea, bronchoconstriction, and urinary and fecal incontinence.
 - (b) NICOTINIC EFFECTS: Fasciculations and weakness of muscles (including the diaphragm) tachycardia, hypertension, and mydriasis.

(c) CNS EFFECTS: Restlessness, anxiety, headaches, convulsions, and coma.

b. Pathophysiology:

- (1) SARIN is an anticholinesterase organophosphate (OP) compound producing cholinergic overdrive at MUSCARNIC, NICOTINIC, and CNS sites, due to inhibition of the acetylcholinesterase enzyme with accumulation of acetylcholine and excessive stimulation.
- (2) The military nerve agents differ from other OPs in potency and rapidity of "aging" of the OP-enzyme complex.

3. TREATMENT

a. Decontamination

- (1) The M291 Skin Decontaminating Kit is manufactured by Rohm and Haas under contract with the U.S. Army Medical R&D Command at Fort Detrick, MD for military use and civil defense applications. The kit consists of six packets, each containing an applicator pad impregnated with AMBERGARD 555 ion-exchange resin which absorbs the active agent. An applicator pad is rubbed over any contaminated skin and discarded. More detailed instructions for use are provided with the kit (Product Info, 1991).
 - (a) The kit has been tested for safety and efficacy against organophosphate nerve gases. This kit is a replacement for the M258-A1 kit and offers several advantages over the older kit. It is safe to use on the skin, even in the absence of suspected exposure, and can therefore be used in training as well as actual field conditions (Product Info, 1991).
- (2) Wash ALL exposed skin three times with soap and water. Use of dilute bleach solution (1:10 with water), ethanol, or tincture of green soap may be more efficacious. Isolate contaminated clothing and dispose of as hazardous waste. Exposed eyes should be copiously flushed with tepid water for at least 15 to 20 minutes. Towelettes carried by military personnel contain an alkaline chloramine and phenol mixture that can break down nerve agents.

- b. Potential for Secondary Contamination: HIGH before decontamination; LOW after decontamination, if all SARIN has been removed from the skin.
- c. First Aid Measures: Remove victims of inhalation exposure from the toxic environment; rescuers must wear protective clothing and appropriate respiratory protection. Administer supplemental oxygen with assisted ventilation as required. Suction secretions as required.
- d. Symptomatic Supportive Care:
 - (1) Standard anticonvulsant therapy may be required; diazepam may be efficacious. Monitor ECG and adequacy of respirations and ventilation; supplemental oxygenation, endotracheal intubation, and assisted ventilation may be required.
 - (2) Inhaled sympathomimetics or IV theophylline may be used to treat bronchospasm if atropine alone is inadequate. Standard antiarrhythmic agents may be required; support pulse and blood pressure.
- e. Specific Antidotes:
 - (1) ATROPINE:
 - (a) Primarily effective for MUSCARINIC effects; will not reverse NICOTINIC effects.
 - (b) DIAGNOSTIC DOSE: ADULT: 1 mg IV or IM; CHILD: 0.25 mg (about 0.01 mg/kg) IV or IM; THERAPEUTIC DOSES: ADULT: 2 to 5 mg slowly IV; CHILD: 0.05mg/kg slowly IV; REPEAT DOSES may be administered every 10 to 30 minutes as needed to achieve and maintain full atropinization (drying of pulmonary secretions).
 - (c) CONTINUOUS ATROPINE INFUSION: Initial infusion rates of 0.02 to 0.08 mg/kg/hr have been recommended. CAUTION: Severity of atropine SIDE EFFECTS may be increased in a HOT CLIMATE.
 - (2) PRALIDOXIME (Protopam 2-PAM) and its chloride (US); mesylate (P2S) (UK): and methylsulphate (France, Italy).

- (a) Severe OP poisoning with nicotinic and/or CNS manifestations should be treated with pralidoxime. ADULT: 1 to 2 g IV at 0.5g/min. or mixed in 250 ml of NS and infused over 30 minutes. CHILD: 25 to 50 mg/kg diluted to a 5 percent concentration in NS and infused over 5 to 30 minutes.
 - (b) DOSING INTERVALS: Doses may be repeated at 1 hour after the initial dose, and every 7 to 12 hours thereafter if required.
 - (c) CONTINUOUS INFUSION: A continuous infusion of 500 mg/hr. for adult patients may be more beneficial than bolus dosing.
 - (d) MAXIMUM DOSE: Maximum recommended dose for pralidoxime is 12 g/24 hours for adults.
- (3) OBIDOXIME DICHLORIDE: May be a less toxic and more efficacious alternative to pralidoxime. Given as an IM or IV injection of 250 mg. Subsequent injections of 250 mg every 2 hours or continuous infusion of 35 mg/hr may be necessary.
- (4) HI-6: an alternative oxime, has excellent acetylcholinesterase regenerating action with VX and very good action with SARIN (GB).
- (5) AUTOINJECTORS: U.S. military personnel carry three atropine (2 mg) and three pralindoxime chloride (600 mg) autoinjectors to be used concomitantly for initial field self- or buddy-treatment of nerve agent poisoning. A single diazepam autoinjector (10 mg) is also carried and used after the last atropine autoinjector to prevent seizures.
- (6) PROPHYLACTIC ANTIDOTE: Pyridostigmine bromide 30 mg every 8 hours can provide some protection against nerve agents (especially SOMAN) by reversibly binding up to 30 percent of acetylcholinesterase and protecting it from irreversible OP binding. At this dose, only minimal adverse effects have been noted; however, single overdoses of 360 to 900 mg may produce serious effects including abdominal cramps, diarrhea, emesis, nausea, hypersalivation, fasciculations, muscle weakness, and blurred vision (Almog *et al.* 1991).

- f. Other: If induction of paralysis with muscle relaxing agents is required for intubation, SUCCINYLCHOLINE SHOULD BE AVOIDED because of potential prolonged duration of paralysis.

4. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSISTENCE

- a. Persistence: Nerve agents in general are moderately water soluble and have a high degree of solubility in lipids. They are slowly hydrolyzed in the environment to less toxic or nontoxic substances. SARIN and the other "G" agents are liquids whose physical properties allow evaporation and dispersion over several hours; they are thus considered "nonpersistent."
- b. Decontamination Measures: Nerve agents in general are rapidly detoxified by strong alkalis and chlorinating compounds. The M-291 Decontamination Kit, containing six packets of 2.8 grams each of AMBERGARD XE-555 resin (Ambersorb), is carried by military personnel for decontaminating personal equipment. Alkaline solutions or bleach may also be used. Natural aeration or treatment with supertropical bleach (STB) or (D2S) (diethylenetriamine plus a caustic) may also be used.

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
Student Manual**

Unit 6: Integrated Response to Terrorist Events

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to apply the components of the Incident Command System (ICS) and integrate them into an overall management plan for terrorist events.

Enabling Objectives

- Describe the functional responsibilities of a Command Officer when responding to a terrorist incident.
 - Demonstrate the ability to develop an incident command organizational response to terrorist incidents.
 - Develop a formal incident Action Plan (AP) for a terrorist incident.
-

INTRODUCTION

This unit of the course is a review of the Incident Command System (ICS) and its integration into an overall management plan for terrorist events.

It is assumed that students in this course will have a working knowledge of the basics of the ICS and will have experience in the practical application of ICS to a variety of emergency situations. In this unit, the various components of ICS will be discussed, along with their application to managing terrorist incidents.

Discussions will stress the duties and responsibilities of Command, and the use of functional units during terrorist emergencies. Single Command, Unified Command, and Area Command also will be discussed, as well as the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the use of Action Plans (AP's).

OVERVIEW

The role of the fire service has undergone dramatic changes in recent years with regard to the need to respond to a wider variety of emergency situations. In most cases, this has not been accompanied with increases in resources to meet these new challenges; in many cases it has been coupled with reductions from previous resource levels.

It becomes obvious that in order to meet the emergency response challenge facing today's fire service, a systems approach to managing this wide variety of emergency incidents is necessary. This wide variety of incidents can be manifested in one single terrorist incident using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).

The ICS provides a tool for command-level fire officers to help meet this challenge. It is an organized and systematic management approach that can be used in response to all emergencies, regardless of type or size.

BACKGROUND

Since the development of the ICS, the fire service has experienced several challenges in understanding its application. As a result, inconsistencies in the system began to develop; other hybrid systems came into existence, further distancing a common approach to incident command. A single incident management system is critical for effective command and control of major incidents. At these incidents, a single department may interface with other agencies on the local, State, and Federal level. In order to reduce the inherent confusion that may be associated with larger scale incidents, using a common command system is a must.

It is important to note that the ICS's have other applications or modules similar to the structural firefighting applications that have been in place for some time. These create a framework for other activities to operate in and further enhance the use of ICS. As an example, there are the multicasualty, hazardous materials (haz mat), highrise, and the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) applications. The terrorist incident can include all of these applications, while adding the critical fact that this is a Federal crime scene.

Need for a Systems Approach

A high degree of professionalism is expected of today's fire service; performance at emergency incidents is being scrutinized more closely than ever before. Command-level officers have a responsibility to ensure that a standardized incident management system is in place within their departments and that its use is customary in day-to-day operations.

The use of a systems approach to emergency management can increase the effectiveness and safety of emergency response resources. Following set procedures and reasonable guidelines enhances overall safety while increasing the odds of a positive conclusion to emergency incidents. This becomes critical when resources are limited.

By maintaining a high level of professionalism and effectiveness, criticism of departments is lessened and exposure to legal actions, due to questionable performance, is reduced.

The Incident Command System as a Tool

The ICS is probably one of the most important tools available to the command-level officer for managing emergency incidents.

ICS provides an "all-risk" system that can be applied to any type of emergency incident. It is applicable to any size incident from the routine fire handled by an initial alarm assignment to large and complex multidiscipline, multiagency situations.

The use of the ICS is not limited to the fire service nor is it limited to managing emergency operations only. The principles of ICS can be used to manage emergency incidents, establish an organization to run an EOC, or plan for an event. Other response agencies, such as law enforcement, EMS, and public works, are using the systems to manage incidents for which they have primary responsibility. In California, a State law mandates the use of a Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) by all State and municipal agencies.

ICS is a ready-made companion to the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) approach to merging the capabilities of all community agencies in dealing with emergency situations. ICS provides the common emergency management system under which a wide variety of community agencies can operate interactively.

The chief of department and command-level officers who are responsible for emergency operations have several responsibilities regarding the use of ICS within their departments. They must establish policies for its use in everyday responses and enforces its use. They must provide training for department personnel in the use of ICS and evaluate its effectiveness during emergency operations. They also must have a knowledge of how the various components of the system work and how they can be applied, at large scale and complex incidents, when they may be called on to fill a management role.

COMPONENTS OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

The ICS has a number of components. These components **working together interactively** provide the basis for effective incident management:

- common terminology;
- modular organization;
- integrated communications;
- Unified Command structure;
- consolidated AP's;
- manageable span-of-control;
- predesignated incident facilities; and
- comprehensive resource management.

Nowhere is the need more critical for these ICS components than at an incident of terrorism.

Common Terminology

It is essential for any management system, and especially one which will be used in joint operations by many diverse users, that common terminology be established for the following elements:

- **Organizational Functions.** A standard set of major functions and functional units has been predesignated for the ICS and named. Terminology for the organizational elements is standard and consistent.

- Resource Elements. Resources refer to the combination of personnel and equipment used in tactical operations. Common **kinds** of resources have been identified within ICS. Resources that vary in capability, because of size or power (for example, engines, rescue units, or helicopters), are **typed** as to capability.
- Facilities. Common identifiers are used for those facilities in and around the incident area that will be used during the course of the incident. These facilities include such locations as the Incident Command Post (ICP), Base, and Staging Areas.

Modular Organization

The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for the overall management of any incident. Initially, the IC will manage all aspects of the incident but, as the incident becomes larger or more complex, the IC may establish other functional components to assist him/her. The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion. It builds from the bottom up, based primarily on span-of-control considerations.

As the need arises, additional components may be added to the organization to manage specific functional areas. The assignment of personnel to those functional areas should be based on their ability to perform well, not specifically on rank.

One of the challenges in a terrorist incident is the need for the rapid modular expansion of the organizational structure due to the multi-disciplinary nature of such events.

Integrated Communications

Communications at the incident are managed through the use of a common communications plan. If necessary, an incident-based communications center is established solely for the use of tactical and support resources assigned to the incident. All communications at the incident should be in plain English. No codes should be used, and all communication should be confined to essential messages only.

Unified Command Structure

In a Single Command situation, there is a single IC who represents the jurisdiction or agency having responsibility for the incident. Unified Command is a team effort which allows all agencies, with either geographical or functional responsibility for the incident, to manage it by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. The early establishment of a Unified Command structure will enhance the strategic management of the terrorist incident greatly while still addressing tactical priorities.

Consolidated Action Plan

Every incident needs some form of AP. For small incidents of short duration, the plan may be simple and need not be written. For large or complex incidents, a written AP should be developed and used to manage the incident. Written AP's should be used

- when resources from multiple jurisdictions or agencies are involved;
- when the incident extends beyond the first operational period; and/or,
- when required by agency policy.

The IC will establish objectives and develop strategy for the incident based on the needs of the jurisdiction. In the case of a Unified Command, the incident objectives must reflect the needs of **all** of the jurisdictional agencies involved. Without Unified Command and a consolidated Action Plan uniting the interagency, interdisciplinary, and multijurisdictional responders, safety, strategic planning, and operational efficiency will be compromised severely.

The AP for the incident should cover all tactical and support activities required for the operational period.

Manageable Span-of-Control

Safety factors and sound management planning will influence and dictate span-of-control considerations. In general, within the ICS, the span-of-control of any individual with emergency management responsibility should range from three to seven, with five being optimal. Span-of-control refers to the number of personnel reporting to any given individual.

Span-of-control ratios can be driven by a number of factors:

- Training/Experience level of subordinates. Less trained or less experienced personnel require more direct supervision, thereby lessening the number of subordinates one can manage effectively.
- Complexity of the incident. A terrorist incident will require more mental concentration, thereby leaving less time available to supervise personnel. The varying skill sets required are also a factor in span-of-control.
- Type or timeframe of the incident. The speed of operations may influence span-of-control. A fast moving incident may require a tighter span-of-control with fewer divisions/groups in place, whereas in a slower moving operation, such as overhaul, the supervisor is less pressed for time for decisionmaking and, therefore, can manage more personnel/divisions/groups.

Predesignated Incident Facilities

Under the ICS, specific functional areas are predetermined, not by actual location but by name. These areas include

- ICP. The location at which the primary command functions are executed.
- Base. That location at which the primary logistics functions are coordinated and administered. The ICP may or may not be co-located with Base. There is only one Base per incident.
- Staging Area. A location where incident personnel and equipment are assigned on a 3-minute availability status.
- Helibase. The site, within the general incident area, for parking, fueling, maintenance, and loading of helicopters.
- Camp. A geographical site, within the general incident area, separate from Base, equipped and staffed to provide food, water, and sanitary services to incident personnel.

Not all of these areas are implemented on a routine basis, but for a significant terrorist event it may be necessary to identify and activate all of these locations. The physical security of these sites also must be included in the strategic planning.

Comprehensive Resource Management

ICS provides the ability to group single resources into multiunit Task Forces, Strike Teams, and Crews. Single and multiunit resources can then be organized by functional Groups or geographic Divisions. As the incident expands in size and span-of-control limits are met, those Divisions and Groups can be organized under Branches. ICS also allows for the creation of Area Command and multiple Operations Sections for exceptionally large incidents.

These resource management tools allow a single IC to maintain control of multiple (thousands) tactical resources at an incident.

AREA COMMAND

Area Command is an expansion of the Incident Command function designed to manage a very large incident that has multiple incident management teams assigned. Area Command may be established anytime that incidents are close enough to require oversight direction among incident management teams, to ensure that conflicts do not arise. Area Command's primary responsibilities are to coordinate the determination of incident

- objectives;
- strategies; and
- priorities for the use of critical resources allocated to Area Command.

Area Command is established to

- Oversee the management of multiple incidents, each of which is being handled by an ICS organization as shown in Figure 6-1.
- Oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams (IMT's) assigned to it.

Area Command typically is used when the incidents are of a similar nature (e.g., terrorists strike two targets in same area). When incidents are of different kinds, they would be handled either as separate incidents or using a Multiagency Coordination System (MAC) approach.

If the incidents under authority of the Area Command are multijurisdictional, a Unified Area Command may be established. This allows each jurisdiction to have representation in the Area Command.




Figure 6-1

The Use of Area Command

Major natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, fires, or major storms create a large number of incidents affecting individual communities and multijurisdictional areas. Due to their size and potential impact, these incidents provide an appropriate environment for the use of Area Command.

Area Command sets priorities among incidents and allocates critical resources according to priorities established by the agency executive. Area Command helps the agency executive by ensuring that agency policies, priorities, constraints, and guidance are being made known to respective IC's. Area Command also reduces the workload of the agency executive, especially if multiple incidents are in progress at the same time. The Area Command Post should be in close proximity to incidents under its command, but not co-located with any ICP.

It is important to remember that **Area Command does not in any way replace the incident-level ICS organizations or functions.** The Area Command organization operates under the same basic principles of ICS. The Area Command organization should be kept as simple as possible. Area Command organizational positions could consist of the Area Commander and, **only as necessary:**

- Assistant Area Commander, Logistics;
- Assistant Area Commander, Planning:
 - Area Command Critical Resources Unit Leader, and
 - Area Command Situation Unit Leader;
- Area Command Information Officer; and
- Area Command Liaison Officer.

UNIFIED COMMAND

Terrorism events, hazardous materials releases, mass casualty incidents, natural disasters, or wildland fires, among others, may involve a number of jurisdictions and/or agencies that have a legal responsibility (either geographic or functional), for portions of an incident, or for the entire incident. Those jurisdictions or agencies, therefore, need to be directly involved in policy decisions relating to the incident. It would be counterproductive to allow each of the responsible agencies to establish an ICP of its own, separate and distinct from the others. In this situation, a Unified Command structure should be established.

Reasons for a Unified Command

More than one agency is responsible for decisionmaking within a single jurisdiction (e.g., a passenger airline crash within a National Forest where local fire, law, and medical, Federal forestry, and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) all are involved).

- More than one jurisdiction is involved (e.g., a major flood or a hurricane that extends beyond jurisdictional boundaries).
- Incident location (e.g., an inland waterway entirely within the boundaries of a single jurisdiction also could involve the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)).

Involvement

- All agencies with responsibility to manage the incident contribute to the Command process. Jointly, they determine overall incident objectives, determine strategies, and plan tactics. This method ensures maximum use of assigned resources.
- One key official from each jurisdiction or responsible agency is involved.

- Representatives from responsible departments in a single jurisdiction are included.

The IC may be determined by local or State law. California law states that the law enforcement agency is the IC for haz mat incidents on the highways, but the local fire department may have the best capabilities for mitigating the problem. Where there is no law determining who is in charge, agencies should work together to determine which agency takes the lead for each risk a community faces.

The Incident Command function (IC) in a Unified Command may be comprised of two, three, or more persons but will function as a single unit with a single voice. Incident Command is still responsible for establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. In a Unified Command situation, the participating members will be able to accomplish that goal without losing or abdicating agency authority, responsibility, or accountability.

Depending on the type of incident, it must be determined which agencies actually have responsibility for the incident. Not all incidents necessitating the response of two or more agencies require the establishment of a Unified Command. One will have responsibility to be the lead agency and the other(s) will be supporting or assisting agencies.

Generally, the agency with the greatest jurisdictional involvement is assigned the Operations function. The Operations Section Chief may have deputies from other agencies. It is important to evaluate the qualifications of an individual before staffing ICS functional positions.

Single/Unified Command Differences

- In Single Command structure, a single IC is solely responsible for management of the incident.
- In a Unified Command structure, individuals designated by involved jurisdictions/agencies jointly determine objectives, strategy, and priorities.
- The determination of which jurisdiction/agency the Operations Section Chief represents must be made by mutual agreement of the Unified Command. When multiple jurisdictions are involved, the incident often is separated into Branches that reflect jurisdictional boundaries.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

Many jurisdictions have EOC's that may be activated in case of catastrophic events. Some EOC's are designed to provide direction and control for major incidents, others are simply established as a point of information and resource exchange. The EOC provides the communication and coordination link among local, State, and Federal assets.

EOC's normally are multiagency and often are multijurisdictional. They can be organized by using ICS functions:

- Command--EOC Director;
- Operations Section;
- Planning and Intelligence Section;
- Logistics Section;
- Finance/Administration Section;
- Public Information; and
- Liaison with other agencies/jurisdictions.

EOC's also may be organized by responsibility:

- Policy Group;
- Disaster Analysis and Coordination Group;
- Operations Group; and
- Resources Group.

A sample EOC organization is shown in Figure 6-2.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS




Figure 6.2

Maintenance and organization of the EOC usually is accomplished through the local emergency management organization, and policy issues are addressed by an oversight committee. The policymakers often are made up of department heads and/or local government officials (Mayor, City Manager, Board of Supervisors, City Council, etc.).

Information gathering is a primary role of the EOC. Each response agency may have only a partial picture of the overall situation; it is prudent to pool that information at a central point. This allows problems to be evaluated and prioritized, responses to be planned and coordinated,

and any "dead spots"--those areas from which no reports have been received--to be investigated. As vital information flows from field units and reporting stations, the EOC can develop "big picture" strategies for the most effective actions.


Information evaluation is another primary role of the EOC. Its purpose is to evaluate the information and to set priorities for response. Actual or impending threats to human life, such as collapsed buildings, hazardous vapors, or fires in occupied structures clearly are more important than threats to property only. The EOC must ensure that emergency resources are not depleted too early by too heavy a response to minor problems which typically are reported first. Information must continue to flow from the field to ensure a continual revision of situational analysis. Often emergency forces must be shifted and/or refocused as major problems surface.

Determining the need for outside help is another major EOC function. To be most effective at responding to an emergency, timely notice must be given to outside agencies or private sources. To evaluate properly the need for outside assistance and the type and size required, the EOC must know what resources already have been deployed, what remains in reserve, and what special equipment and personnel the situation may require. The EOC provides the most direct link to State and Federal assets. The declaration required to mobilize such assistance must originate at the local EOC.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS


The ICS organization has five major functional areas:

- Command;
- Operations;
- Planning;
- Logistics; and
- Finance/Administration.



Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration are referred to as **General Staff** positions.

Three additional support positions are available to help the IC manage the incident.



These three **Command Staff** positions are established to assume responsibility for key activities that are not part of the line organization.

At emergency incidents, consideration often has to be given to multifunctional concerns, where one individual performs multiple functions. At routine incidents, the IC usually can deal effectively with them all. However, at larger or more complex emergencies, the IC may have to delegate specific functional responsibilities.

When delegation of functional responsibilities is required, General Staff or Command Staff positions may be established selectively, based on the needs of the incident and the desires of the IC. Any functional responsibilities not delegated remain the responsibility of the IC.

With regard to delegating responsibilities and establishing functional positions, **the overall goal is not to build an organization, but to control the emergency.** The ICS is a tool to help the IC manage the incident and to control it successfully.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS

COMMAND

The responsibilities of Command include the following:

- determine incident objectives and overall strategy;
- manage the incident;
- establish immediate priorities;
- establish an ICP;
- approve and authorize implementation of the IAP;
- develop appropriate ICS organizational structure;
- coordinate activity for Command and General Staff;
- coordinate with outside agencies;
- authorize release of information regarding the incident; and
- ensure adequate safety measures are in place.

The IC may have a deputy, who may be from the same agency or an assisting agency. Deputies also may be used at the Section and Branch levels of the ICS organization. Deputies must have the same qualifications as the primary IC, as they must be ready to take over that position at anytime. The multidisciplinary needs of a terrorist incident are an ideal opportunity for integrating section chiefs and deputies from different specialities.

Command Staff

There are three Command Staff positions. The individuals filling these roles report directly to the IC. These positions may have assistants:

- Information Officer--This is a critical early delegation, as multiple public information sources must flow from a single point of contact.
- Safety Officer--Generally will be fire-service based, but should include haz mat, law enforcement, and public health.
- Liaison Officer--Even in a Unified Command system, Liaison is still a requirement due to the myriad other agencies involved in addition to the major players.

Agency Representatives (Agency Rep)

When outside resources are used, an agency or jurisdiction will send a representative to assist in coordination efforts. Agency reps will report to the IC through the Liaison Officer. An agency rep is an individual who has been delegated the authority to make decisions on matters affecting that agency's participation in the incident

OPERATIONS

The Operations Section is responsible for the management of all operations, directly applicable to the primary mission. The Operations Section activates and supervises organizational elements, in accordance with the AP.

The Operations Section Chief is responsible to the IC for the **management of all tactical operations and the safety of personnel** assigned to the Operations Section. Tactical elements are implemented, based on the operational, safety, and span-of-control needs of the incident. When Staging Areas are established, the Staging Area Manager(s) also reports to the Operations Chief.

The Operations Section Chief assists in formulating the AP, directs the preparation of unit operational plans, requests or releases resources, and makes necessary expedient changes to the AP. He/She also will keep the IC informed regarding the situation and resource status, related to tactical operations.

The Operations Chief may function at or near the ICP or at a remote location; that decision will be driven by incident needs and/or agency policy.

Personnel Accountability

All officers holding positions within the Command organization are responsible for the welfare and accurate accountability of all assigned members. While accountability systems vary in design, common elements should be applied at emergency incidents to fully account for personnel. These common elements are

- required use;
- nametags/documentation;
- point-of-entry control;

- tracking system;
- use of Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC's).

Whatever the design, the system must be able to locate all personnel within a small geographic work area, within the hazard zone at any moment in time. The system also must be able to determine if a firefighter is delayed from an assignment, initiate an immediate rescue effort, if indicated, and provide a rapid response to assist or rescue missing, injured, or trapped personnel.

Rapid Intervention Crew

NFPA 1500, *Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program*, requires having specifically designated rescue crews at the incident scene. This requirement is based on the realization that firefighters are exposed to the highest risk of injury or death while operating at the scene of an emergency, and that one of the most effective mechanisms for reducing that risk is to have an RIC ready to provide assistance to emergency personnel should the need arise.

The composition and placement of RIC's may be somewhat agency-specific, determined by individual needs and resource availability. However, it is important that written procedures/guidelines be developed for the use of these crews, especially when they are performing exterior operations in support of interior crews. These written procedures also should include evacuation signals and guidelines for implementing evacuation alarm and procedures known and understood by all. In addition, for agencies involved in auto/mutual-aid response, it is important to develop consistency among all responders in the use of RIC's. It is absolutely imperative that all operating forces know the evacuation signal and general alert procedures.


While there is some flexibility in procedural issues regarding rapid intervention, it is paramount that whenever personnel are performing functions that would subject them to immediate danger from equipment failure or some other unexpected sudden event, at least one properly attired RIC must be available to provide assistance or rescue. The issue of perimeter security and RIC physical security should be addressed and coordinated with law enforcement.

PLANNING

The responsibility of the Planning Section is to **collect, evaluate, and disseminate all information regarding the incident**. Planning maintains information on the current and forecasted situation, as well as on the status of resources assigned to the incident. The Planning Section's responsibilities include

- managing all information related to the incident;
- coordinating and conducting the Planning Meeting(s);
- preparing and distributing the incident AP;
- providing technical resources;
- maintaining situation status;
- tracking resource status;
- collecting incident documentation; and
- developing the demobilization plan.

Four primary functional units may be established within the Planning Section. Technical specialists also may be assigned to assist in evaluating the situation and forecasting requirements for additional personnel and equipment.



The Planning Section Chief supervises the Planning Section and oversees all aspects of the planning process. He/She conducts the Planning Meeting and uses all available information to develop the AP. The Planning Chief also is responsible for developing alternative and contingency plans to meet the needs of a dynamic incident. The Planning Section must include specialized functions for technical advice and information. This information flow of technical advice must be coordinated closely.

The **Resource Status Unit** is responsible for the accountability of all incident resources. The Resource Status Unit responsibilities include

- overseeing the check-in process of all resources assigned to the incident;
- maintaining a master list of all resources, identifying their location and status:
 - assigned--performing an assigned work task,
 - available--assigned to the incident but available for assignment to a work task, and
 - out of service--assigned to the incident but unavailable for response due to rest/rehab, mechanical or personnel reasons; and
- preparing the incident organization charts and resource assignment lists for the AP.

The **Situation Status Unit** is responsible for collecting, processing, organizing, and displaying information that describes the current and projected status of the incident. That includes

- using information from operational units and field observers;
- collecting information on current and projected weather conditions; and
- preparing maps and diagrams related to incident operations.

The **Documentation Unit** is responsible for maintaining complete, accurate, and up-to-date incident files. Incident files will be stored for legal, analytical, historical, and training purposes. **All** incident records and documentation should be collected and stored by the Documentation Unit. In a terrorist incident, the Documentation Unit must work closely with Operations, Command, and evidence processing/law enforcement efforts.

The **Demobilization Unit** is responsible for developing the incident demobilization plan. For small, day-to-day incidents, demobilization planning is a relatively simple process and normally will not require a **written** plan. For larger incidents (such as terrorist events), it is essential to have a written demobilization plan in place in order to ensure a smooth transition. Developing the demobilization plan should be done in close cooperation with the Operations Chief, Logistics Chief, and Liaison Officer, and must be approved by the IC.

Planning for incident demobilization is an important part of the incident planning process. Plans must be developed for the demobilization of specialized teams and resources that will respond to terrorist events. Command Officers have a responsibility to ensure that the plan incorporates replenishment and restocking of expended supplies.

The Planning Section Chief must establish an adequate Demobilization Unit to provide for orderly and efficient release of incident resources. Release priorities must be determined by all organizational elements for resources retained and resources available for release. Determination of release priorities can be made after a full understanding of long-term incident needs has taken place. Demobilization activities may continue for extended periods and must tie in closely with recovery efforts.

Technical specialists may be used to provide information or expertise required for effective control of the incident. Technical specialists will normally be part of the Planning Section, but may be assigned to a functional unit within the Operations Section.


The planning process for a large and/or complex incident involves the following elements:

- understanding the full scope of the situation;
- establishing incident objectives and strategy;
- developing a tactical plan to accomplish those objectives;
- implementing the plan;
- evaluating the plan; and
- modifying the plan, as needed.

Large-scale incidents that extend over a long period of time normally are broken into operational periods. That timeframe is the period of time scheduled for execution of a given set of tactical operations, as specified in the AP. The duration of an operational period may be 24, 12, 8, or 6 (whatever) hours, and is based on the availability of fresh resources, safety considerations, and the length of time needed to achieve tactical objectives.

The Planning Meeting

Planning Meetings are held, as needed, throughout the duration of an incident, to select specific strategies for incident control, and for service and support planning. As the strategies are identified, the availability of appropriate resources will be determined.



The Planning Section Chief is responsible for conducting the Planning Meeting. The meeting normally should last about 30 minutes. The IC will determine who should attend, but attendees normally include the Command and General Staff and other personnel with planning responsibilities. Radios, cell phones, and pagers should be turned off (or left outside). Attendees must come prepared and adhere to the planning process. Maps, diagrams, and other appropriate information should be displayed for all to see. The AP will be developed from the information presented at the Planning Meeting.

Planning Meeting Checklist

No.	Activity	Primary Responsibility
1	State Incident Objectives-- Policy Issues	Incident Commander
2	Give Situation & Resource Briefing	Planning Section Chief
3	State Primary & Alternate Strategies	Ops Section Chief
4	Designate Branch, Division, Group Boundaries & Functions, as Appropriate	Ops Section Chief
5	Describe Tactical Operations & Tactics	Ops & Planning Section Chiefs
6	Make Tactical Resource Assignments	Ops, Planning, & Logistics Section Chiefs
7	Facilities and Reporting Locations	Logistics Section Chief
8	Resources, Support, and Overhead	Planning & Logistics Sections Chiefs
9	Support Plans--Comm, Med., Traffic	Planning Section Chief/IC
10	Finalize, Approve, and Implement the Plan	IC and General Staff

Incident Action Plan

The bulk of the AP will be prepared at the first Planning Meeting and will only need to be updated following subsequent planning and meetings. **It will reflect general control objectives, overall incident strategy, and specific tactical plans for the next operational period.** When complete, the AP also may have a number of attachments (maps, diagrams, messages, etc.)

See ICS Forms Catalog, Appendix F.

When only a few units are engaged actively in a simple incident, the AP is developed in the mind of the IC and passed on verbally. The AP includes strategy and tactics for the incident, as well as the supporting operations that must occur. The IC must ensure that operating resources are aware of the incident objectives and overall strategy. This information normally is conveyed verbally to arriving companies and other officers.

AP's generally are not written for day-to-day operations. However, on large-scale incidents, such as terrorism, civil disturbance, natural disasters, haz mat spills, etc., there should be a written plan for each operational period.

Action planning begins by identifying the overall incident objectives. The strategy should be developed to define more clearly what has to be done.

Once the strategy has been defined, tactics are developed to accomplish the strategic goals. If the strategy defines where you want to go, then tactics are the ways to get you there. They provide the answers to the "how" and "where" of the AP. Tactics are measurable in both time and performance.

Once the plan is established and resources are committed, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of the plan. Information must be gathered and analyzed so that necessary modifications may be made to improve the effectiveness of the plan, if necessary. This step is part of the continuing sizeup process. The plan may be modified based on current and projected conditions.

A formal written AP should be developed when:

- The incident involves multiple jurisdictions or agencies.
- The incident extends beyond one operational period.
- A number of organizational elements are activated.
- It is required by agency policy.

Written incident AP's provide

- a clear statement of objectives and actions;
- a basis for measuring effectiveness (work and cost);
- a basis for measuring progress; and
- the ability to maintain accountability.

Elements of a Formal Written Incident Action Plan

The formal AP will be developed based on information generated at the Planning Meeting. Specific ICS forms are provided to document that information and become part of the AP. Different elements of the organization are responsible for completing these forms. The Planning Section is responsible for collecting each of the forms and compiling the AP. The essential elements of a formal AP are shown in the chart.

Element	Completion Responsibility	ICS Form
Statement of Incident Objectives	Resource Unit	202
Incident Organization List	Resource Unit	203
Tactical Assignment Listed	Resource Unit	204
Communications Plan	Communications Unit	205
Medical Plan	Medical Unit	206
Air Operations Summary (if needed)	Air Operations Supervisor	220
Safety Message/Plan	Safety Officer	
Traffic Plan	Ground Support Unit	
Maps/Diagrams	Situation Unit	
Weather Forecast	Weather Observer	
Demobilization Plan	Demob Unit	

Once the plan is compiled, the IC will approve it. It will then be duplicated, as necessary, and distributed to all supervisory personnel who need it, normally during the Operations Briefing.

Operations Briefing


On large incidents (or major disasters that require more than one operational period), the written AP (covering the new period) is reviewed at the Operations Briefing with the oncoming shift. It is usual for multiday, large, incidents/disasters to be divided into 12-hour operational periods (referred to as day and night or A and B shifts). The intent of each briefing is to review the new AP **that covers the next operational period.**

Who attends each Operations Briefing is dictated by the Operations Section Chief but will include all operational supervisory personnel, down to the Division/Group level, and any others who may provide important information for tactical operations.

LOGISTICS

The Logistics Section is responsible for **providing facilities, services, and materials** in support of the incident. The Logistics Section Chief will activate and supervise Branches and Units within the Section, as necessary. In a growing incident, establishment of a Logistics Section should be considered early.

A full Logistics Section will be comprised of a number of Units under the Service and Support Branches.



The **Communications Unit** is responsible for the development of plans to make the most effective use of incident-assigned communications equipment and facilities. This includes the installation and testing of all communications equipment, and supervision and operation of the incident communications center. They also will develop the incident communications plan.

The **Medical Unit** will develop procedures for handling any medical emergency involving incident personnel. This includes providing medical aid and transportation for injured and ill personnel. The Medical Unit also is responsible for development of the incident medical plan.

The **Food Unit** determines food and water requirements for incident personnel, including those in remote locations. The Food Unit must be able to anticipate needs in terms of numbers of personnel to be fed, as well as any special feeding requirements due to the type or location of the incident.

The **Supply Unit**, when established, is responsible for ordering personnel, equipment, and supplies. It also is responsible for receiving, storing, and maintaining an inventory of all incident-related resources. This includes both expendable and nonexpendable supplies for incident support.

The **Facilities Unit** will establish, set up, maintain, and demobilize all facilities used in support of incident operations. The Facilities Unit also will set up any facilities needed for operation of the incident (ICP, Staging Areas, or Base).

The **Ground Support Unit** is responsible for the maintenance and repair of primary tactical equipment, vehicles, and mobile ground-support equipment. This includes fueling all mobile equipment. It is also responsible for providing transportation services in support of incident operations, except air transportation, and for preparing and implementing the incident traffic plan.

**FINANCE/
ADMINISTRATION**


The Finance/Administration Section may be established at incidents when the agency(s) involved have a specific need for financial services. When established, this section has the responsibility for all financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the incident.

Although financial concerns may not be a major factor during most emergencies, there are certain types of incidents or circumstances where they are significant:

- extended duration incidents;
- incidents using outside resources or supplies;
- incidents where reimbursements may be available; and
- incidents involving cost sharing.

Most fire and police agencies lack the day-to-day organizational structures to manage the financial demands of a large-scale or complex incident. However, assistance in this area usually is available through other governmental agencies within the jurisdiction, such as the city finance officer or county budget director.

Based on current and future needs, specific units may be established within the Finance/Administration Section.



The **Time Unit** is responsible primarily for ensuring that personnel time records are prepared and comply with the agency's time policy and Federal regulations.

The **Procurement Unit** will address all financial matters pertaining to vendor contracts, leases, and fiscal agreements.

The **Compensation/Claims Unit** is responsible for documents related to compensation for injury and to any claims that result from incident operations.

The **Cost Unit** provides cost effectiveness analysis, cost estimates, and cost saving recommendations for the incident.

Only with a strong Unified Command system can fire and rescue services integrate with the other response entities having statutory and functional responsibilities at incidents of terrorism.

Each organization or response discipline will have its own management structure and each must interface for the common good while completing its lawful or assigned missions.

SUMMARY

There is a definite need for a systems approach to managing emergencies. This is especially true for large-scale or complex incidents. The use of a structured system, properly applied, will greatly increase the probability of a successful outcome.

The benefits of using the ICS to manage emergency incidents are many. Some of the most obvious are

- increased professionalism through a structured approach that minimizes chaos and confusion and enhances overall safety;
- an all-risk/all-agency system that is adaptable to a wide variety of incidents and multiple agencies;
- modular expansion of the system through selective application of functional positions to fit specific incident needs;
- maximum use of resources through unity of command concepts, organizational structure, and span-of-control considerations;
- identification of specific responsibilities for functional assignments, providing a high degree of accountability;
- easier and more effective management of incidents through the use of an organizational structure that provides for selective delegation of identified functional responsibilities; and

- enhanced incident scene safety by providing manageable span-of-control and adequate supervisory personnel for all activities.

Activity 6.1

Mountain Terrorist Incident

Purpose

To gain an understanding of the Unified Incident Command System and the incident Action Plan (AP) used to guide incident management.

Directions

1. Read Student Description and Planning Meeting paragraphs for Mountain Terrorist Incident.
2. Follow the instructor's direction as he/she points out significant points of the incident AP starting with Summary Sheet.
3. As a means of identifying the integrated management of the Unified Command System, the instructor will walk through the AP identifying key roles and positions, prompting students.

Activity 6.1 (cont'd)

Mountain Terrorist Incident

Incident Description

Terrorist Incident--Hazardous chemical release (nerve gas Sarin) at Magic Mountain Amusement Park during peak attendance. A multi-agency response of fire, law enforcement, and EMS, Park Security. Local, State, Federal levels of response.

Planning Meeting

Initial Planning Meeting conducted for the Command and General Staff. Multi-agency organization and Unified Command. The meeting would be held as soon as possible using the intelligence at the time and available staff personnel. The operational period established would be 4 hours due to incident complexity and dynamics.

Command would be unified fire and law enforcement and the incident AP would be approved accordingly. Prior to the Planning Meeting a Unified Commanders' meeting would be conducted to discuss responsibilities, etc.

The SEMS ICS Planning Meeting format would be used for the meeting (attached).

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

INCIDENT DEBRIEFING	1. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN	2. DATE PREPARED 8-2-98	3. TIME PREPARED 1735 HRS
<p align="center">4. MAP SKETCH</p> <p align="center">MAGIC MOUNTAIN PARK</p> <p>The map sketch shows Magic Mountain Park with several key features: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ENTRANCE: Located at the bottom left of the park area. WARM ZONE: A shaded area to the left of the central park area. HOT ZONE: A shaded area in the center of the park, containing a circled 'X'. PARKING: Two parking areas are shown, one at the top right and one at the bottom left. MAGIC MOUNTAIN PARKWAY: A road at the bottom of the map with a north-south arrow pointing towards the park. U.S. 5: A road on the right side of the map. WIND 5MPH SE: An arrow pointing towards the top right, indicating wind direction and speed. ICP (B): A small square icon with a diagonal line and the letter 'B' in a circle, located in the bottom left corner of the sketch area. (S): A circled 'S' located in the bottom right corner of the sketch area. </p>			
ICS 201 (12/93) NFES 1325	PAGE 1	5. PREPARED BY (NAME AND POSITION) R. WARFORD SITUATION UNIT LEADER	

UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

INCIDENT OBJECTIVES	1. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN INCIDENT	2. DATE PREPARED 8-2-98	3. TIME PREPARED 1800 HRS.
4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 8-2-98 1800-2100 HRS.			
5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)			
1. SECURE PERIMETER, HOT ZONE, WARM ZONE, COLD ZONE.			
2. MOVE CROWDS TO SAFETY AREAS AND SECURITY.			
3. CONTROL, CONTAIN, STABILIZE SARIN GAS RELEASE.			
4. RESCUE VICTIMS.			
5. PROVIDE EMS, DECON TRIAGE, TREAT AND TRANSPORT.			
6. PROVIDE FOR RESCUER SAFETY.			
7. PROTECT AGAINST 2ND DEVICE OR HOSTILE ATTACK.			
8. SECURE EVIDENCE AND CRIME AREA.			
9. SECURE PARK FROM ENTRY AND EXIT.			
10. CONTROL SURROUNDING VEHICULAR TRAFFIC.			
11. INVESTIGATE AND SEARCH FOR TERRORISTS.			
6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD SE WINDS 2 to 5 MPH. TEMP 80°F. HUMIDITY 27%			
7. GENERAL SAFETY MESSAGE USE SITE SAFETY PLAN. PROVIDE PERSONAL PROTECTION AND DECON FOR RESCUERS. DECON VICTIMS BEFORE TREATMENT. BE AWARE OF POSSIBLE SECONDARY DEVICE, AND HOSTILE ATTACK.			
8. ATTACHMENTS (✓ IF ATTACHED)			
✓ ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)		✓ MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)	✓ RESPONSE PROTOCOL
✓ ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS 204)		✓ INCIDENT MAP	□ _____
✓ COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)		✓ TRAFFIC PLAN	✓ NERVE GAS INFO.
202 ICS 3-80	9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER		10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER) F. BORDEN

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT LIST		1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED
		MOUNTAIN	8/2/98	1800 hrs
4.	INCIDENT COMMANDER AND STAFF	OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 8/2/98 1800 - 2200 HRS		
	INCIDENT COMMANDER UNIFIED	F. BORDEN		
	DEPUTY/INCIDENT COMM	B. LEWIS		
	SAFETY OFFICER	J. DOLAN		
	INFORMATION OFFICER	S. RUDA		
	LIAISON OFFICER	R. GANDY		
5.	AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES			
	AGENCY	NAME		
	DOD	D. DEVITO		
	FBI	T. FERRARA		
	FEMA	G. BAUGHMAN		
6.	PLANNING SECTION			
	CHIEF	P. MILLER		
	DEPUTY			
	RESOURCES UNIT	J. FEATHERSTONE		
	SITUATION UNIT	R. WARFORD		
	DOCUMENTATION UNIT	R. VASQUEZ		
	DEMOBILIZATION UNIT			
	TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS	F. QJEDA TECH RES W. TROUP WMD		
7.	LOGISTICS SECTION			
	CHIEF	T. CURRY		
	DEPUTY			
a.	SUPPORT BRANCH			
	DIRECTOR			
	SUPPLY UNIT	M. O'CONNOR		
	FACILITIES UNIT	K. ZUMWALT		
	GROUND SUPPORT UNIT			
b.	SERVICE BRANCH			
	DIRECTOR			
	COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	D. MANNO		
	MEDICAL UNIT	K. NIDA		
	FOOD UNIT			
		8.	OPERATIONS SECTION	
		CHIEF	R. DEFEO	
		DEPUTY	R. ODENTHAL	
		a. FIRE	BRANCH I - DIVISION/GROUPS	
		BRANCH DIRECTOR	J. RI/WADD	
		DEPUTY		
		DIVISION/GROUP	STB	G. SEIDEL
		DIVISION/GROUP	HM	R. NEAHY
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		b. MEDICAL	BRANCH II - DIVISION/GROUPS	
		BRANCH DIRECTOR	D. RASUMOFF	
		DEPUTY		
		DIVISION/GROUP	MEDA	D. LEE
		DIVISION/GROUP	MEDB	J. DEUDY
		DIVISION/GROUP	TIP	J. MARTIN
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		c. LAW	BRANCH III - DIVISION/GROUPS	
		BRANCH DIRECTOR	S. LACHASSE	
		DEPUTY		
		DIVISION/GROUP	SEC	R. LEG
		DIVISION/GROUP	EVAC	G. MORRISON
		DIVISION/GROUP	TRAF	M. GALVAN
		DIVISION/GROUP	INV.	T. HANEY
		DIVISION/GROUP		
		d.	AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH	
		AIR OPERATIONS BR. DIR.		
		AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUP.		
		AIR SUPPORT GROUP SUP.		
		HELICOPTER COORDINATOR	R. REYNOLDS	
		AIR TANKER/FIXED-WING CRD.		
			FINANCE SECTION	
		CHIEF	L. MCCOY	
		DEPUTY		
		TIME UNIT		
		PROCUREMENT UNIT		
		COMPENSATION/CLAIMS UNIT		
		COST UNIT		
203 ICS 1-82		9. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. FEATHERSTONE		

NFES 1327

UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

1. BRANCH FIRE		2. DIVISION/GROUP SEARCH & RESCUE		DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8/2/98 TIME 1800 - 2200					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF DEFEO			DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR G. SEIDEL						
BRANCH DIRECTOR J. RYLAND			AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR						
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR		LEADER		NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME		
S & R TEAM 1									
S & R TEAM 2									
RIT 1									
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEARCH CONTAMINATED AREA & REMOVE VICTIMS TO DECON AREA - RIT (RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM) STAND BY FOR INTERVENTION FIRE/SWAT 									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - USE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING & SCBA - COORDINATE W/ HAZ MAT & SECURITY - ALL ENTRY PERSONNEL CARRY SELF AUTOINJECTIONS OF ATROPINE 									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT					REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO-AIR				
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. STONE				11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER			DATE 8/2/98	TIME 1800	

ICS 204 1-82

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH FIRE	2. DIVISION/GROUP HAZ MAT	DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST							
3. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN			4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8-2-98 TIME 1800-2200						
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF DEEED		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR R. NEAMY							
BRANCH DIRECTOR J. KYLAND		AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____							
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME				
HAZ MAT CO 1									
HAZ MAT CO 5									
ENTRY TEAM									
SITE CONTROL									
SAFE REFUGE									
DECON 1									
DECON 2									
TECH. SPEC.									
TECH. SPEC.									
SAFETY OFFICERS									
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ESTABLISH OPERATING ZONES. - I.D. PRODUCT AND SPREAD -- MONITOR AREA. - STABILIZE and CONTROL PRODUCT. - DECON HAZ MAT TEAM AND CONTAMINATED RESCUERS/VICTIMS. 									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - COORDINATE WITH SEARCH-RESCUE, MEDICAL BRANCH, SECURITY. - MAINTAIN ALL SAFETY PROCEDURES. - DECON VICTIMS PRIOR TO MEDICAL CARE. 									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT					REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO-AIR				
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. STONE			11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER			DATE 8/2/98	TIME 1800		

ICS 204 1-82

UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

1. BRANCH MEDICAL		2. DIVISION/GROUP MED GROUP 1		DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8-2-98 TIME 1800-2200					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF DEFED		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR F. PRATT							
BRANCH DIRECTOR D. KASUMOFF		AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____							
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME				
TRIAGE UNIT									
TREATMENT									
TRANSPORTATION									
MED. SUPPLY									
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PROVIDE EMS TO EXPOSED AFTER DECON BY HAZ MAT. - TRIAGE WILL MANAGE MORGUE. - USE DESIGNATED TRIAGE & TREATMENT AREAS. 									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - USE ATROPINE AS ANTIDOTE. - COORDINATE WITH HAZ MAT AND LAW INVESTIGATION. - WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING. 									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT					REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO- AIR				
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. STONE			11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER			DATE 8/2/98	TIME 1800		

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH Law	2. DIVISION/GROUP Security	DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST						
3. INCIDENT NAME Mountain			4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8-2-98 TIME 1800-2200					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL								
OPERATIONS CHIEF Deleo		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR R. Lee						
BRANCH DIRECTOR S. Lachasse		AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____						
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD								
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME			
Perimeter Team								
Park Team								
LACO SWAT								
LAPD SWAT								
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS								
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - maintain security on perimeter. - maintain security and control of patrons in park. - Provide for rapid intervention SWAT Operations if needed. 								
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS								
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - close off park and maintain watch for secondary attack. - Use L.A. Co. SO. shooting protocol. - Coordinate with evacuation group. 								
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY								
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT			
	REPEAT				LOCAL REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO-AIR			
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. Stone			11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. Miller			DATE 8/28/98	TIME 1800	

ICS 204 1-82

UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

1. BRANCH <u>Law</u>	2. DIVISION/GROUP <u>Traffic</u>	DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME <u>Mountain</u>				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE <u>8-2-98</u> TIME <u>1800-2200</u>			
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL							
OPERATIONS CHIEF <u>Defeo</u>			DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR <u>M. Galvan</u>				
BRANCH DIRECTOR <u>S. Lachasse</u>			AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____				
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD							
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME		
<u>Motor Task Force</u>							
<u>LASO Task Force</u>							
<u>CHP Task Force</u>							
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control + direct emergency response vehicles into park. - Control + direct civilian traffic around + in park. - Control + direct traffic outside of park. 							
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain response routes into park on Interstate 5 and Magic Mountain Parkway. - Divert civilian traffic from I-5. - Coordinate with security and maintain traffic plan. 							
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY							
FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION	FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL			SUPPORT	LOCAL		
	REPEAT				REPEAT		
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL				GROUND-TO- AIR			
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) <u>J. Stone</u>		11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) <u>P. Miller</u>			DATE <u>8-2-98</u>	TIME <u>1800 hrs.</u>	

ICS 204 1-82

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

1. BRANCH LAW	2. DIVISION/GROUP EVACUATION	DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST							
3. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8-2-98 TIME 1800-2200					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL OPERATIONS CHIEF B. DEPED BRANCH DIRECTOR S. LACHASSE DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR G. MORRISON AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____									
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR	LEADER	NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME				
FIRE TASK FORCE 1									
POLICE TASK FORCE 1									
POLICE TASK FORCE 2									
PARK SECURITY TEAM									
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS - MOVE PEOPLE TO DESIGNATED SAFE AREAS. - FIRE TASK FORCE WORKS IN HOT AND WARM ZONES. - POLICE AND PARK SECURITY WORK IN COLD ZONE.									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS - IDENTIFY CONTAMINATED VICTIMS FOR MEDICAL, HAZ MAT, + SECURITY GROUPS. - COORDINATE WITH MEDICAL + HAZ MAT GROUPS. - DO NOT MIX CONTAMINATED VICTIMS WITH EVACUEES. - DO NOT PERMIT EVACUEES TO LEAVE PARK.									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT					REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO-AIR				
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. STONE			11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER			DATE 8/2/98	TIME 1800 HRS.		

ICS 204 1-82

UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

1. BRANCH LAW		2. DIVISION/GROUP INVESTIGATION		DIVISION ASSIGNMENT LIST					
3. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN				4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE 8-2-98 TIME 1800-2200					
5. OPERATIONS PERSONNEL									
OPERATIONS CHIEF DEFED		DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR T. HANEY							
BRANCH DIRECTOR S. LACHASSE		AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR _____							
6. RESOURCES ASSIGNED THIS PERIOD									
STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE RESOURCE DESIGNATOR		LEADER		NUMBER PERSONS	TRANS. NEEDED	DROP OFF PT/TIME	PICK-UP PT/TIME		
F.B.I. TEAM									
A.T.F. TEAM									
D.O.D. TEAM									
LASD TEAM									
7. CONTROL OPERATIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - F.B.I. LEAD IN INVESTIGATING INCIDENT. - LOCATE AND I.D. SUSPECTS. - COLLECT EVIDENCE. - INTERROGATE WITNESSES. 									
8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - COORDINATE WITH FIRE BRANCH + SECURITY GROUP. - WORK IN SAFE AREAS UNLESS PROTECTED. - ESTABLISH CLOSED AREAS FOR EVIDENCE COLLECTION. 									
9. DIVISION/GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY									
FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.	FUNCTION		FREQ.	SYSTEM	CHAN.
COMMAND	LOCAL				SUPPORT	LOCAL			
	REPEAT					REPEAT			
DIV/GROUP TACTICAL					GROUND-TO- AIR				
10. PREPARED BY (RESOURCES UNIT) J. STONE				11. APPROVED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF) P. MILLER			DATE 8/2/98	TIME 1800 HRS.	

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN		1. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN	2. DATE/TIME PREPARED 8-2-98 1800	3. OPERATIONAL PERIOD DATE/TIME 8-2-98 1800-2200	
4. BASIC RADIO CHANNEL UTILIZATION					
SYSTEM/CACHE	CHANNEL	FUNCTION	FREQUENCY	ASSIGNMENT	REMARKS
L.A. CO. FIRE	1	COMMAND		ICP COMM & GEN STAFF	
L.A. CO. SHER.	2	DISPATCH		ICP	USE TELEPHONE ALSO.
PARK SECURITY	3	INTEL		FIRE LAW MED	USE SECURE CHANNEL ONLY
FIRE S&R	10	TACTICAL		FIRE LAW	
FIRE HM	11	TACTICAL		FIRE LAW	
MEDICAL	12	TACTICAL		FIRE EMS	
LAW SECURITY	20	TACTICAL		LAW FIRE EMS	
LAW EVAC.	21	TACTICAL		FIRE LAW	
208 ICS 9-86		5. PREPARED BY (COMMUNICATIONS UNIT) D. MANNO			


UNIT 6: INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO TERRORIST EVENTS

MEDICAL PLAN	1. INCIDENT NAME MOUNTAIN	2. DATE PREPARED 8-2-98	3. TIME PREPARED 1800	4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD 1800-2200					
5. INCIDENT MEDICAL AID STATIONS									
MEDICAL AID STATIONS		LOCATION		PARAMEDICS					
				YES	NO				
MED. STATION 1		MAIN GATE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
MED. STATION 2		NORTH PARKING LOT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
6. TRANSPORTATION									
A. AMBULANCE SERVICES									
NAME		ADDRESS		PHONE		PARAMEDICS			
						YES	NO		
L.A. CO. + LA. CITY						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
GOODHEW						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
MERRY AIR						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
B. INCIDENT AMBULANCES									
NAME		LOCATION		PARAMEDICS					
				YES	NO				
L.A. CITY		MEDICAL STAGING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
GOODHEW		"	"	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
L.A. CO. HEALTH		"	"		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
MERCY AIR		HELISPOT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
L.A. CITY AIR		"		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
7. HOSPITALS									
NAME		ADDRESS		TRAVEL TIME		HELIPAD		BURN CENTER	
				AIR	GRND	PHONE	YES	NO	YES
VALLEY PRES.				5	20		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
SANTA CLARITA				10	45		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
NORTHRIDGE				15	60		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
U.C.L.A.				20	90		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
8. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES									
- INITIAL CARE @ MED STATIONS									
- DECON FIRST									
- NOTIFY MED. BRANCH DIR.									
- USE AIR EVAC. TO HOSP. FOR SERIOUS									
- USE ATROPINE FOR EXPOSURE									
206 ICS 8-78		9. PREPARED BY (MEDICAL UNIT LEADER) K. NIDA				10. REVIEWED BY (SAFETY OFFICER) J. DOLAN			

NPES 1331

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

Incident Name MOUNTAIN
 Operational Period 1800 - 2200 HRS
 Date 8-2-98 Time 1800 HRS



**Note: In some disciplines, the Staging Area and Staging Area Manager may report to the Logistics Chief.*

PLANNING MEETING CHECKLIST

No.	ACTIVITY	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
1	STATE INCIDENT OBJECTIVES--POLICY ISSUES	INCIDENT COMMANDER
2	GIVE SITUATION & RESOURCE BRIEFING	PLANNING SECT. CHIEF
3	STATE PRIMARY & ALTERNATE STRATEGIES	OPS SECTION CHIEF
4	DESIGNATE BRANCH, DIVISION, GROUP BOUNDARIES & FUNCTIONS AS APPROPRIATE	OPS SECTION CHIEF
5	DESCRIBE TACTICAL OPERATIONS & TACTICS	OPS & PLANS SECTION CHIEF
6	MAKE TACTICAL RESOURCE ASSIGNMENTS	OPS, PLANNING, & LOG. SECT. CHIEFS
7	FACILITIES AND REPORTING LOCATIONS	LOGISTICS SECT. CHIEF
8	RESOURCES, SUPPORT, AND OVERHEAD	PLANS & LOGISTICS SECTIONS CHIEFS
9	SUPPORT PLANS--COMM, MED., TRAFFIC	PLANS SECT. CHIEF/IC
10	FINALIZE, APPROVE, & IMPLEMENT THE PLAN	IC AND GEN. STAFF

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
Student Manual**

Unit 7: Incident Documentation and Evidence Preservation

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to understand the importance of incident documentation and evidence preservation as they relate to terrorist incidents.

Enabling Objectives

- Identify the importance of documentation during a terrorist incident.
 - Identify the steps involved in documentation for terrorist incidents.
 - Explain how proper evidence preservation will assist other agencies with their responsibilities during and after a terrorist incident.
-

VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENTATION

More and more fire departments are finding themselves confronted with increasing demands to provide information, prove their cases, and present their recommendations by the numbers. In many cases it is required by law.

All government activities require some documentation for various reasons:

- To review the activities in order to improve future performance.
- To provide a basis for current and future planning activities.
- Oversight responsibilities of legislative bodies require good records.
- Judicial reviews and litigations depend on complete and accurate documentation.
- Financial audits, vendor payments for goods and services, reimbursements from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other agencies, and correct adjudication of damage claims all depend on accurate reports and records.
- Good documentation is essential to develop the historical record.

The emergency nature of a terrorist event does not lessen the need for, nor alleviate, requirements for complete documentation. Documentation will be greater both in volume and in scope than during routine emergencies. Workload will be proportional to the size and impact of the event. This need is driven by:

- more extensive damage;
- amount of casualties;
- more agencies involved;
- greater cost;
- increased possibility of something going wrong; and
- increased exposure.

Records and reports are used by many groups and agencies. At all levels of government other public agencies, in addition to the fire department, use records and reports. Federal agencies include FEMA for support and reimbursement, Department of Energy (DOE) for radiological incidents, Department of Transportation (DOT) for hazardous materials incidents, and Department of Commerce (DOC) for weather-related incidents, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for incidents of terrorism.

At the State level, the State's Emergency Services Agency, State Fire Marshal, legislature, and, in some cases, other agencies, play similar roles to their Federal counterparts or have other interests in the proper documentation of an incident.

Locally the governmental bodies that have a special interest are the financial department, governing council or board, local disaster coordinator, or the administration.

The public has a right to see nonconfidential documents concerning an incident. Confidential documents include ongoing law enforcement investigations, personnel performance, Social-Security-numbered documents, and other documents that can lead to litigation or personnel action.

Incident documents are of interest to citizen groups, historians, individuals, and new organizations. The private sector has a need for documents to settle claims for damage and to pay vendors. The third sector, institutions such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross, needs documents as information for fundraising and to help obtain reimbursements for activities.

It is very difficult to capture data after the fact; information must be captured about events as they occur. Use the following checklist.

- keep notes;
- use audio and video recorders;
- take pictures;
- make drawings and sketches;
- demand receipts, vouchers, time slips;
- keep copies of everything; and
- regularly get documents to appropriate agency for retention.

DOCUMENTATION FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS

Step 1: Identify Information Required for the Future

Checklist--Are all the forms needed available?

Financial Documentation

- Incident Command System (ICS) forms/reports such as unit log, check-out form, performance ratings.

- All other financial documents are agency-specific.
- Determine which forms your agency will use.
 - Provide adequate number in kits at Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and for ICS teams.
 - Provide simple step-by-step instructions for financial documents, as untrained personnel **will** be using them.
- Make it obvious who retains the various copies of financial documents.

When hiring temporary help under emergency conditions, no Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) rules are suspended. Hires must be legal and taxes must be paid.

- Rental agreements and rental agreement timesheets.
- Reimbursement forms for FEMA and those required by the State.
 - Compensation forms. You must keep time documents for all workers, even volunteers. Document wage rate agreements when hiring casual help; include maximum allowable daily hours and overtime rates. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requirements apply even during emergencies. Be sure to include IRS and INS forms when hiring casual help.
 - Damage claims system must be in place. Use a trained comp/claims unit that will not argue the issue during the emergency, simply document the situation. Include photos, drawings, videotapes (with date and time, if possible) in the documentation. Document as soon as reported to capture the freshest information. Be sure to include witness statements and investigator's narrative in the package.
 - Injury claims. Use standard injury report forms specific for worker's employer. Document all aspects of investigations of serious injuries and fatalities. Have trained investigation teams to document serious injuries and fatalities.
 - Agreements. Include copies of all agreements that could be used during an incident (e.g., mutual aid, rental and purchase, assistance-by-hire, cost share) in the documentation kit.

- Cost reports. Daily estimates of both damage and abatement costs must be documented; these can be estimates. Set up the system in advance using standard rates. Total cost/damage figures should be accurate but will be time consuming to compile. At the end of the incident, ongoing collection of the information will facilitate the process.

Operational Documentation

- Unit logs from Operations provide a critical record of events. They are a valuable debriefing/planning tool. Compiled, they provide a critical chronology of the incident analysis and history. Accurate times of events are essential.
- Used incident Action Plans (AP's), especially maps, provide valuable debriefing information to Situation Unit. Maps provide a common basis of location--a special problem during disasters. Usually, these are not filed in the documentation unit. Data should be transferred to the file map with identification of the recorder noted.
- Debriefing forms.
- Operational Planning Worksheet, if used, stored in file.
- Incident briefing.
- General messages to/from Operations filed by incident dispatcher.
- Checkout forms.
- Contingency plans.
- Performance ratings.
- Special narratives.

Logistical Documentation

- resource orders;
- performance ratings;
- special narrative reports;
- equipment evaluation/test results;

- rental equipment/inspections;
- unit logs;
- radio logs; and
- medical/rehab documentation.

Planning and Technical Documentation

In addition to being responsible for the final incident documentation package, technical/planning personnel have the bulk of the documentation responsibility.

- Generic records and reports such as Unit Logs, performance ratings, and checkout forms.
- Index and Responsible Official Receipt Form signed by the receiving official when final document package is turned over to the jurisdiction. The original is kept by the Incident Commander (IC).
- The Incident Briefing Form (ICS Form 201) usually is received from Operations or initial IC and retained in plans.
- Incident Takeover Form, used if a command team takes command of the incident. Includes delegation of authority and expectations of the line officer (administrator).
- Originals and corrected copies of the AP's, normally one per operational period. The corrected copy indicates changes made at briefings and during the operational period.
- Incident chronology and damage maps developed and maintained by the Situation Unit. Maps should be of adequate scale to show affected area in some detail. At least one map per operational period should be made and retained. (The same base map can be reused.) These should indicate time and date status information was gathered, not time the map was drawn.
- Operational Planning Worksheets. Originated by Operations and completed by Planning: One for each operational period.
- Demobilization Plan. Developed by the Demobilization Unit, it will include release policies and procedures from the incident; this is an extremely important document. (These policies should be known in advance.)

- Special narrative reports.
- T-Cards. Resource Status Cards from Resource Unit. They must be kept current with status of resources.
- Technical Specialist Reports.
- Information gathering and field maps come from the Situation Unit; raw data are used to develop operational planning maps.
- Damage predictions that were developed during risk assessment.
- Individual incident report/narrative. Preparation of the narrative is the responsibility of the Planning Chief. It is updated each operational period. It contains a summary of action taken/results/significant events and includes the performance of the Command and General Staff and cost to date. Standards for the narrative should be in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP).
- Delegation of authority and administrative information.

Any time a command team is used or the IC is from another jurisdiction, a delegation of authority is required. This provides the legal framework for action on the incident. Used if the jurisdictional agency has too many simultaneous emergencies or has entered into an agreement to establish a team with adjacent agencies. It spells out lines of authority and responsibility and it establishes limits and expectations for the IC and team.

- Emergency Response Plan. A reference copy should be included in the package. Mostly for the historical record, since it usually changes after use; however, there is an expectation that the plan will be followed.
- Check-In Lists (ICS Form 211).
- Rehabilitation plan developed at the close of the suppression or abatement phase of the incident. It may be part of the IAP or a separate document, and may include the damage assessment process. The rehabilitation plan is developed by technical specialists in various fields such as engineering, hydrology, biology, and public health. They may be organized into teams and may require an operational plan.

Safety

- Generic reports (ICS and Finance/Administration).
- Safety Officers' reports, which include
 - Accident/Injury reports. These must tie in with Finance/Administration for compensation/claims problems.
 - Injury narratives.
 - Safety advisories.
- Incident Log, chronological list of vehicular and personnel incidents.

Personal Logs and Notes

- Keep notes on all significant events, using a brief narrative form that includes who, what, where, when, why, how, and sketches.
- Do not keep personal notes in Unit Log or official notebook; keep them separately. (A small spiral-bound pocket notebook works well.)
- Information of a confidential nature should be kept on separate papers and not included in the log except by reference.

Incident Commander's Checklist

- Supplies.
 - Maps (topographic 7.5 minute; street maps; preplans).
 - Tape recorder/Spare batteries.
 - Notebook or logbook.
 - Spare pencils or pens.
- Information to gather/record.
 - Time of first notification.

- Impact estimates.
- Injuries/Deaths.
- Area (size) if known.
- Property damage.
- Other impacts.
- Factors weighed in making decisions.
- Key information.
- Decisions reached.
- Times of briefings/planning meetings, and content.
- Deviations from policy, with rationale.
- Financial commitments.
- Command transfers.
- Changes in objectives.
- Policy changes.
- Information released to the public.
- Demobilization policies.

Step 2: Specify Documentation Responsibility Based on Access to Information

Include position checklists for each of the major positions. This is in addition to the requirement of the Field Operations Guide (FOG) (ICS Form 201).

Needs should be spelled out at briefings and regularly during the incident so data can be captured while fresh.

Step 3: Publish and Distribute the Plan

The required documentation should be in the Emergency Operation Plan (EOP) as well as in the FOG. Specific annexes should list the required documents by position/function as well as any forms that may be necessary.

Ensure that the plan and the annexes are published and distributed in adequate numbers.

Step 4: Train to the Plan

Once plans have been developed, the Command Officers must ensure that the plan is sound and will function as designed. This can be accomplished by using the following training:

- Tabletops--Introduce documents/forms during tabletop exercises.
- Functional exercises--Use documents during functional training exercises.
- Full field exercises.
 - Require complete documentation from field exercises.
 - Evaluate documents.

During tabletop exercises introduce documents/forms to the role players to develop familiarity with the forms and the documentation required. During functional training exercises practice using the forms.

Require complete documentation from field exercises, and evaluate the documents to ensure that everyone understands the expectations.

Use as much of the daily documentation process as possible in the emergency documentation plan. It is easier to train if the documentation system is familiar.

Likewise, routinely use applicable documents (e.g., ICS Forms, financial forms) in daily operations if they are appropriate.

DOCUMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION

Planning Chief

Although all functions have documentation responsibilities, the Planning Section is responsible for the collection and retention of incident documents, ensuring completeness and accuracy of all documents, documenting the incident status and assigned resources status, and distributing incident information.

This does not relieve other sections of their responsibilities. They must complete and submit accurate and neat logs, reports, records, photos, maps, and videos appropriate to the function. The basic requirements appear in each position checklist and at the beginning of the Field Ops Guide under "Common Responsibilities." Complete requirements are in the Position Manual, except for agency-specific requirements. Most Finance/Administration Section documentation will be agency-specific.

Documentation Unit Leader

Establishes and organizes the incident files. Basic files that are found consistently on all incidents include copies of the AP. There also will be unique files, depending on the incident, e.g., patient reports on a mass casualty incident.

Accept and file reports and forms submitted by ICS units. Prepare a filing system in advance, using standard file folders by report or form type. Use a standard file box (cardboard will do) and file chronologically.

Use a date/time stamp if possible; otherwise write date/time on the reports and forms as they are received.

Check on the accuracy and completeness of records submitted for files. Many emergency workers will skimp on paperwork due to the emergency situation. Forms should have all blocks completed, marked N/A, or lined through to indicate completeness. No form section should be left blank except to fill in later. Check primarily for obvious errors: time, date, incident name, etc. The Documentation Unit should not make changes or alter documents in any way. Correct errors or omissions by contacting appropriate ICS units. Author of document should correct document with line out, change, and initial. **Do not use correction fluid or erasures to change documents**, as these are public legal records.

Keep a plentiful supply of necessary forms and reports to hand out to appropriate requesters. Have two good copy machines at a minimum. Post copies of the AP's and other frequently requested reports.

IDENTIFYING THE AVAILABLE DOCUMENTATION SYSTEMS

A number of documentation systems have been developed by various agencies for use by the fire service. Start by using the system with which your organization has greatest familiarity. See if it will work. If not, use it as a core and build on it. See what adjacent agencies use. (In a major incident many of the players who staff your jurisdiction will come from neighboring jurisdictions. If they are familiar with a system it will shorten the learning curve.)

To maintain an available supply, start with an initial supply and maintain a supply of clean masters to make additional copies on a copy machine.

This will keep the cost down, having invested in only a small initial supply.

Some documents will be outdated before they are ever used.

SPECIALIZED DOCUMENTATION

Reports on damage caused by responders during the operation. (Covered in the Finance/Administration section requirements.)

Exposure and injury reports, whenever personnel are exposed to hazardous substances or bloodborne or airborne pathogens. Exposures may be handled differently than injuries. Injury reports and exposure reports are agency-specific. The agency representative is the person to assist with this.

Performance reports to hiring authority. ICS required for trainers and exceptional (good or bad) performance. Many agencies also require performance reports on all employees assigned to an incident.

The necessary qualifications for completing performance reports must be known and met.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF DOCUMENTATION

Notes will be called into court as exhibits, so keep them official and maintain a separate notebook for personal use. Keep in mind that personal notebooks may be legally discoverable.

Personnel performance appraisals can lead to legal questions. Qualified privilege exists if recipient meets the test.

Inaccurate and incomplete documentation jeopardizes a criminal investigation and reflects negatively on the response agencies.

INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE PRESERVATION

One of the key differences between a terrorist event and other emergency response operations is that the former is a criminal act. Terrorism is directly counter to the common values shared by fire, medical, and law enforcement personnel. One of the main goals, after life safety of responders, victims, and the restoration of order, should be the proper handling of the scene and accompanying evidence in order that the perpetrator(s) may be identified and apprehended. Terrorism is a crime not only against individuals but also against our national sense of values, dignity, and security. It demands that significant efforts, second only to life and safety, be devoted to the processing of the incident as a crime scene.

Patients are crime victims and responders become witnesses, and all have important roles in the rendering of justice via investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of the guilty parties. The Command Officer plays a highly pivotal role in the early recognition of the needs required for management of a crime scene.

EVIDENCE PRESERVATION

Items that are considered evidence vary from those that are obvious (unexploded devices) to those that are subtle and less obvious. Blast fields, damage patterns, discoloration, even contaminated clothing and personal effects may be considered evidence.

Some evidence may be dangerous, such as unexploded or partially expended explosives, chemically contaminated material, or unstable structures. Command Officers must balance the need to protect responders and still preserve evidence of the criminal activity. In some areas, law enforcement professionals may be untrained and ill-equipped to protect themselves against the chemical or radiological hazards of some evidence. Properly trained and equipped fire crews may be called upon to remove contaminated material for evidence. Commanders must weigh the hazards, risks, and potential gain of such operations. Many local law enforcement organizations, as well as FBI Evidence Response Teams (ERT's), and ATF National Response Teams (NRT's) are trained and equipped to operate in hazardous areas. In these cases, they may require

medical support and backup capabilities while the forensic experts process the scene. Close coordination, communication, and cooperation is essential between police, fire, haz mat, and medical responders to identify, conserve, and document evidence while not compromising responder safety or overall incident life safety objectives.

While evidence processing is a law enforcement responsibility, there is a high likelihood that first responders will be included in the process. From the interviews and statements of responder observations to the identification of sources of evidence, examples would be

- scene diagrams;
- first-arriving photos or videos;
- disposition of patients;
- mechanism of injury;
- vehicles in area: parked, leaving the scene, out of place;
- victim symptomology: signs, symptoms, conditions; and
- victim clothing and effects.

EMS personnel should take care not to destroy evidence on victims or at the scene. These scenes may need to be treated similarly to an arson scene in regard to evidence preservation. Do not cut bullet holes or shrapnel damage to clothing. Details of the scene should be committed to memory and then to paper as soon as possible.

The Command Officer must establish liaison with law enforcement authorities in a terrorist incident immediately, or as soon as practical. The duties of scene documentation/evidence preservation liaison should be established. This can be one of the Liaison duties or a separate position in the Documentation function. Again, the responsibility falls to law enforcement, but fire/rescue responders should be a proactive element in the process.

In the preincident planning process, the key law enforcement contacts for scene documentation and evidence processing should be identified. Other authorities having jurisdiction (FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)) also should be identified and procedures developed with them as well.

Local conditions will dictate where in the command structure this assignment should reside. The key point, regardless of how this evidence processing is accomplished, is that it should be addressed prior to the incident. Fire, medical, and law enforcement personnel should train together in the discipline of scene documentation, evidence conservation and preservation, and chain of custody.

SUMMARY

Command Officers are responsible for

- understanding the value and importance of documentation; and
- developing a documentation plan for terrorist incidents that will include the following:
 - identifying the available documentation systems,
 - specialized documentation, and
 - documentation responsibilities in the emergency organization.

Inaccurate and incomplete documentation jeopardizes a criminal investigation and reflects negatively on the response agencies.

Activity 7.1

Facilitated Group Discussion Based on the Harbor Incident

Purpose

To gain an understanding of the need for proper incident planning and the associated documentation that is required for successful incident management and termination.

Directions

1. You will have completed for homework on the first night a review of both the case study and the AP for the Harbor Incident.
2. Your instructor will facilitate a discussion of the incident with a focus on the planning and the documentation requirements of the incident.
3. Your instructor will discuss with the group the use of, and the material contained in, the following ICS forms:
 - a. ICS 202: Incident Objectives Form.
 - b. ICS 203: Organization Assignment List.
 - c. ICS 204: Assignment List.
 - d. ICS 205: Incident Radio Communications Plan.
 - e. ICS 206: Medical Plan.
 - f. ICS 207: Incident Organization Chart.

Questions

1. What are the overall incident objectives, and what role does the Command Officer have in the development of the objectives?
2. How does an organization meet the demands of such an event and still meet the demands of everyday activity? Does your organization have a plan?
3. How do the tasks assigned by Form 204 differ from an unanticipated terrorist event?
4. Can medivac be used for contaminated patients? Has your jurisdiction planned for this?
5. Are expectations of the plan realistic? Do you believe that 30,000 to 40,000 panicking and potentially contaminated patients can be managed by the available resources?

6. Can this happen in your community?
7. Why are the documentation needs so important in an event like this?

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM FORMS

Name and Number	Purpose	Originator	Required Approval	Distribution
201: Incident Briefing	Gives IC basic information: incident situation, resources, initial response record.	Initial attack IC	None	Command and General Staff, Situation and Resource Units, and Documentation Unit
202: Incident Objectives	Specifies control objectives, including alternatives and specific precautions to be observed. It is the cover page for the IAP. A weather forecast is included.	Planning Section Chief	Incident Commander	All Section, Branch, Division, Group and Unit Leaders, and Documentation Unit
203: Organization Assignment List	Provides IC with positions activated and names of personnel staffing positions.	Resource Unit	None	All Section, Branch, Division, Group and Unit Leaders, and Documentation Unit
204: Division Assignment List	Keeps Operations personnel current on incident assignments.	Operations Chief and Resource Unit	Planning Section Chief	All Section, Branch, Division, Group and Unit Leaders, and Documentation Unit

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

Name and Number	Purpose	Originator	Required Approval	Distribution
205: Incident Radio Communications Plan	Provides information on all radio frequency assignments. These are placed on the Division Assignment List (ICS Form 204).	Communications Unit Leader	None	All Section, Branch, Division, Group and Unit Leaders, and Documentation Unit
206: Medical Plan	Lists information on medical aid stations, transportation services, hospitals, and emergency medical procedures.	Medical Unit Leader	Safety Officer	All Section, Branch, Division, Group and Unit Leaders, and Documentation Unit
214: Unit Log	Records details of unit activity. It is used as a reference to extract information for the after-action report.	Section Chiefs, Branch Directors, Division or Group Supervisors, Unit and Strike Team Leaders	None	Submit to immediate supervisor for transmittal to Documentation Unit
215: Planning Worksheet	Provides help in making decisions on resource needs during Planning Meeting. Addresses resource assignments.	IC and General Staff at each Planning Meeting	None	Planning Section, Resource Unit to prepare assignment list and request for resources for next operational period.

Activity 7.2

Evidence Processing

Purpose

To identify strategic considerations of documentation and evidence processing.

Directions

1. Review Acme Applied Science Case Study and plot plan on the following pages.

2. Identify documentation goals and objectives.

3. Identify mechanism within the ICS structure to accomplish documentation goals and objectives.

4. Identify aspects of evidence preservation (what needs to be preserved and how).

5. Identify what additional agencies will be needed.

6. Do you move apparatus? Is it safe? Will it compromise the scene? How long will the apparatus be immobilized?

Activity 7.2 (cont'd)

Acme Applied Science Case Study

You are the chief of a three-station volunteer fire department outside a small, heavily industrialized city. At 2035 hours on a Friday in February, you are dispatched to an explosion in a chemical plant in your jurisdiction in a suburban industrial park near the regional airport. The chemical company has experienced labor troubles due to contract disputes and worker complaints about safety violations.

The first fire units on the scene report no fire, but a massive explosion with definite loss of life. You grant their request for a second alarm and haz mat response. Your duty battalion chief sets up corridors between "TR" and "HR." This will bring a total of six engine companies, two ladders, one heavy rescue, two medic units, and two Basic Life Support (BLS) units, as well as the county haz mat team. Fire units operate on a common radio frequency and ICS but are autonomous organizations (four different departments have responded). The county haz mat team is an independent unit operating within the system. EMS is a separate volunteer system on a separate radio frequency.


You arrive and the apparatus is positioned according to the diagram on the following page.

You have been notified that the following agencies are responding:

- county emergency management agency;
- State police;
- county sheriff;
- State Department of Environmental Protection;
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regional authorities;
- U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA);
- U.S. Coast Guard Strike Team; and
- Chemical Safety Board.

Activity 7.2 (cont'd)

Plot Plan



**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers**
Student Manual

Unit 8: Federal Response

Terminal Objective

Upon completion of this unit, the students will be able to identify the components of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and explain methods of its activation.

Enabling Objectives

- Identify the roles of local, State, and Federal governments as defined in the FRP.
 - Define crisis management and consequence management as they apply to terrorism.
 - Explain the relationship between Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39 and the Terrorism Annex in the FRP.
 - Identify the primary Federal agencies or organizations that can provide assistance during a terrorist incident.
-

UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is in place for all types of emergencies including natural and technological hazards as well as civil unrest. The FRP is activated upon the request of the Governor of the particular State involved and upon approval by the President. The FRP incorporates haz mat notification and assistance requests by using the emergency warning point contact system (statewide, one-number contact system) mandated in all States.

The concept of operation is based on the idea that all levels of government have responsibilities, including planning, response, public protection, and recovery capabilities. The Federal response augments State and local government response and resources by providing expertise and technical support, specialized equipment, skills, and information. The Federal response can provide additional resources when State and local resources have been exhausted and can coordinate response and resource activities at all levels of government.

The role of local/county government is the provision of emergency response service, making it the front line of defense for all types of emergency response. This includes fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and, in most cases, police. Local and county governments, therefore, must provide for a reasonably safe community. This means that they work to minimize or prevent public safety hazards. This level is responsible for the declaration of local emergency or disaster, for identifying a widespread emergency and for recognizing when a significant emergency or disaster has overwhelmed local resources and capabilities. Local government also must identify the nature and extent of damage caused by the emergency and the capabilities needed to manage and recover from the emergency. This level is responsible for restoration of critical services such as gas and electricity, water and sewage systems, and transportation corridors.

State government provides support personnel, equipment and supplies, including additional personnel for response and recovery activities. The State often has stockpiled various equipment and supplies. In some instances, this level has available specialized resources, expertise, and equipment. Through the National Guard, it can supply support, staffing, and expertise. The State also is responsible for a declaration of emergency/disaster.

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN

The FRP, supported by 29 departments and agencies, is used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for responding to any incident or situation requiring or potentially requiring Federal emergency or disaster assistance.

The existing emergency response system may be stressed severely in providing a timely and effective response to the consequences of a mass casualty disaster.

Due to the potentially devastating impact, coordination at all levels of government is critical to ensuring that response needs are met. In responding to the consequences of a terrorist incident, the primary objective of the Federal response is to assist State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to prevent or minimize the loss of life and property.

The FRP implements the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, ensure public health and safety, and recover from the impact of the incident or event.

The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), supported by 17 Federal departments and agencies, is used to coordinate the Federal radiological response to an incident involving nuclear materials.

The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP), supported by 15 Federal departments and agencies, is used to coordinate the Federal environmental response to an incident involving haz mat, including chemical agents. Environmental response activities include monitoring, decontamination, and long-term restoration.

The FRP framework includes Federal 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF's) usually chaired by a specific Federal agency or department.

- Transportation (Dept. of Transportation);
- Communications (National Communications System);
- Public works and Engineering (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers);
- Firefighting (U.S. Forest Service);
- Information and Planning (FEMA);
- Mass Care (Red Cross);
- Resource Support (General Services Administration);
- Health and Medical (Public Health Service);
- Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) (FEMA);

- Haz mat (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA));
- Food (Department of Agriculture); and
- Energy (Department of Energy).

The continuum of local to State to Federal response is laced with many acronyms. The most critical are identified here, because they illustrate the mechanism of Federal response and they are the ones the Strategic Commander most likely will encounter. The mayor, county executive, or duly empowered local emergency manager establishes an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The Governor declares a state of emergency via the State EOC and begins assessment.

If the State concludes that the needed response may exceed State and local resources, the State requests a preliminary damage assessment (PDA). The PDA's information is used in the Presidential Disaster Declaration process.

When the disaster is declared, FEMA will dispatch an interagency Emergency Response Team Advance Element (ERT-A) to assess the situation further and initiate response activities. Federal assistance is coordinated through the Regional Operations Center (ROC) at a FEMA regional office or at the Disaster Field Office (DFO) set up near the incident site. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) coordinates efforts among Federal, State, and local organizations. The Federal interagency ERT is activated to support the FCO in coordinating Federal response and recovery activities.

Other Federal elements may include the Emergency Support Team (EST) providing overall coordination and support or the Incident Support Team (IST) which provides management support for technical resources such as USAR.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-39

In June 1995, the White House issued PDD-39, "United States Policy on Counterterrorism," which directed a number of measures to:

- Reduce the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism.
- To deter and respond to terrorist acts.
- To strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences to terrorist use of B-NICE weapons including weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Defined crisis management and consequence management.

- Directed FEMA to reconfigure the FRP in order to allow for an increased effective response to terrorist incidents.

FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN--TERRORISM INCIDENT ANNEX

In order to ensure the FRP would be useful in facilitating the Federal response to terrorism incidents, FEMA in concert with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other FRP department and agency signatories, developed a Terrorism Incident Annex.

Its purpose is to describe the Federal concept of operations in implementing PDD-39, and when necessary, to respond to terrorism incidents within the United States.

The Annex was published on February 7, 1997, and defines the policies and structures used to coordinate crisis management and consequence management.

It facilitates the incorporation of other Federal plans that may be implemented in response to a terrorism incident.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-62 (CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION DIRECTIVE)

PDD-62 highlights the growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United States.

It details a new and more systematic approach to fighting terrorism by bringing a program management approach to United States counter-terrorism efforts.

The directive also establishes the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism which will oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs including areas such as:

- counter-terrorism;
- protection of critical infrastructure; and
- preparedness and consequence management for WMD's.

This directive mandates the establishment of a cachement of antibiotics to treat the general public in the event of an unconventional biological attack against the United States.

PDD-63 (also called the Critical Infrastructure Protection Directive) calls for a national effort to assure the security of the increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures of the United States. Such infrastructures include telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.

- The directive required immediate Federal government action including risk assessment and planning to reduce exposure to attack.
- It stressed the critical importance of cooperation between the government and the private sector by linking designated agencies with private sector representatives.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The FBI has been designated as the lead agency for the management of the Federal response to terrorist incidents (hereafter referred to as crisis management). As the lead for crisis management, the FBI has the responsibility for proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident response, and postincident response, including functioning as the commander of onscene operational response to all terrorist threats and acts occurring in the United States.

PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing lead Federal agency responsibilities for counter-terrorism assigned to the Department of Justice, as delegated to the FBI, for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States.

Crisis management focuses on the measures taken to identify and plan for the resources necessary to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a terrorism threat or incident.

Federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations and by Federal consequence management, and may operate concurrently.

Crisis management is primarily a law enforcement response.

The laws of the United States assigned primary authority to the Federal government to respond to terrorism threats or incidents; State and local governments provide assistance as required.

Under PDD-39 provisions, the FBI will

- Manage the information and make appropriate decisions at the strategic level at the crisis management operations center and the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).

- Appoint an FBI Onscene Coordinator (OSC) who will work closely with Joint Operations Center (JOC) to provide leadership and direction to the Federal crisis management response.
- The FBI OCS will convene meetings with decisionmakers representing FEMA, the Federal agencies involved in technical operations, and the State. These meetings will be held in order to formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for additional resources.
- Establish the primary Federal operations centers for crisis management in the field and Washington, DC.
- Establish the primary Federal centers for information on the crisis management response for the media, members of Congress, and foreign governments in the field and Washington, DC.
- Designate appropriate special agent liaison and advisory personnel to support FEMA. Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants consultation with the White House.
- Advise the White House, through the Attorney General, when the FBI requires assistance for a Federal crisis management response, in accordance with the PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines.
- Coordinate the Federal crisis management response with the lead State and local crisis management agencies.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

There are 56 FBI field offices in the United States with each office being headed by a Special Agent In-Charge (SAC) who are autonomous individuals having sole responsibility for their territories. In addition, there are approximately 400 resident agents who are based in less-populated United States cities that do not have a formal field office. Some resident agents may have a small number of special agents under their supervision.

FBI Evidence Response Teams (ERT)--Each of the 56 FBI local field offices maintains an ERT tasked with the detection, collection, and preservation of criminal evidence consistent with FBI lab and U.S. Attorney standards. A growing number of ERT's will have Level "A" and "B" response capability.

Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) is based within the FBI Laboratory Division. This unit is designed to lead and augment the Federal science and technology capability to terrorist threats/incidents involving WMD and provide a law enforcement representative in evidence issues to enhance later prospective effectiveness and efficiency. HMRU have Level "A," "B," and "C" response capabilities.

Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) is recognized as an FBI entity that provides coordinated support to the FBI OSC. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has been trained to operate in haz mat environments, is part of the CIRG. The CIRG provides additional operations support in the areas of negotiation, behavioral profiling and assessment, and crisis management support.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) include Federal, local, and State law enforcement agencies and are prevention-oriented groups that allow the exchange and coordination of terrorism intelligence and terrorist activities across the law enforcement community.

LOCAL FBI INITIAL RESPONSE TO A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INCIDENT

Local first responders provide initial scene response, recognize the incident as possibly being a terrorist or criminal related, and notify the local FBI field office.

The local FBI dispatches an advance team to the scene to join up with the local established Incident Command System (ICS) to determine if available onscene information supports the possibility of a terrorist incident.

Upon arrival, the local FBI advance element meets with the Incident Commander (IC) to receive a briefing on what information has been collected by the initial law enforcement, fire service, EMS, and haz mat emergency responders.

The ICS can provide valuable information as to legitimate responders who are present in what could be determined a Federal crime scene. The ICS personnel accountability system (PAS) can be an asset for this effort.

The haz mat team can provide valuable and crucial information as to their recon findings, initial instrument detection findings, and clothing that victims removed and placed into containers during the decon process.

EMS can provide valuable information as to the signs and symptoms presented by victims and what hospital each victim was transported to.

This will allow for the FBI to dispatch agents to each of the receiving hospitals in order to interview victims and receive into a chain-of-custody forensic evidence that medical staff removed from the victims to include bomb fragments and blood tests.

FBI Crisis Management Response Request. The local FBI field office provides a graduated flexible response to a range of incidents, including

- A credible threat, which maybe presented in verbal, written, intelligence-based, or other form.
- An act of terrorism that exceeds the local FBI field division capability to resolve.
- The confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss (e.g., "significant threat").
- The detonation of an explosive device, use of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in **limited injury or death** (e.g., "limited consequences/State and local consequence management response").
- The detonation of an explosive device, use of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in **substantial injury or death** (e.g., "major consequences/Federal consequence management response").
- In response to a credible threat involving terrorism, the FBI Headquarters initiates a threat assessment process that involves close coordination with Federal agencies with technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the threat from a technical, as well as tactical and behavioral standpoint.
- FBI provides the initial notification to law enforcement authorities within the affected State of a threat or occurrence that the FBI confirms as an act of terrorism. If warranted, the FBI implements an FBI response and simultaneously advises the Attorney General, who notifies the President and National Security Council (NSC) groups.
- Federal crisis management response is required. If Federal crisis management response is authorized, the FBI activates multi-agency crisis management structures at FBI Headquarters, the responsible FBI Field Office, and at the incident site.

LOCAL FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION COMMAND POST STRUCTURE

During crisis management, the FBI will coordinate closely with local law enforcement authorities to provide a successful law enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also will closely coordinate with FEMA who will immediately notify those Federal, State, and local consequence management response agencies selected by the local SAC.

The FBI SAC may invite select officials from the local jurisdiction's fire service, EMS, and/or emergency management agency (EMA) to function as part of the local FBI Command Group. This would probably be in those incidents involving a WMD threat that has the propensity of rapidly evolving to an actual release and resulting in a consequence management.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

FEMA is the lead Federal agency for consequence management response.

Consequence management focuses on measures to protect public health and safety, efforts like rescue and medical treatment of casualties, evacuation of people at risk, protection of first responders, and preventing the spread of contamination.

It also focuses on restoring essential government services, providing emergency relief to government, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

Consequence management response begins at the local level. Initial actions to reduce the loss of life, injury, and damage to property will fall to the first responders in the first critical hours--before Federal help arrives.

The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States in responding to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal government provides assistance only as required.

FEMA actions for consequence and FBI crisis management coordination.

- The FBI may notify Federal agencies, including FEMA, of a significant threat of an act of terrorism. Federal agencies requested by the FBI, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the FBI Headquarters-Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC).

- FEMA and other Federal agencies requested by the FBI OSC will deploy regional office representatives to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) being established by the responsible FBI Field Office.
- Representatives may include a senior FEMA official to serve in the JOC Command Group, in order to assist the FBI OSC and to provide continuity in leadership should a Federal consequence management response be required.
- Issues arising from the response that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the FBI OSC and the other members of the JOC Command Group, who are all working in consultation with other local, State, and Federal representatives. While the FBI OSC retains authority to make Federal crisis management decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible. The FBI OSC and the senior FEMA official will provide, or obtain from higher authority, an immediate resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources (such as airlift or technical operations assets) between the crisis management and the consequence management response.
- The JOC Command Group plays an important role in ensuring coordination of Federal crisis management and consequence management actions. As a situation progresses, consequences may become imminent. FEMA will consult immediately with the White House and the Governor's office in order to determine if FEMA is directed to use authorities of the Robert. T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance (Stafford) Act to assign Federal consequence management agencies to predeploy assets, in order to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. These actions will involve appropriate notification and coordination with the FBI, as the overall Federal Lead Agency or counterterrorism.
- FEMA Headquarters may activate an EST, may convene an executive-level meeting of the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG), and may place an Emergency Response Team--National (ERT-N) on alert. When FEMA activates the EST, FEMA will notify FBI Headquarters to request a special agent liaison. The responsible FEMA Region(s) may activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) to the affected State. When the responsible FEMA Region(s) activate a ROC, the Region(s) will notify the responsible FBI Field Office(s) to request a special agent liaison.

No-notice WMD terrorist incidents:

- If an incident occurs without warning that produces major casualties and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, then FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence management and crisis management actions concurrently. If the President directs FEMA to implement a Federal consequence management response, then FEMA will implement response actions by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense (DOD). FEMA will support the FBI as required and will coordinate the response of FRP agencies providing support to the affected local area and incident command system.
- During the consequence management response, the FBI provides a special agent liaison to either the ROC director or the FCO in the field, and a special agent liaison to the EST Director at FEMA Headquarters. Issues arising from the response that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the ROC director or FCO, in consultation with the FBI special agent liaison, the onscene decisionmakers of the Federal agencies supporting the technical operation, and the ESF leaders, who are all working in consultation with local, State and other Federal representatives.
- Federal consequence management decisions. At all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible. Meetings will continue to be scheduled until the FBI and FEMA agree that coordination is no longer required. Operational reports will continue to be exchanged, as described in the preincident phase. The FBI special agent liaisons will remain at the EST and the ROC or DFO until FEMA and the FBI agree that a special agent liaison presence is no longer required.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE ASSETS

As directed in PDD-39, the DHHS will activate health and medical response capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)/WMD terrorism. DHHS may coordinate with individual agencies identified in the DHHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal response to acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism, to use the structures, relationships, and capabilities described in the DHHS plan to support response operations. The DHHS response plan may include threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, epidemiological investigation, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination, public health support, medical support, and

pharmaceutical support operations. These strategic, tactical, and task functions would be affected by one or more of the following response assets:

- **Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).** The MMRS operates as a fully integrated multidisciplinary response system that has been designed by, and for, the local response community. MMRS capabilities include agent detection and identification, patient decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law enforcement activities. Twenty-seven cities were targeted initially for establishing MMRS teams; Washington, DC, Metropolitan Council of Governments (COG) and the Atlanta-Fulton County Emergency Management Agency (AFC/EMA) developed the first pilot MMRS teams in 1996. Approximately 40 additional MMRS programs are planned in the future.
- **National Medical Response Team (NMRT).** The NMRT's are enhanced Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT's) which are comprised of medical personnel. These teams are capable of agent identification, patient decontamination, triage, and medical treatment in support of local health systems. There are three NMRT's: in Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Denver, Colorado; and Los Angeles, California.
- **Centers for Disease Control (CDC)** provides on site and offsite technical consultation and response support for State and local health departments. CDC also maintains the Epidemiological Intelligence Service (EIS).
- **National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)** is a system of pre-enrolled Veterans Administration (VA) and other hospitals designed to receive those mass casualty patients which have exceeded the local stricken area's hospital bed and specialized care capability. Certain VA hospitals function as NDMS Federal Coordinating Centers. There are 35 DMAT's that support the NDMS. A medical Management Support Unit (MSU) is operated by the DHHS/Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and based in Rockville, Maryland.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

- **Urban Search and Rescue Team (USAR).** The USAR saves lives and protects property from both natural and manmade catastrophic urban disaster. USAR's have a limited haz mat capability. There are 27 USAR teams located in the United States consisting of 64 members.
- **The Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) vehicles** provides a myriad microwave, shortwave, 800 MHz, DES-encryption, UHF, VHF-low, and other emergency communications support to Federal response agencies. There are five MERS teams located throughout the United States.
- **Rapid Response Information System (RRIS).** The RRIS is a database containing information on Federal response capabilities, agents and munitions characteristics, and safety precautions. This is an Internet source that can be assessed by local responders and organizations.
- **FEMA EST** provides management support responding FEMA assets to a disaster scene.

Environmental Protection Agency

As directed in PDD-39, the EPA will activate environmental response capabilities to support the Federal response to acts of terrorism. EPA may coordinate with individual agencies identified in the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) to use the structures, relationships, and capabilities of the national response system as described in the NCP to support response operations. If the NCP is formally implemented

- The OSC under the NCP will coordinate the NCP response with the FEMA official (either the senior FEMA official at the JOC, the ROC director, or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for onscene coordination of all Federal support to State and local governments.
- The NCP responses may include threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-term site restoration (environmental cleanup) operations.

The EPA has statutory authorities and responsibilities in preparing to respond to emergencies involving hazardous substances.

- This includes some radiological substances and some chemical agents (e.g., Sarin).
- These authorities and responsibilities are for all natural and manmade incidents, including those caused by acts of terrorism.
- An EPA OSC will manage all Federal environmental response efforts at the scene of an incident. The OSC works closely with the State/local first responders to protect human health and the environment.
- The OSC is the point-of-contact for the coordination of Federal environmental efforts with the local response community, and can be a source of valuable support and information to the first responders.
- In response to a terrorism incident, the EPA will activate several environmental response capabilities to support Federal efforts.
- The EPA will coordinate with the National Response System agencies to use the structures and capabilities developed to support NCP.
- Depending on the situation, the EPA will activate the NCP.
- Providing technical advice and assistance, such as monitoring, identification of contaminants, sample collection and analysis, onsite safety, prevention, and decontamination activities.
- Issuing any permits required for the custody, transportation, and disposition of chemical material.
- EPA--Environmental Response Teams are based out of Edison, NJ and Cincinnati, OH.
- Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC's), located in all EPA regional offices and supported by technical assistance contractors to operate in contaminated environments, sample, monitor, cleanup, etc.

Department of Energy

As directed in PDD-39. The DOE will activate nuclear response capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of nuclear terrorism.

The response may include onsite management, radiological monitoring and assessment, development of Federal protective action recommendations, and provision of information on the radiological response to the public, the White House, Members of Congress, and foreign governments.

DOE response assets include

- **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** The RAP provides the initial DOE radiological emergency response. Under the RAP, there are several Radiological Assistance Teams (RAT's) to assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment and property at the accident or incident scene. These teams also provide advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery.
- **Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).** The REAC/TS provides 24-hour medical consultation on health problems associated with radiation accidents. Also it provides training programs and emergency response teams comprised of health professionals.
- **Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).** The NEST provides technical response to resolution of incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search, locate, and identify devices or material; move, render safe, or disable devices; and mitigate damage from device detonation or disablement actions.
- **Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** The AMS provides helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial multispectra scanning surveys.
- **Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC).** The ARAC provides real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a nuclear accident or incident.

Department of Defense Response Assets

Response Task Force (RTF). An ART is a joint task force with the mission of providing overall DOD support to civil authorities conducting crisis and consequence management operations. For chemical and biological incidents, the major elements of the RTF are the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT) and the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (MCBIRF).

Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT). The U.S. Army Soldier's Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has overall responsibility for command and control of the C/B-RRT, and provides its core elements.

Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU). The TEU mission is to provide worldwide, no-notice capability to conduct field sampling, monitoring, recovery, render safe (EOD support), decontamination, transportation, exploitation, verification, and mitigation of hazards associated with weaponized and nonweaponized chemical and biological materials, and conduct operations in compliance with Federal, State, and local laws.

Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC), Chemical Support Division (CSD). The CSD provides low-level monitoring using the Real Time Analytical Platform (RTAP), a vehicle containing a fully functional chemical analysis system. In its current configuration, the RTAP can automatically sample ambient air to detect the presence of specific chemical warfare agents (nerve and mustard).

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Level 4 biological lab in Maryland which can provide expert onsite and offsite technical consultation advice on biological warfare agents.

Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI). Can provide expert onsite and offsite technical consultation advice on biological warfare agents. This includes a mobile biological laboratory.

The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for providing military units that can assist in both the crisis management and consequence management aspects of a WMD incident.

There are plans to deploy 10 initial WMT Civil Support teams in each of the 10 Federal regions. These teams will have chemical, biological, and radiological recon and detection capability, communications and data support, mobile laboratory support, and can operate at Level "A," "B," and "C" capacities. WMD/CST teams will be a National Guard asset unless Federalized, at which time they will become a FEMA response asset.

JOINT OPERATION CENTER (JOC)

When determined appropriate by the OSC, the local FBI Command Post (CP) will be modified to function as a Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC configuration includes representatives of the primary participating agencies and Command, Operations, Consequence Management, and Support Groups as described below.

- **Command Group**--Comprised of senior officials of the FBI, DOE, DOD, HHS-PHS (Health and Human Services-Public Health Service), FEMA, and other Federal and State agencies, as appropriate, to provide the OSC with a means to coordinate and reach decisions quickly on interagency matters that affect the resolution of the incident.
- **Operations Group**--Contains representatives of the organizations directly involved in actions in and around the terrorist incident site and whose actions are deemed critical to the successful resolution of the crisis.
- **Consequence Management Group**--Contains decisionmaking and special agent liaison representatives of consequence management organizations to provide advice on decisions that may have implications for consequence management, and to provide continuity in leadership should a consequence management response become necessary. If consequences become imminent or actually occur, State and local organizations will initiate their consequence management actions, with FEMA expediting the provision of Federal consequence management response support. The group is coordinated by FEMA with an FBI Special Agent liaison from the OSC.
- **Support Group**--Contains representatives of organizations whose primary task is to support members of the Operations Group, depending on the various support components, including Logistics, Legal, Administrative, Special Agent liaison, and Media components. The Media component serves as the single point-of-contact for the coordination and release of public information to the media from the incident site. DOJ/FBI, in coordination with participating agencies, will develop a strategy and procedures for responding to media inquiries. The overall intent will be for the Federal government to speak clearly with one voice regarding any response to a terrorist incident.

FEMA will establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) in the field and at FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC, to serve as the primary Federal information center on consequence management response actions for the

media and members of Congress. FEMA JIC will immediately establish coordination with the FBI Media Component at the FBI CP or JOC and the FBI National Press Office.

CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT INTEGRATION

Representatives from those selected Federal, State, and local consequence management agencies may be requested to serve in the FBI JOC Command Group, the JOC Support Group/Media Component, and the JOC Consequence Management Group.

A FEMA representative will coordinate the actions of the FBI JOC Consequence Management Group. He/She also can expedite activation of a formal Federal consequence management response should it become necessary and will work closely with the FBI Special Agent liaison between this group and the FBI OSC. The JOC Consequence Management Group will monitor the crisis management response in order to advise FEMA on decisions that may have implications for consequence management response, and to provide continuity should a formal consequence management response be initiated.

If a terrorism incident that produces major consequences occurs without warning, then FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence and crisis management actions concurrently. FEMA will consult immediately with the White House and the affected State Governor's office to determine if a formal Federal Consequence Management response is required. If the President directs FEMA to implement a consequence response, then the appropriate Federal ESF's will be implemented as needed. FEMA will therefore support the FBI as required and coordinate the assets of ESF responding Federal agencies.

FEDERAL RESPONSE INTEGRATION WITH THE LOCAL INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

As each Federal response support element arrives on the scene, a liaison officer will be assigned to the incident, or Unified Command Post. FEMA will prestage other support response assets as Federal lead agency for the coordination of other responding FRP agencies and support under Federal Emergency Support #39. A liaison officer will be assigned to the local Incident Command Post (ICP).

The DHHS will prestage its support response assets under Federal Emergency Support #8. A liaison officer will be assigned to the local ICP.

The EPA will prestage its contractor teams, OSC or other support response assets under Federal Emergency Support #10. A liaison officer will be assigned to the local ICP.

The DOE will prestage its mobile labs or other support response assets under Federal Emergency Support #9. A liaison officer will be assigned to the local ICP.

The DOD will prestage its support response assets pursuant to Federal directives. A liaison officer will be assigned to the local ICP.

TERRORISM INCIDENT REPORTING AND INFORMATION SOURCES

National Response Center (NRC) is the central reporting emergency number for environmental contaminant releases as listed in your current edition of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) *North American Emergency Response Guidebook* (NAERG). This center is operated by the U.S. Coast Guard and can be reached at 1-800-424-8802 (24 hrs).


FEMA Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) can be contacted by any responder or response organization via the Internet at www.rris.fema.gov. RRIS can provide a multitude of information of NBC munitions, signs and symptoms, equipment, and other data as well as providing a direct link to:

- SCBCOM D/P Hotline; and
- SCBCOM D/P Helpline.

FBI National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) can be contacted via the Internet at www.ndpo.com and is a central information source on the latest coordination efforts regarding WMD training, equipment, and seminars, and provides an electronic forum among users to discuss WMD issues.

CYCLE OF REQUEST FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE

This graphic illustrates the cycle of local to State to Federal response to a terrorist incident.



Incident Commander

The local IC recognizes the size and scope of the incident and realizes additional and/or specialized assets will be needed. They can range from regional and State resources to specific or massive Federal assets. At the same time, notification is initiated to local and Federal law enforcement agencies. The FBI is the lead agency for all terrorist events. The consequence (fire, EMS) and crisis (law enforcement) management efforts continue concurrently.

Emergency Operations Center

The locality establishes an EOC for the purpose of offsite, strategic interagency management and establishes the line of communication to State emergency management. A local emergency is declared.

State Emergency Operations Center

The State EOC evaluates requests and information from the locality, and orders a State disaster declaration. It notifies and requests Federal assistance.


Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA evaluates information and recommends a Presidential Disaster Declaration response. This response may be specific, such as USAR with an IST, or general, in the form of an ERT.

Emergency Response Team and Incident Support Team

The ERT and IST will coordinate activities via the FCO with the local IC.

In a WMD incident, crisis management, with FBI in the lead, must occur concurrently with consequence management. Consequence management will be initiated by first-responding fire, EMS, haz mat, and law enforcement personnel. They will be supported by State and Federal assets. The foundation for this integration of response efforts is the Unified Command system.



JOC--Joint Operations Center (FBI)
SIOC--Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI)
DFO--Disaster Field Office (FEMA)
CDRG--Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (FEMA)
UCS--Unified Command of first responders; fire, police, EMS, haz mat, emergency management, etc.

In this highly simplified diagram, the flow of response assets is depicted from the scene to the highest levels of law enforcement and national policymakers. Note the direct lines from the FBI JOC to the ICS/UCS and incident scene. This denotes the direct lines of statutory authority and tactical operations of the FBI in the crisis management aspect of terrorist events.

SUMMARY

Crisis Management

The FBI is the Federal lead agency. The response efforts will be **integrated** with the existing local and State command structure and operational procedures.

The focus is to identify and plan for the resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a terrorism threat or incident.

The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal government to respond to threats or acts of terrorism.

Consequence Management

FEMA is the Federal lead agency for the **coordination of other responding Federal assets**. Federal assistance dealing with consequence management will be **supportive of and integrated with** existing local and State command structure and operational procedures.

The laws of the United States assign primary authority to States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal government provides assistance as required.

In order to be prepared to respond to a terrorist incident, we recommend the establishment of local, State, and Federal joint:

- planning committees; and
- training and exercise programs involving response to a terrorist incident.

The Federal government has many response assets to support the first responders in the event of a terrorist incident. Get familiar with these assets and incorporate them in all local and State planning for response to terrorism incidents.

Become familiar with your local protocols and operating procedures concerning incident response. To request Federal assistance, follow your local and State protocols.

Consider integrating your developed terrorism response plans with existing Local Emergency Planning Council (LEPC), local EMS and hospital mass-casualty plans, and other existing disaster plans in place with other local agencies.

All levels of government have responsibility in planning, response, public protection and recovery. Each level of government has its role. The next higher level usually is initiated by a declaration of emergency.

Supplemental Reading:
Federal Response Plan
Text, Sections I--VI

**Federal Response Plan
Text only, Sections I--VI
(For Public Law 93-288, As Amended)**

BASIC PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1988, Public Law 93-288 was amended by Public Law 100-707 and retitled as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288, as amended). The Stafford Act provides the authority for the Federal Government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property.

The Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as amended), hereafter referred to as the Plan, is designed to address the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation in which there is a need for Federal response assistance under the authorities of the Stafford Act. It is applicable to natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, and volcanic eruptions; technological emergencies involving radiological or hazardous material releases; and other incidents requiring Federal assistance under the Act.

The Plan describes the basic mechanisms and structures by which the Federal government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment State and local response efforts. To facilitate the provision of Federal assistance which a State is most likely to need under twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF's). Each ESF is headed by a primary agency, which has been selected based on its authorities, resources and capabilities in the particular functional area. Other agencies have been designated as support agencies for one or more ESF based on their resources and capabilities to support the functional area. The twelve ESF's serve as the primary mechanism through which Federal response assistance will be provided to the affected State under the overall coordination of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) appointed by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on behalf of the President.

The Plan serves as the foundation for the further development of detailed headquarters and regional plans and procedures to implement Federal response activities in a timely and efficient manner to support State response activities.

A. Purpose.

The Plan establishes an architecture for a systematic, coordinated, and effective Federal response. The purpose of the Plan is to:

1. Establish fundamental assumptions and policies.

2. Establish a concept of operations that provides an interagency coordination mechanism to facilitate the immediate delivery of the Federal response assistance.
3. Incorporate the coordination mechanisms and structures of other appropriate Federal plans and responsibilities into the overall response.
4. Assign specific functional responsibilities to appropriate Federal departments and agencies.
5. Identify actions that participating Federal departments and agencies will take in the overall Federal response, in coordination with the affected State.

B. Scope.

The Plan applies to all Federal government departments and agencies which are tasked to provide response assistance in a disaster or emergency situation. It describes Federal actions to be taken in providing immediate response assistance to one or more affected States.

Under the Plan, a State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Response assistance includes those actions and activities which support State and local government efforts to save lives, protect public health and safety, and protect property. The identified actions and activities in the Plan, carried out under the ESF's, are based on the existing Federal agency statutory authorities or on specific functional mission assignments made under the provisions of P.L. 93-288, as amended, and identified in the ESF Annexes to the Plan.

The Plan does not specifically address recovery assistance, including the provision of temporary housing, loans, and grants to individuals; business loans; and grants to local and State government entities provided under the disaster assistance programs of FEMA and other agencies. However, in most instances, recovery activities will be conducted concurrently with response activities.

In some instances, a disaster or emergency may result in a situation which affects the national security of the United States. For those instances, appropriate national security authorities and procedures will be used to address the national security requirements of the situation.

C. Organization.

As shown in figure 1, the plan consists of the following components.

1. The Basic Plan, describing the purpose, scope, situation, policies and concept of operations of Federal response activity in a disaster.
2. Appendices to the Basic Plan, including a list of acronyms/ abbreviations, terms and definitions, and authorities and directives.
3. Functional Annexes to the Basic Plan describing the policies, situation, planning, assumptions, concept of operations and responsibilities for each ESF.
4. Support Annexes to the Basic Plan describing the areas of Financial Management, Public Information, and Congressional Relations.

II. POLICIES

A. Authorities.

1. In providing response assistance under the Plan, Federal departments and agencies are covered under the authorities of P.L. 93-288, the President may direct any Federal agency to utilize its authorities and resources in support of State and local assistance efforts. This authority has been further delegated to the Director, FEMA, the Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support (SLPS), and to the FEMA Regional Directors in carrying out the provisions of the Stafford Act.
2. Response by departments and agencies to lifesaving and life protecting requirements under the Plan has precedence over other Federal response activities, except where national security implications are determined to be of a higher priority. Support from departments and agencies will be provided to the extent that it does not conflict with other emergency missions which a department or agency is required to carry out.
3. The Plan does not supplant existing plans or authorities, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) or the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), which have been developed for response to incidents under department and agency statutory authorities other than the Stafford Act. However, the Plan may be used to supplement these plans and authorities, as required, to provide and effective response.

B. Assignment of Responsibilities.

Plan provides standing mission assignments to the designated departments and agencies with primary and support responsibilities to carry out ESF activities. Federal departments and agencies designated as primary agencies serve as Federal executive agents under the FCO in accomplishing the ESF response missions. Upon activation of an ESF, a primary agency is authorized, in coordination with the FCO and the State, to initiate and continue the actions to carry out the ESF missions described in the ESF Annexes to the Plan, including tasking of designated support agencies to carry out assigned ESF missions.

C. Response Requirements.

Federal assistance provided under P.L. 93-288, as amended, to supplement State and local government response efforts. ESF's will coordinate with the FCO and the affected State to identify specific response requirements and will provide Federal response assistance based on State-identified priorities.

D. Response Coordination.

1. Each ESF will provide resources using its primary and support authorities and capabilities, in coordination with other ESF's, to support its missions. ESF's will allocate available resources to each declared State based on priorities identified in conjunction with the State and in coordination with the FCO. If resources are not available within the declared State, the ESF will seek to provide them from a primary or support agency area or region. If the resource is unavailable from an area or region, the requirement will be forwarded to the appropriate ESF headquarters office for further action.
2. In the case where a conflict of priorities develops as a result of more than one ESF needing the same resource, the affected ESF's will work directly with the FCO to resolve the situation. If the FCO cannot resolve the conflict, the matter will be referred to the national Emergency Support Team (EST), and then to the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG), if necessary, for final resolution. The national EST also serves as a central source for information on the availability of resources nationally for use in response operations.

E. Recovery Operations.

Although this Plan addresses response activities of departments and agencies, under P.L. 93-288, the FCO is also responsible for coordinating recovery activities to provide assistance to the affected State, as required. Recovery operations will be initiated commensurate with State priorities and based on the availability of resources which do not conflict with response operations.

F. Operating Facilities.

In support of response activities under the Plan, several kinds of operating facilities have been identified to facilitate the movement and use of personnel and resources in the affected area. Operating facilities are grouped under two categories:

1. Single support facilities, such as a casualty collection point, used primarily to support the operations of a single ESF; and
2. Multiple support facilities used to support the operations of several ESF's. Multiple support facilities, along with their letter designations, include the following.

Regional Operations Center--A Regional Operations Center (ROC) is the facility established at the FEMA Regional Office (or a Federal Regional Center) in response to (or in anticipation of) an event that may require Federal assistance under the Plan. The ROC is staffed by FEMA regional personnel and representatives from the ESF primary agencies as required. It serves as an initial point-of-contact in the region for the affected State(s), the national EST and Federal agencies.

Point of Departure--A Point of Departure (POD) is the designated location (typically an airport) outside of the disaster-affected area from which response personnel and resources will deploy to the disaster area.

Point of Arrival--A Point of Arrival (POA) is the designated location (typically an airport) within or near the disaster-affected area where newly-arriving staff, supplies and equipment are initially directed. Upon arrival, personnel and other resources are dispatched to either the Disaster Field Office (DFO), a Mobilization Center, Staging Area or directly to a disaster site.

Assembly Point--An Assembly Point (AP) is the designated location near the disaster-affected area where newly-arriving personnel register, receive an orientation regarding the disaster situation and are assigned to a specific duty station. The AP could be located at the POA or at the DFO, once they are established.

Marshaling Area--A Marshaling Area (M) is an area used for the complete mobilization and assemblage of personnel and resources prior to their being sent to the disaster-affected area. Marshaling Areas are used particularly for disasters outside of the continental United States.

Mobilization Center--A Mobilization Center (MC) is the designated location at which response personnel and resources are received from the POA and prepositioned for deployment to a local Staging Area or

directly to an incident site, as required. An MC also provides temporary support services, such as food and billeting, for response personnel prior to their deployment.

Staging Area--A Staging Area (S) is the facility at the local jurisdictional level near the disaster site where personnel and equipment are assembled for the immediate deployment to an operational site within the disaster area.

Base Camp--A Base Camp (C) is the designated location under local or State control within the disaster area which is equipped and staffed to provide sleeping facilities, food, water, and sanitary services to response personnel.

Disaster Field Office--A Disaster Field Office (DFO) is the primary field location in each affected State for the coordination of response and recovery operations. It houses the FCO and staff comprising the Emergency Response Team (ERT). It will operate 24-hours a day, as needed, or with a schedule sufficient to sustain the Federal response operations. Except where facilities do not permit, the FCO will be co-located with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) at the DFO.

G. Multistate Response.

One or more disasters may affect a number of States and regions concurrently. In those instances, the Federal government will conduct multistate response operations; for each declared State, an FCO will be appointed to coordinate the specific requirements for Federal response and recovery within the State. Under multiple State declarations, ESF departments and agencies will be required to coordinate the provision of resources to support the operations of all of the declared States.

H. Donations.

1. The Federal government encourages the giving of cash to private non-profit voluntary organizations involved in disaster relief, rather than specific donation of clothing, food, and other goods. Should goods or services be offered, the Federal government will coordinate the transportation and distribution of only those donations it accepts for use. To facilitate this policy, the Federal government will issue appropriate press releases in conjunction with States and voluntary organizations, establish a central phone number for handling donations inquiries and set up a database for recording offers of goods and volunteer services.

2. Donations coordinators will be designated at FEMA Headquarters, at each DFO and at State locations, as needed, to work with the ESF's in managing donations. FEMA will ensure that a database is made available to the ESF's to identify needed goods and services or to respond to offers of goods and services. Should an ESF wish to take advantage of the offer of a donated good or service, that ESF is responsible for contacting the potential donor and arranging for the receipt, transport and distribution, or acquisition of the donated good or service.
- I. Law Enforcement.
1. Each State has the general responsibility for law enforcement, using local resources, and State resources, including the National Guard (to the extent that the National Guard remains State authority and has not been called into Federal service or ordered into active duty). In some cases, a State government may experience a law enforcement emergency (including one in connection with a disaster or emergency) in which it is unable to provide an adequate response to an uncommon situation which requires law enforcement assistance, which is or threatens to become of serious or epidemic (large-scale) proportions, and with respect to which State and local resources are inadequate to protect lives and property of citizens, or to enforce the criminal.
 2. In the event that such a law enforcement emergency exists throughout a State or part of a State (on behalf of itself or a local unit of government) may submit an application in writing from the Chief Executive Officer of the State to the Attorney General of the United States to request emergency Federal law enforcement assistance under the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, (42 U.S.C., Section 10501-10513) as prescribed in 28 C.F.R., Part 65. The Attorney General will approve or disapprove the application no later than 10 days after receipt. If the application is approved, Federal law enforcement assistance may be provided to include equipment, training, intelligence or personnel.
 3. In the event that a serious law enforcement emergency or civil disturbance constitutes an insurrection against a State government under 10 U.S.C. 331, the State legislature or the Governor (if the legislature cannot be convened) may request, through the Attorney General, that the President call into Federal Service the militia (National Guard) of any State, and use the Armed Forces, to end the emergency or suppress the disturbance.

4. In the event that a serious law enforcement emergency or civil disturbance makes impractical or otherwise hinders the enforcement of the laws of the United States and/or deprives any part of a State's population of Constitutional rights and privileges under 10 U.S.C. 332-333, the President may call into Federal service the militia (National Guard) of any State, and use the Armed Forces, to end the emergency or suppress the disturbance.
5. Procedures for coordinating Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Justice (DOJ) responses to law enforcement emergencies arising under 10 U.S.C. 331-333 are set forth in the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances, dated April 1, 1969.

J. Nonliability.

Under Section 305 of the Stafford Act, a Federal agency or designated employee of a Federal agency, including the American Red Cross (ARC) and its employees and volunteers, performing a function under the authority of P.L. 93-288, as amended, are not liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of, or the failure of exercise or performance of, that function.

K. Financial Management.

FEMA funding for response activities will be made available to participating agencies performing tasks under the Plan in a manner consistent with provisions of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., and applicable regulations. Reimbursement will be provided in accordance with policies and procedures outlined in the Financial Management Annex and in regulations contained in 44 CFR Part 206.

L. Public Information.

1. Public information activities will be undertaken to ensure the coordinated, timely, and accurate release of a wide range of information to the news media and to the public about disaster-related activities. These activities will be carried out in a Joint Information Center (JIC) established in the disaster area and staffed with Federal, State, and local public affairs representatives. Information intended for the news media and the public will be coordinated prior to release with the FCO, other Federal departments and agencies, and with State and local officials.
2. A JIC also will be set up at FEMA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., based upon the need to provide support to the field activities for either a single-State disaster or multistate disasters.

3. Procedures regarding public information are described in the Public Information Annex to the Plan.

M. Congressional Relations.

1. Congressional liaison will be established to provide information to the Washington, D.C., and district offices of Members of Congress and to respond to questions, concerns, and problems raised by their constituents. The activities will be managed by the Congressional Liaison Officer (CLO), who will be managed by the Congressional liaison personnel from all Federal departments and agencies involved in the response, and by a congressional liaison element at FEMA Headquarters in Washington.
2. Onscene congressional relations staff will be located at the JIC established in the disaster area. At this JIC, a deputy CLO will maintain continuing liaison with the public affairs personnel at the headquarters JIC and with the congressional liaison element at FEMA Headquarters. The onscene congressional relations staff also will provide information pertaining to requests for hearings and special legislation to the headquarters congressional liaison element.
3. Information to be released to congressional offices and constituents will be coordinated among participating Federal departments and agencies and with State and local officials, as appropriate, prior to release.
4. Both the congressional relations staff onscene and at the national level will conduct briefings for Members of Congress and their staffs. Timing, format, and content of these briefing will be determined by the CLO in coordination with the FCO and the SCO, as appropriate.
5. Procedures regarding congressional relations and liaison are described in the Congressional Relations Annex to the Plan.

N. After-Action Reports.

Following Federal response to a disaster under the Plan, FEMA will coordinate the preparation of an after-action report documenting the Federal response effort. Each Federal department and agency involved in the response effort will keep records of its activity to assist in preparing the after-action report.

III. SITUATION

A. Disaster Condition.

1. A disaster or emergency may overwhelm the capabilities of a State and its local governments in providing a timely and effective response to meet the needs of the situation. For example, the occurrence of a large or catastrophic earthquake in a high-risk, high-population area will cause casualties, property loss, disruption of normal life support systems, and will impact the regional economic, physical, and social infrastructures.
2. A disaster or emergency has the potential to cause substantial health and medical problems, with hundreds or thousands of deaths and injuries, depending on factors such as times of occurrence, severity of impact, existing weather conditions, area demographics, and the nature of building construction. Deaths and injuries will occur principally from the collapse of manmade structures and collateral events, such as fires and mudslides.
3. A disaster or emergency may cause significant damage particularly to the economic and physical infrastructure. An earthquake may trigger fires, floods, or other events that will multiply property losses and hinder the immediate emergency response effort. An earthquake or hurricane may significantly damage or destroy highway, airport, railway, marine, communications, water, waste disposal, electrical power, natural gas and petroleum transmission systems.

B. Planning Assumptions.

1. The Plan assumes that a disaster or emergency, such as an earthquake, may occur with little or no warning at a time of day that produces maximum casualties. The Plan also deals with other types of disasters, such as a hurricane, which could result in a large number of casualties and cause widespread damage, or with the consequences of any event in which Federal response assistance under the authorities of the Stafford act is required. In all cases, the Plan assumes that the response capability of an affected State will be overwhelmed quickly.
2. The large number of casualties and/or the heavy damage to buildings, structures and the basic infrastructure will necessitate direct Federal government assistance to support State and local authorities in conducting lifesaving and life-supporting efforts.
3. As a result of persons being injured and others being trapped in damaged or destroyed structures, the likelihood of a significant number of deaths within 72 hours will require the immediate response of Federal search and rescue personnel, and medical personnel, supplies and equipment to minimize preventable deaths and disabilities.

4. Federal departments and agencies may need to respond on short notice to provide effective and timely assistance to the State. Therefore, the Plan provides pre-assigned missions for Federal agencies to expedite the provision of response assistance to support State and local efforts to save lives, alleviate suffering and protect property.
5. The declaration process under the Plan will be carried out under P.L. 93-288, as amended. Under Title V, and as prescribed in 44 C.F.R., Part 205. Based on the severity and magnitude of the situation, the Governor will request the President to declare a major disaster or an emergency for the State, and the President will issue a declaration, as warranted. The President will also appoint an FCO to coordinate the overall activities under the declaration.
6. For certain situations, the President may declare an emergency with or without a Governor's request, as specified in Title V of P.L. 93-288, as amended. Under Title V, the President may direct the provision of emergency assistance either at the request of a Governor (Section 501.(a)), or upon determination by the President that an "emergency exists for which the primary responsibility rests with the United States..." (Section 501.(b)).
7. The ARC is deemed to be a Federal agency for the purpose of the Plan. Though created by the United States Congress in 1905, the ARC is a private, charitable corporation whose primary functions include the alleviation of human suffering caused by disaster or other natural catastrophe.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General.

1. During the period immediately following a major disaster or emergency requiring Federal Response, primary agencies, when directed by FEMA, will take actions to identify requirements, and mobilize and deploy resources to the affected area to assist the State in lifesaving and life-protecting response efforts.
2. Agencies have been grouped together under the functional ESF's to facilitate the provision of response assistance to the State. These functions are transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. If Federal response assistance is required under the Plan, it will be provided using some or all of the ESF's, as necessary.

3. Each ESF has been assigned a number of missions to provide response assistance to the State, the designated primary agency, acting as the Federal Executive Agent, and with the assistance of one or more support agencies, is responsible for managing the activities of the ESF and ensuring that the missions are accomplished. ESF's have the authority to execute response operations to directly support State needs. The primary and support agency assignments by each ESF are shown in Figure 2.
4. Specific ESF functional missions, organizational structures, response actions and primary and support agency responsibilities are described in the Functional Annexes to the Plan.
5. ESFs will coordinate directly with their functional counterpart State agencies to provide the assistance required by the State. Requests for assistance will be channeled from local jurisdictions through the designated State agencies for action. Based on State-identified response requirements, appropriate Federal response assistance will be provided by an ESF to the State, or at the State's request, directly to an affected local jurisdiction.
6. An FCO will be appointed by the President to coordinate the Federal activities in each declared State. The FCO will work with the SCO to identify overall requirements, including unmet needs and evolving support requirements, and coordinate these requirements with the ESF's. The FCO will also coordinate public information, Congressional liaison, community liaison, outreach and donations activities, and will facilitate the provision of information and reports to appropriate users.
7. The FCO will head a regional interagency ERT, composed of ESF representatives and other support staff. The ERT provides initial response coordination with the affected State at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) or other designated State facility and supports the FCO and ESF operations in the field. The FCO will coordinate response activities with the ESF representatives on the ERT to ensure that Federal resources are made available to meet the requirements identified by the State.
8. A national interagency EST, composed of ESF representative and other support staff, will operate at FEMA headquarters to provide support for the FCO and the ERT.
9. The CDRG, composed of representatives from all departments and agencies under the Plan, will operate at the national level to provide guidance and policy direction on response coordination and operational issues arising from FCO and ESF response activities. The CDRG is also supported by the EST and will operate from FEMA headquarters.

10. Activities under the Plan will be organized at various levels to provide partial response and recovery (utilizing selected ESF's) or to provide full response and recovery (utilizing all ESF's).

B. Organization.

The organization to implement the procedures under the Plan is composed of standard elements at the national and regional levels. The overall response structure is shown in Figure 3. It is designed to be flexible in order to accommodate the response and recovery requirements specific to the disaster. The response structure shows the compositions of the elements providing response coordination and response operations activities at the headquarters and regional levels, but does not necessarily represent lines of authority or reporting relationships. In general, national-level elements provide support to the regional-level elements which implement the on-scene response operations in the field.

1. National-level Response Structure.

The national-level response structure is composed of national interagency coordination and operations support elements from the participating departments and agencies. Overall interagency coordination activities are supported by the CDRG and EST at FEMA Headquarters. These elements will be augmented by department and agency operations support elements at other locations. As shown in Figure 4, the national-level response structure is composed of the following specific elements:

a. Catastrophic Disaster Response Group.

(1) The CDRG is the headquarters-level coordinating group which addresses policy issues and support requirements from the FCO and ESF response elements in the field. It is chaired by the FEMA Associate Director, SLPS, and includes representatives from the Federal departments and agencies which have responsibilities under the Plan. The CDRG addresses response issues and problems which require national-level decisions of policy direction. The CDRG may be augmented by officials from other organizations, not listed in the Plan, which have resources, capabilities, or expertise needed for the response effort.

(2) The CDRG will meet on an as-needed basis at the request of the CDRG Chairperson. Meetings, unless otherwise indicated, will be held at the Emergency Information and Coordination Center (EICC), located in FEMA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

b. Emergency Support Team.

The EST is an interagency group comprised of representatives from each of the primary agencies, select support agencies and FEMA Headquarters staff. It operates from the FEMA EICC. Detailed procedures regarding the EST organization and operations are found in the "EST Organization and Operational Procedures" document published by FEMA.

(1) The EST:

(a) Supports the CDRG and assists in assuring interagency headquarters information and coordination support for response activities;

(b) Serves as the central source of information at the national level regarding the status of Federal response activities and helps disseminate information (through a JIC) to the media, Congress and the general public; and

(c) Provides interagency resource coordination support to the FCO and regional response operations. In this capacity, the EST provides coordination support for FCO, ERT and ESF activities, as necessary. ESF representatives from the primary agencies provide liaison between field operations, their respective emergency operations centers (if applicable) and headquarters activities. The EST also coordinates offers of donations, including unsolicited resources offered by various individuals and groups, with field elements for use in response operations.

(2) To accomplish the resources coordination function, the EST:

(a) Coordinates the acquisition of additional resources, which an ESF is unable to obtain under its own authorities, to support operations;

(b) Advises the CDRG regarding the need to resolve a resource conflict between two or more ESF's which cannot be resolved in the affected region(s); and

(c) Supports coordination of resources for multistate and multi-regional disaster response and recovery activities.

c. Agency Operational Centers.

In addition to supporting EST activities at the FEMA EICC, headquarters departments and agencies will conduct national-level response activities at their own EOC's.

2. Regional-level Response Structure.

The regional-level response structure is composed of interagency elements operating from various locations. Initially, representatives from the ESF's and FEMA will assemble at the ROC located at the FEMA Regional Office (or Federal Regional Center). As needed, an Advance Element of the Emergency Response Office (or Federal Regional Center). As needed, an Advance Element of the Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) will deploy to the field to assess or begin response operational as required. When fully operational, the regional-level response structure will include the FCO and ERT in a DFO, with regional ESFs conducting response operations to provide assistance to each affected State. The regional structure is depicted in Figure 5.

a. Regional Operations Center.

The ROC is activated by the Regional Director at a FEMA Regional Office. It is staffed by FEMA and representatives from the primary agencies and other agencies, as needed, to initiate and support Federal response activity. The ROC:

- (1) Gathers damage information regarding the affected area;
- (2) Serves as a point-of-contact for the affected State(s), national EST and Federal agencies;
- (3) Establishes communications links with the affected State(s), national EST and Federal agencies;
- (4) Supports deployment of the ERT(s) to field locations;
- (5) Implements information and planning activities (under ESF #5);
- (6) Serves as a initial coordination office Federal activity until the ERT is established in the DFO in the field; and
- (7) Supports coordination of resources for multistate and multiregional disaster response and recovery activities, as needed. The organization of the ROC is shown in Figure 6.

b. Emergency Response Team.

The ERT is the interagency group that provides administrative, logistical, and operational support to the regional response activities in the field. The ERT includes staff from FEMA and other agencies who support the FCO in carrying out interagency activities. The ERT also provides support for the dissemination of information to the media, Congress and the general public. Each FEMA Regional Office is responsible for rostering an ERT and developing appropriate procedures for its notification and deployment.

(1) Advance Element of the Emergency Response Team.

The ERT-A is the initial group to respond in the field to an incident. It is the nucleus of the full ERT which operates from the DFO. As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, the Advance Element is headed by a team leader from FEMA and is composed of FEMA program and support staff and representatives from selected ESF primary agencies. It is organized with Administration and Logistics, Information and Planning, and Operations groups and includes staff for public information, congressional liaison, and community liaison activities, as required.

(a) A part of the ERT-A will deploy to the State EOC or the other locations to work directly with the State to obtain information on the impact of the event and to begin identifying specific State requirements for Federal response assistance.

(b) Other members of the Advance Element, including leasing, communications and procurement representatives, and logistical and other support staff from FEMA, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator (FECC) or a representative, and the Forest Service, as required, will deploy directly to the disaster site to identify or verify the location for a DFO; establish communications; and set up operations, including the establishment of one or more Mobilization Centers, as required.

(2) Structure of the ERT.

As shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, the ERT is composed of the following elements:

(a) Federal Coordinating Officer.

The FCO is appointed on behalf of the President by the Director, FEMA. The FCO heads the ERT and is supported in the field by staff carrying out public information, congressional liaison, community relations, outreach (to disaster victims) and donations coordination activities. The FCO:

- coordinates overall response and recovery activities with the State;
- works with the SCO to determine State support requirements and to coordinate these requirements with the ESF's;
- tasks ESF's or any Federal agency to perform missions in the Plan and to perform additional missions not specifically addressed in the Plan; and
- coordinates response issues and problems with the CDRG which require national-level decisions or policy direction.

(b) Administration and Logistics.

This element includes activities which provide facilities and services in support of response operations, as well as for recovery activities. Includes the DFO support functions of administrative services, fiscal services, computer support and a message center.

(c) Information and Planning.

This element includes information and planning activities to support operations. It includes functions to collect and process information; develop information into briefings, reports, and other materials; display pertinent information on maps, charts and status boards; consolidate information for action planning; and provide technical services in the form of advice on specialized areas in support of operations.

(d) Response Operations.

This element includes the ESF's which are activated to provide direct response assistance in support of State requirements. The functions include ESF #1--Transportation, ESF #2--Communications, ESF #3--Public Works and Engineering, ESF #4--Firefighting, ESF #6--Mass Care, ESF #7--Resource Support, ESF #8--Health and Medical Services, ESF #9--Urban Search and Rescue, ESF #10--Hazardous Materials, ESF#11--Food, and ESF #12--Energy. Each ESF is responsible for assessing State-identified Federal assistance requirements and resource requests and to organize and direct appropriate ESF response operations. The ESF primary agency will identify the functional support requirements to be provided by itself, support agencies and other ESF's.

(e) Recovery Operations.

This Element includes the program activities of FEMA and other Federal agencies (OFA's) which provide disaster recovery assistance. This consists of Individual Assistance (including temporary housing, grants and loans to individuals, families and businesses); Public Assistance (including debris clearance, the repair or replacement of roads, streets and bridges and the repair or replacement of water control facilities, public buildings and related equipment, public utilities and the repair or restoration of recreational facilities and parks); and Hazard Mitigation Assistance (including measures to lessen or avert the threat of future disasters).

(f) Defense Coordinating Officer.

The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) function is supported by the DOD. The DCO is provided by the DOD to serve in the field as the point of contact to the FCO and the ESF's regarding requests for military assistance. The DCO and staff coordinate support and provide liaison to the ESF's.

C. Notification.

1. FEMA may receive initial notification or warning of a disaster from multiple sources, including the National Earthquake Information Service (NEIS) of the United States Geological Survey (USGS); the National Weather Service (NWS) (including the National Hurricane Center, the Severe Storms Forecast Center and the River Forecast Center); the Office of Territorial Affairs of the Department of the Interior; The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center; the FEMA National Warning Center; a FEMA Regional Office; a State Emergency Operations Center; or the news media.
2. Upon the determination of the occurrence of a disaster or emergency, the FEMA National Emergency Coordination Center (NECC) will notify key FEMA headquarters and regional officials. If there is a need for activation of response structures of the Plan, the NECC will notify CDRG and EST members at the national level, as required. The NECC will also notify the National Response Center, as appropriate. At the regional level, the appropriate Regional Director will notify members of the regional ERT.
3. Upon notification by FEMA, each agency is responsible for conducting its own internal national and regional notifications.

4. CDRG members may be called to assemble at the FEMA EICC for an initial meeting. CDRG members or alternates must be available at the call of the CDRG Chairperson to meet at any time during the initial response period, as necessary.
5. Detailed Federal headquarters and regional response notification action as are described in regional and headquarters procedures.

D. Activation.

1. The Plan will be used to address particular requirements of a given disaster or emergency situation. Selected ESF's will be activated based on the nature and scope of the event and the level of Federal resources required to support State and local response efforts.
2. Once a response requirement is identified, some or all of the structures of the Plan will be activated. This includes the establishment of the EST at headquarters level, the activation of some or all of the ESF's and the deployment of an ERT from the regional office. The sequence of actions that will be taken at the national level and at the regional level upon activation of the Plan is shown in Figure 11.
3. At the national level, the FEMA Associate Director, SLPS, in consultation with the FEMA Director, has the authority to activate part or all of the response structures at the headquarters level to address the specific situation.
4. At the regional level, a FEMA Regional Director, in consultation with the Associate Director, SLPS and the FEMA Director, also may activate part or all of the response structures of the Plan within the Region for the purpose of providing response support to an affected State.
5. Based on requirements of the situation, FEMA headquarters and regional offices will notify Federal departments and agencies regarding activation of some or all of the ESF's and other Structures of the Plan. Priority for notification by FEMA will be given to contacting primary agencies.

E. Deployment.

When activated, ESF's and other operational elements will take actions to identify, mobilize and deploy personnel and resources to support regional and national response operations, including the ROC and ERT activities in the regions and CDRG and EST activities in FEMA headquarters.

V. RESPONSE ACTIONS

A. Initial Actions.

1. Headquarters Actions.

- a. The FEMA Director will provide information on the requirements for Federal response assistance to the White House and to senior-level Federal government officials, as required. The FEMA Associate Director, SLPS, will activate the EST and convene the CDRG, as appropriate. A JIC will be established, as required.
- b. The interagency EST will assemble in the FEMA EICC within two hours of notification to initiate headquarters interagency operations. The EST will provide support for regional response activities, as needed.
- c. At the call of the CDRG Chairperson, the CDRG will convene in the FEMA EICC. Members will report on their agency deployment actions and initial activities in support of the ESF's.
- d. Federal departments and agencies may activate their headquarters EOC's to provide coordination and direction to regional response elements in the field.
- e. FEMA will take the necessary actions to expedite the processing of a Governor's request for a Presidential major disaster or emergency declaration.

2. Regional Actions.

- a. Upon the occurrence of an event that requires or may require a Federal response, the FEMA Regional Director will initiate Federal response activities from the Regional Office.
- b. FEMA and other Federal agencies will activate a ROC and establish links with the affected State until the ERT is established in the field.
- c. The FEMA Regional Director, with the support of the ESF's, will initially deploy members of the ERT-A to the affected State for the purpose of assessing the impact of the situation, collecting damage information and determining response requirements. The Regional Director will coordinate the Federal support of State requirements until the FCO assumes those responsibilities. A JIC will be established, as required.

- d. ESF's will take actions to quickly determine the impact of the disaster on their own capabilities and will identify, mobilize, and deploy resources to support response activities in the affected State.

B. Continuing Actions.

1. Headquarters Actions.

- a. The EST will establish communications with the FEMA Region and with the DFO. The EST will provide liaison between the national-level participating departments and agencies for response operations support, including coordination of national-level resource requirements.
- b. The FEMA headquarters JIC will support the JIC in the field, as required.
- c. The Congressional Affairs staff, from FEMA and supporting departments and agencies, will conduct briefings for Members of Congress and their staffs, consistent with the Congressional Liaison element of the ERT.
- d. Federal agencies will support ESF activities, as directed by the directed by the designated primary agencies.

2. Regional Actions.

- a. The FCO will provide overall coordination of Federal response activities with the SCO of the affected State.
- b. Each ESF will establish contact with its State response counterpart to determine the specific requirements for Federal assistance and will provide appropriate response to the ESF missions. Each ESF will designate a representative to coordinate ESF activities with the FCO.

VI. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- 1. At FEMA Headquarters, several offices have responsibilities for developing, exercising, and maintaining the Plan and implementing the Federal response at the national level.

- a. The Office of the Director, in consultation with the Associate Director, SLPS, and the appropriate Regional Director, is responsible for implementing FEMA Headquarters response actions under the Plan. The Director also is responsible, by delegation from the President, for appointing an FCO for each declared State.
- b. The State and Local Programs and Support Directorate is responsible for providing overall coordination of the planning process and establishing a Federal response program for periodic exercise and Plan review. The Office of Emergency Management, SLPS is responsible for coordinating overall planning and response activities under the Plan. The Office of Emergency Management is also responsible for the design and implementation of procedures for the Headquarters EST, and in coordination with the FEMA Regional Offices, is responsible to support the design and implementation of procedures for the Regional ERT's. The Office of Disaster Assistance Programs is responsible for processing a Governor's request for disaster assistance and for managing Federal recovery activities under a disaster declaration.
- c. The National Preparedness Directorate is responsible for alerting and notifying the EST and the CDRG through the NECC, providing an EST operational capability in the EICC, and providing a range of emergency support to the ERT through the FEMA Emergency Response Capability (FERC).
- d. The External Affairs Directorate is responsible to support public affairs and Congressional relations activities under the Plan. The Office of Public Affairs is responsible for implementing public affairs activities under the Plan, including coordination the public information activities of other agencies using one or more JIC's. The Office of Congressional relations is responsible for establishing contact with Congressional offices representing the affected area and providing support for all aspects of Congressional relations, including providing personnel for headquarters and regional operations, conducting briefings and developing special legislation, as needed, to facilitate the response process,

- e. The Office of Financial Management is responsible for developing guidance and procedures in concert with Plan agencies regarding the dispositions and accounting of funds. This includes providing a funding code for reimbursement of eligible expenditures related to P.L.93-288 activities, establishing a Letter of Credit mechanism to ensure rapid availability and transfer of funds to Federal and State organizations, when required, and processing requests for supplemental appropriations, as needed.
 - f. The Office of General Counsel is responsible for providing legal advice to the CDRG Chair and coordinating with other agencies regarding P.L. 93-288 authorities and other agency emergency authorities and directives. The Office will coordinate the perpetration of emergency legislation required to support the response effort.
 - g. The Office of Administrative Services and the Office of Operations Support are responsible for providing administrative and logistical support for headquarters response activities, including support for the EST and the CDRG.
2. In the FEMA Regions, each FEMA Regional Director is responsible for implementing activities of the Plan. This includes coordinating the development of an interagency response capability, the development and maintenance of the regional supplements to the Plan, ESF Appendices, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's). The Regional Director is also responsible for exercising the Plan in the Region and for implementing Federal response activities under the Plan during an actual Event.
- B. Primary Agencies.
- 1. At the national level, primary agencies are responsible to plan and coordinate with their support agencies for the delivery of ESF-related assistance. Primary agencies are responsible for preparing and maintaining the ESF annexes and appendices to the Plan to reflect the policies, procedures regarding assistance to be provided, and associated responsibilities of the designated primary and support agencies. Each primary agency at the national level will
 - a. Designate an official to serve as a representative to the CDRG;
 - b. Designate staff to serve as a point-of-contact on the EST for ESF activities and to provide support for Congressional relations, public information and financial management activities, as required;

- c. Designate an official at the headquarters level and in each FEMA Region to be responsible for the development of planning and procedures for each ESF;
 - d. Provide direction and assistance to national and regional elements tasked to assist with planning and response operations;
 - e. Participate in the process of developing and exercising the Plan; and
 - f. Coordinate the development of supplemental material to the Plan, including national and regional plan annexes, appendices and other supplements describing specific policies and procedures for response operations.
2. At the regional level, primary agencies will work with their support agencies to provide assistance to the State and to other ESF's, as may be required. Primary agencies will use the ESF annexes of the Plan as a basis for developing regional appendices to the ESF annexes and regional SOP's to support response activities.

C. Support Agencies.

Support agencies will assist the primary agencies in preparing and maintaining ESF annexes and appendices, developing national and regional operating procedures, and providing support for ESF operations. Each support agency will

1. Designate the headquarters-level office which will serve as the primary point of contact for all actions relating to the Plan;
2. Participate in the process of exercising, reviewing, maintaining and implementing the Plan; and
3. Designate representatives to serve on the CDRG and to staff ESF field operation at the DFO and at other operational locations.

D. Other Federal Agencies.

Other Federal departments and agencies may have the authorities, resources, capabilities or expertise that may be required to support response operations, but that have not been formally designated under the Plan. Those organizations may be requested to participate in Federal planning and response operations and asked to designate staff to serve as representatives to the CDRG, and to provide support to response operations in the field.

Functional Annexes:

ESF #1--Transportation

ESF #2--Communication

ESF #3--Public Works and Engineering

ESF #4--Firefighting

ESF #5--Information and Planning

ESF #6--Mass Care

ESF #7--Resource Support

ESF #8--Health and Medical Services

ESF #9--Urban Search and Rescue

ESF #10--Hazardous Materials

ESF #11--Food

ESF #12--Energy

Support Annexes:

FM--Financial Management

PI--Public Information

CR--Congressional Relations

Supplemental Reading:

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (Unclassified)

The following is a copy of an unclassified* abstract derived from Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, dated June 21, 1995. This abstract has been reviewed and approved by the National Security Council (NSC) for distribution to Federal, State, and local emergency response and consequence management personnel to assist them in responding to terrorist emergencies.

*The full text of PDD-39 is a CLASSIFIED document. State and local officials, however, should understand that PDD-39 essentially gives the responsibility of response to terrorist attacks to the FBI for "crisis management" and FEMA for "consequence management." State and local agencies and assets will be expected to support the Federal efforts.

U.S. POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORISM
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-39)

1. General. Terrorism is both a threat to our national security as well as a criminal act. The Administration has stated that it is the policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both people and facilities, wherever they occur. In support of these efforts, the United States will

- a. Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists.
- b. Work closely with other governments to carry out our counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against them.
- c. Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they pay for their actions.
- d. Make no concessions to terrorists.

2. Measures to Combat Terrorism. To ensure that the United States is prepared to combat terrorism in all its forms, a number of measures have been directed. These include reducing vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to terrorist acts, and having capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, including those of mass destruction.

a. Reducing Vulnerabilities. In order to reduce our vulnerabilities to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all department/agency heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and facilities are fully protected against terrorism. Specific efforts that will be conducted to ensure our security against terrorist acts include the following.

- Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical national infrastructure.
- Expand the program of counterterrorism.
- Reduce the vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/facilities abroad and military personnel facilities.
- Exclude/Deport persons who pose a terrorist threat.
- Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and protect the President and other officials against terrorist attack.

Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.

b. Deter. To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and we will vigorously deal with terrorist sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and support. In this regard, we must make it clear that we will not allow terrorism to succeed and that the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of terrorists is of the highest priority. Our goals include the disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. Return of terrorists overseas, who are wanted for violation of U.S. law, is of the highest priority and a central issue in bilateral relations with any State that harbors or assists them.

c. Respond. To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the victims of terrorists. The goal during the immediate response phase of an incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, while seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance. After an incident has occurred, a rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents and a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as NBC threats.

The Director, FEMA, will ensure that the Federal Response Plan is adequate for consequence management activities in response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. populations, including those where weapons of mass destruction are involved. FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and capabilities are adequate and tested. FEMA, supported by all Federal Response Plan signatories, will assume Lead Agency role for consequence management in Washington, DC and on scene. If large scale casualties and infrastructure damage occur, the President may appoint a Personal Representative for consequence management as the on scene Federal authority during recovery. A roster of senior and former government officials willing to perform these functions will be created and the rostered individuals will be provided training and information necessary to allow them to be called on short notice.

Agencies will bear the costs of their participation in terrorist incidents and counterterrorist operations, unless otherwise directed.

d. NBC Consequence Management. The development of effective capabilities for preventing and managing the consequences of terrorist use of NBC materials or weapons is of the highest priority. Terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of such materials/weapons or removing this capability from terrorist groups. FEMA will review the Federal Response Plan on an urgent basis, in conjunction with supporting agencies, to determine its adequacy in responding to an NBC-related terrorist incident; identify and remedy and shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, or training; and report on the status of these efforts in 180 days.

Supplemental Reading: Terrorism Incident Annex

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS



Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Response Plan
 Notice of Change

Date:	Number:	Subject:
February 7, 1997	FEMA 229, Chg 11	Terrorism

- 1. Purpose.** This notice of change adds a Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan (FRP), which will be used to implement Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39).
- 2. Background.** PDD-39 defines policies regarding the Federal response to threats or acts of terrorism involving nuclear, biological, and/or chemical material, and/or weapons of mass destruction (NBC/WMD). PDD-39 directs the undersigned departments and agencies to perform specific responsibilities that may affect the performance of their responsibilities under the FRP.
- 3. Supersession.** None.
- 4. Action Required.** Insert pages TI-1 through TI-22 after page CR-22.
- 5. Distribution.** All Federal departments and agencies with FRP responsibilities.
- 6. Additional Copies.** May be obtained by contacting FEMA Printing and Publications at (202) 646-3484.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS


TERRORISM INCIDENT ANNEX

I. INTRODUCTION

In June 1995, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), "*United States Policy on Counterterrorism*." PDD-39 directed a number of measures to reduce the Nation's vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PDD-39 discusses crisis management and consequence management.

Crisis management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management predominantly a law enforcement response. Based on the situation, a Federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operations, and by Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently (see **Figure 1**).

Consequence management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.



source: DHHS-PHS / FEMA

Figure 1 - Relationship between Crises and Consequence Management

A. Purpose.

The purpose of this Terrorism Incident Annex, hereafter referred to as the Annex, is to describe the Federal concept of operations to implement PDD-39, when necessary, to respond to terrorist incidents within the United States. The Annex:

1. Describes crisis management. Guidance is provided in other Federal plans.
2. Defines the policies and structures to coordinate crisis management with consequence management.

3. Defines consequence management, which uses Federal Response Plan (FRP) structures, supplemented as necessary by structures that are normally activated through other Federal plans.

B. Scope.

1. The Annex applies to all threats or acts of terrorism within the United States that the White House determines require a Federal response.
2. The Annex applies to all Federal departments and agencies that may be directed to respond to a threat or act of terrorism within the United States.
3. The Annex builds upon FRP concepts and procedures by addressing unique policies, assumptions, structures, responsibilities, and actions that will be applied for consequence management as necessary.

II. POLICIES

- A. Lead Agency Responsibilities.** PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing Federal Lead Agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to the Department of Justice, as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. It is FBI policy that crisis management will involve only those Federal agencies requested by the FBI to provide expert guidance and/or assistance, as described in the PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines (classified) and FBI Incident Contingency Plans (classified).
- B. Consequence Management.** PDD-39 states that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall ensure that the FRP is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism. FEMA, with the support of all agencies in the FRP, shall act in support of the FBI in Washington, DC, and on the scene of the crisis, until such time as the Attorney General shall transfer the Lead Agency role to FEMA (see **Figure 2**). FEMA retains responsibility for consequence management throughout the Federal response, and acts in support response of the FBI as appropriate, until the Attorney General, in consultation with the FBI Director and the FEMA Director, determines that such support is no longer required. It is FEMA policy to use FRP structures to coordinate all Federal assistance to State and local governments for consequence management.




Figure 2 - Relationship Among Federal Agencies Under PDD-39

- C. **Costs.** PDD-39 states that Federal agencies directed to participate in the resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations shall bear the costs of their own participation, unless otherwise directed by the President.

III. SITUATION

A. Conditions.

1. A general concern or actual threat of an act of terrorism occurring at or during a special event within the United States may cause the President to direct Federal agencies to implement precautionary measures which may include some of the consequence management actions described in this Annex. When directed, FEMA will coordinate with the FBI and the affected State to identify potential consequence management requirements and with Federal consequence management agencies to implement increased readiness operations.
2. A **significant threat** or act of terrorism may cause the FBI to respond and to implement a crisis management response as described in this Annex. FBI requests for assistance from other Federal agencies will be coordinated through the Attorney General and the President with coordination of NSC groups as warranted. During the course of a crisis management response, consequences may become imminent or occur that cause the President to direct FEMA to implement a consequence management response as described in this Annex.

3. The occurrence of an incident without warning that produces major consequences involving NBC/WMD may cause the President to direct FEMA to implement consequence management response as described in this Annex.

B. Planning Assumptions.

1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal or private level possesses the authority and the expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism, particularly if NBC/WMD are involved.¹
2. An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States involving NBC/WMD, may produce major consequences that would overwhelm the capabilities of may local and State governments almost immediately. Major consequences involving NBC/WMD may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as well.
3. Local, State, and Federal responders may define working perimeters -- that may overlap to some degree. Perimeters may be used to control access to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which may impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established.
4. If protective capabilities are not available, responders cannot be required to put their own lives at risk in order to enter a perimeter contaminated with NBC material. It is possible that the perimeter will be closed until the effects of the NBC material have degraded to levels that are safe for first responders.
5. This Annex may be implemented in situations involving major consequences in a single State or multiple States. The FBI will establish coordination relationships among FBI Field Offices and with Federal agencies supporting crisis management, including FEMA based on the locations involved.²
6. This Annex may be implemented in situations that also involve consequences in neighboring nations.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Crisis Management.

(FBI, National Security Division, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section)

PDD-39 reaffirms the FBI's Federal lead responsibility for crisis management response to threats or acts of terrorism that take place within United States territory or in international waters and do not involve the flag vessel of a foreign country. The FBI provides a graduated flexible response to a range of incidents, including

1. A credible threat, which may be presented in verbal, written, intelligence-based or other form.
2. An act of terrorism which exceeds the local FBI field division capability to resolve.
3. The confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss (e.g., a "*significant threat*").
4. The detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a WMD, or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in limited injury or death (e.g., "*limited consequences/State and local consequence management response*").
5. The detonation of an explosive device, use of another destructive event, with or without warning, that results in substantial injury or death (e.g., "*major consequences/Federal consequence management response*").

In response to a credible threat involving -- NBC/WMD, the FBI initiates a threat assessment process that involves close coordination with Federal agencies with technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the threat from a technical, as well as tactical and behavioral standpoint.

The FBI provides the initial notification to law enforcement authorities within the affected State of a threat or occurrence that the FBI confirms as an act of terrorism. If warranted, the FBI implements an FBI response and simultaneously, advises the Attorney General, who notifies the President and NSC groups as warranted, that a Federal crisis management response is required. If a Federal crisis management response is authorized, the FBI activates multi-agency crisis management structures at FBI Headquarters, the responsible FBI Field Office, and at the incident site (see **Figure 3**). (*The FBI provides*

guidance on the crisis management response in the FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan (classified) and the FBI Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (classified)).




Figure 3 - Multi-Agency Crisis Management Structures

If the threat involves NBC/WMD, the FBI Director may recommend to the Attorney General, who notifies the President and NSC groups as warranted, to deploy a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST). The mission of the DEST is to provide expert advice and assistance to the FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) related to the capabilities of the DEST agencies and to coordinate follow-on response assets. When deployed, the DEST merges into the existing Joint Operations Center (JOC) structure. *(Authorization and coordination procedures and the interagency organizational structure for the DEST are outlined in the PDD- 39 Domestic Guidelines (classified)).*

During crisis management, the FBI coordinates closely with local law enforcement authorities to provide a successful law enforcement resolution to the incident. The FBI also coordinates with other Federal authorities, including FEMA. The FBI Field Office responsible for the Incident site modifies its Command Post to function as a JOC. The JOC

structure includes the following standard groups: Command, Operations, Support, and Consequence Management. Representation within the JOC includes some Federal, State, and local agencies with roles in consequence management. FEMA notifies Federal, State and local consequence management agencies selected by the FBI OSC to request that they deploy representatives to the JOC. Selected Federal, State and local consequence management agencies may be requested to serve in the JOC Command Group, the JOC Support Group/Media component, and the JOC Consequence Management Group (see **Figure 4**, shaded boxes).




Figure 4 - FBI Joint Operations Center Structure

A FEMA representative coordinates the actions of the JOC Consequence Management Group, expedites activation of a Federal consequence management response should it become necessary, and works with an FBI representative who serves as the liaison between the Consequence

Management Group and the FBI OSC. The JOC Consequence Management Group monitors the crisis management response in order to advise on decisions that may have implications for consequence management, and to provide continuity should a Federal consequence management response become necessary.

B. Consequence Management

1. Preincident.

The FBI may notify Federal agencies, including FEMA, of a **significant threat** of an act of terrorism. Federal agencies requested by the FBI, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the FBI Headquarters Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC). Based on the circumstances, FEMA Headquarters and the responsible FEMA Region(s) may implement a standard procedure to alert involved FEMA officials and Federal agencies supporting consequence management. FEMA and other Federal agencies requested by the FBI OSC will deploy representatives to the JOC(s) being established by the responsible FBI Field Office(s).³ Representatives may include a senior official to serve in the JOC Command Group, in order to assist the FBI OSC and to provide continuity in leadership should a Federal consequence management response be required.

Issues arising from the response that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the FBI OSC and the other members of the JOC Command Group, who are all working in consultation with other local, State and Federal representatives. While the FBI OSC retains authority to make Federal crisis management decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible. The FBI OSC and the senior FEMA official will provide, or obtain from higher authority, an immediate resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources (such as airlift or technical operations assets) between the crisis management and the consequence management response.

The JOC Command Group plays an important role ensuring coordination of Federal crisis management and consequence management actions. Coordination will also be achieved through the exchange of operational reports on the incident. Because reports prepared by the FBI are "law enforcement sensitive," FEMA representatives with access to the reports will review them, according to standard procedure, order to identify and forward information to Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5 that may affect operational priorities and action plans for consequence management.




Figure 5 - Preincident Consequence Management

As a situation progresses, consequences may become imminent. FEMA will consult immediately with the White House and the Governor's office in order to determine if FEMA is directed to use authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance (Stafford) Act to mission-assign Federal consequence management agencies to pre-deploy assets, in order to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. These actions will involve appropriate notification and coordination with the FBI, as the overall Federal Lead Agency for counterterrorism.

FEMA Headquarters may activate an Emergency Support Team (EST), may convene an executive-level meeting, of the Catastrophe Disaster Response Group (CDRG), and may place an Emergency Response Team--National (ERT-N) on alert.⁴ When FEMA activates the EST, FEMA will notify FBI Headquarters to request a liaison. The responsible FEMA Region(s) may activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) to the affected State(s) (see **Figure 5**). When the responsible FEMA Region(s) activate a ROC, the Region(s) will notify the responsible FBI Field Office(s) to request a liaison.

2. Trans-Incident.

(Situations involving a transition from a threat to an act of terrorism).

If consequences become imminent or occur that cause the President to direct FEMA to implement a Federal consequence management response, then FEMA will initiate procedures to activate additional FRP structures (the EST, the CDRG, the ROC, and a Disaster Field Office (DFO) if necessary). Federal, State and local consequence management of agencies will begin to disengage from the JOC (see **Figure 6**). The senior FEMA official and liaisons will remain at the JOC until the FBI and FEMA agree that a liaison presence is no longer required. FEMA will establish Joint Information Centers (JICs) in the field and Washington, DC, to serve as the primary Federal information centers on the consequence management response for the media, members of Congress, and foreign governments. FEMA JICs will establish coordination with the FBI Media component in the field and the FBI Headquarters National Press Office, which serve as the primary Federal information centers on the crisis management response.




Figure 6 - Trans-Incident Consequence Management

3. Postincident.

(Situations without warning).

If an incident occurs without warning that produces major consequences and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, then FEMA and the FBI will initiate consequence management and crisis management actions concurrently. FEMA will consult immediately with the White House and the Governor's office to determine if a Federal consequence management response is required. If the President directs FEMA to implement a Federal consequence management response, then FEMA will implement portions of this Annex and other FRP annexes as required. FEMA will support the FBI as required and will lead a concurrent Federal consequence management response.

During the consequence management response, the FBI provides a liaison to either the ROC Director or the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in the field, and a liaison to the EST Director at FEMA Headquarters (see Figure 7). Issues arising from the response that affect

multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the ROC Director or FCO, in consultation with the FBI liaison, the on-scene decisionmakers of the Federal agencies supporting the technical operation, and the ESF Leaders, who are all working in consultation with local, State and other Federal representatives. While the ROC Director or FCO retains authority to make Federal consequence management decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible. Meetings will continue to be scheduled until the FBI and FEMA agree that coordination is no longer required. Operational reports will continue to be exchanged, as described in the preincident phase. The FBI liaisons will remain at the EST and the ROC or DFO until FEMA and the FBI agree that a liaison presence is no longer required.




Figure 7 - Postincident Consequence Management

4. Disengagement.

If an act of terrorism does not occur, then the consequence management response disengages when the FEMA Director, in consultation with the FBI Director, directs FEMA Headquarters and the responsible Region(s) to issue a cancellation notification by standard procedure to appropriate FEMA officials and FRP agencies. FRP agencies disengage according to standard procedure.

If an act of terrorism occurs that results in major consequences, then each FRP structure (the EST, the CDRG, the ROC, and the DFO if necessary) disengages at the appropriate time according to standard procedures. Following FRP disengagement, operations by individual Federal agencies or by multiple Federal agencies under other Federal plans may continue, in order to support the affected State and local government with long-term hazard monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration (clean-up).

V. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. FBI.

PDD-39 clarifies and expands upon the responsibilities of the FBI as the Federal Lead Agency for crisis management. The FBI will

1. Appoint an FBI OSC to provide leadership and direction to the Federal crisis management response. The FBI OSC will convene meetings with decision makers representing FEMA, the Federal agencies involved in technical operations, and the State (as appropriate). These meetings will be held in order to formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for additional resources.
2. Issue and track the status of crisis management actions assigned to Federal agencies. A common system should be used by the FBI and FEMA, in order to provide a capability to control, prioritize, and deconflict taskings to Federal agencies, several of which support crisis management and consequence management.
3. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for crisis management in the field and Washington, DC.
4. Establish the primary Federal centers for information management response for the media, members of Congress, and foreign governments in the field and Washington, DC.
5. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to support FEMA.
6. Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants consultation with the White House.
7. Advise the White House, through the Attorney General, when the FBI requires assistance for a Federal crisis management response, in accordance with the PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines.

8. Coordinate the Federal crisis management response with the lead State and local crisis management agencies.

B. FEMA.

PDD-39 clarifies and expands upon the responsibilities of FEMA as the Federal Lead Agency for consequence management. FEMA will

1. Appoint a ROC Director or FCO to provide leadership and direction to the Federal consequence management response. The ROC Director or FCO will convene meetings with decision makers representing the FBI, the Federal agencies involved in technical operations, and the State (as appropriate). These meetings will be held in order to formulate incident action plans, define priorities, review status, resolve conflicts, identify issues that require decisions from higher authorities, and evaluate the need for additional resources.
2. Issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned to Federal agencies. A common system should be used by the FBI and FEMA, in order to provide a capability to control, prioritize, deconflict, and (as appropriate) audit and reimburse taskings to Federal agencies, several of which support crisis management and consequence management.
3. Establish the primary Federal operations centers for consequence management in the field and Washington, DC.
4. Establish the primary Federal centers for information on consequence management response for the media, members of Congress, and foreign governments in the field and Washington, DC.
5. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to support the FBI.
6. Determine when consequences are imminent that warrant consultation with the White House and the Governor's office.
7. Consult with the White House and the Governor's office to determine if a Federal consequence management response is required and if FEMA is directed to use Stafford Act authorities. This process will involve appropriate notification and coordination with the FBI.
8. Coordinate the Federal consequence management response with the lead State and local consequence management agencies.

C. Federal Agencies Supporting Technical Operations.

1. Department of Defense.

As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Defense (DOD) will activate technical operations capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of NBC/WMD terrorism. As required under the Constitution and laws of the United States, DOD will coordinate military operations within the United States with the appropriate civilian lead agency(ies) for the technical operations.

2. Department of Energy.

As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Energy (DOE) will activate nuclear response capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of nuclear/WMD terrorism. DOE may coordinate with individual agencies identified in the FRERP to use the structures, relationships, and capabilities described in the FRERP to support response operations. The FRERP does not require formal implementation. Under the FRERP:

- a. The Federal OSC under the FRERP will coordinate the FRERP response with the FEMA official (either the senior FEMA official at the JOC, the ROC Director or the FCO). Who is responsible under PDD-39 for onscene coordination of all Federal support to State and local governments (see **Figure 8**).
- b. The FRERP response may, include onsite management, radiological monitoring and assessment, development of Federal protective action recommendations, and provision of information on the radiological response to the public, the White House and Members of Congress, and foreign governments. The Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the FRERP will serve as the primary Federal source of information regarding onsite radiological conditions and offsite radiological effects.
- c. The LFA/FRERP will issue taskings that draw upon funding from the responding FRERP agencies.

3. Department of Health and Human Services.

As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) will activate health and medical response capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of NBC/WMD terrorism. DHHS may coordinate with individual agencies identified in the *DHHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism*, to use the structures, relationships, and capabilities described in the DHHS plan to support response operations. If the DHHS plan is **formally** implemented:

- a. The DHHS on-scene representative will coordinate, through the ESF #8 Leader, the DHHS plan response with the FEMA official (either the senior FEMA official at the JOC, the ROC Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-scene coordination of all Federal support to State and local governments (see **Figure 8**).
 - b. The DHHS plan response may include threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, epidemiological investigations, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination, public health support, medical support, and pharmaceutical support operations.
 - c. DHHS will issue taskings that draw upon funding from the responding DHHS plan agencies.
4. Environmental Protection Agency.

As directed in PDD-39, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will activate environmental response capabilities to support the Federal response to acts of NBC/WMD terrorism. EPA may coordinate with individual agencies identified in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) to use the structures, relationships, and capabilities of the National Response System as described in the NCP to support response operations. If the NCP is **formally** implemented:

- a. The Onscene Coordinator under the NCP will coordinate, through the ESF #10 Leader, the NCP response with the FEMA official (either the senior FEMA official at the JOC, the ROC Director or the FCO), who is responsible under PDD-39 for on-scene coordination of all Federal support State and local governments (see Figure 8).
- b. The NCP response may include threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-term site restoration (environmental clean-up) operations.




Figure 8 - Relationships Among Federal Plans to Implement PDD-39

VI. FUNDING GUIDELINES

As stated in PDD-39, Federal agencies directed to participate in the resolution of terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations bear the costs of their own participation, unless otherwise directed by the President. This does not preclude Federal agencies from reallocating funds from current agency operating budgets, accepting reimbursable work orders offered by other Federal agencies, and/or submitting requests for supplemental appropriation to the Office of Management and Budget for consideration.

If the President directs FEMA to use Stafford Act authorities, FEMA will issue mission assignment through the RFP to support consequence management. FEMA provides the following funding guidance to the FRP agencies.

A. Special Events and the Stafford Act.

Commitments by individual agencies to take precautionary measures in anticipation of special events will not be reimbursed under the Stafford Act, unless mission-assigned by FEMA to support consequence management.

B. Crisis Management/Law Enforcement and the Stafford Act.

Stafford Act authorities do not pertain to law enforcement functions. Law enforcement or crisis management actions will not be mission-assigned for reimbursement under the Stafford Act.⁵

VII. REFERENCES (not otherwise referenced in the FRP)

- A. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (classified).** An unclassified extract may be obtained from FEMA.
- B. FBI Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (classified).** An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.
- C. FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan (classified).** An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.
- D. PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines (classified).**
- E. DHHS Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism.**

VIII. PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT

Inquiries concerning this Annex should be addressed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response and Recovery Directorate, Operations and Planning Division, Planning and Coordination Branch.^{6,7}

FOLLOW ON PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

¹ FEMA will incorporate language into the FRP Basic Plan concerning the incident command system (ICS) and command structures.

² FEMA will incorporate language into an FRP procedure and FEMA internal procedures for backup operations concerning support to multiple terrorism operations within a single State or in multiple States.

³ FEMA Headquarters will develop planning guidance for the FEMA Regions to incorporate language into the Regional Response Plans to explain that the senior FEMA Official at the JOC has the authority to expedite activation of a Federal consequence management response. Following a Stafford Act declaration, Federal consequence management operations will transition from the JOC Consequence Management Group, supported by the ROC, to a DFO.

⁴ FEMA will incorporate language into the FRP Basic Plan concerning the Emergency Response Team - National.

⁵ FEMA will renew and update language concerning Stafford Act declaration assignments in the FRP Basic Plan as follows:

FEMA can use limited pre-deployment authorities in advance of a Stafford Act declaration to *"lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe"*, only if the President expresses intent to go forward with a declaration (Section 201). This authority is further interpreted by Congressional intent, to the effect that the President must determine that assistance under existing Federal programs is inadequate to meet the crisis before FEMA may directly intervene under the Stafford Act.

The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue *"emergency"* and *"major disaster"* declarations (Section 501). Emergency declarations may be issued in response to a Governor's request, or in response to those rare emergencies, including some acts of terrorism, for which the Federal Government is assigned in the laws of the United States the exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority to respond. Major disaster declarations may be issued in response to a Governor's request for any natural catastrophe or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood or explosion which has caused damage of sufficient severity and magnitude, as determined by the President, to warrant major disaster assistance under the Act.

If a Stafford Act declaration is provided, funding for consequence management may continue to be allocated from responding department and agency operating budgets, the Disaster Relief Fund, and supplemental appropriations.

Mission assignments are reimbursable work orders issued by FEMA to Federal agencies directing completion of a specific task. While the Stafford Act states that *"Federal agencies may (emphasis added) be reimbursed for expenditures under the Act"* from the Disaster Relief Fund (Section 304), it is FEMA policy to reimburse Federal agencies for work performed under mission assignments. Mission assignments issued to support consequence management will follow FEMA's *"Standard Operating Procedures for the Management of Mission Assignments (May 1994)"* or applicable superseding documentation.

⁶ FEMA will update FRP Appendix A. The following acronyms and abbreviations used in the Annex will be incorporated:

DEST	Domestic Emergency Support Team
FBI OSC	FBI On-Scene Commander
JOC	Joint Operations Center
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NSC	National Security Council
PDD-39	Presidential Decision Directive 39
SIOC	Strategic Information Operations Center
WMD	Weapons Of Mass Destruction

⁷ FEMA will incorporate these terms and definitions into the FRP Appendix B:

1. **Biological agents** are microorganisms or toxins from living organisms that have infectious properties which produce lethal or serious effects in plants and animals. (FBI)
2. **Chemical agents** are solids, liquids, or gases that have chemical properties that produce lethal or serious effects in plants and animals. (FBI)
3. **Limited consequences** are within State and local capabilities.
4. **Major consequences** exceed State and local capabilities, requiring a Federal response.
5. **Nuclear weapons** release nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission and/or fusion of atomic nuclei. (DOE)
6. **Significant threat.** The confirmed presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss. (FBI)
7. **Technical operations** include operations to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, dispose, and decontaminate personnel and property exposed to explosive ordnance or NBC/WMD material.
8. **Terrorist Incident.** A violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (FBI)
9. **Weapon of Mass Destruction.** (A) Any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title, (which reads) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, mine or device similar to the above, (B) poison gas, (C) any weapon involving a disease organism, or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. (18 U.S.C., Section 2332a)

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers**

Student Manual

**Appendix A:
Federal Bureau of
Investigation—
Chemical/Biological
Incident Contingency
Plan
(Unclassified)**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL (C/B)
INCIDENT CONTINGENCY PLAN

(UNCLASSIFIED)

INTRODUCTION:

The first priority of the plan is public safety and the preservation of life. In a terrorist or other criminal-related C/B incident, the FBI will assume a central investigation and/or crisis management role, in association with local law enforcement authorities, to successfully resolve the incident. Concurrently, in a major incident, other specialized Federal entities from a variety of agencies and departments, will provide consequence management resources in support of state and local agencies. These resources are primarily designed to address health and safety issues, and include a wide variety of emergency support, including housing, food, and medical support.

The plan is designed to marshal the appropriate Federal tactical, technical, scientific, and medical support to bolster the FBI's investigative and crisis management abilities and to augment state and local resources in addressing the threat inherent in a C/B incident. The contingency plan emphasizes coordination between all participants and is particularly concerned with the bridge between law enforcement activities and the management of the medical consequences of the crisis.

If a terrorist or other criminal-related C/B incident should occur, the FBI will assume the lead Federal role to successfully resolve the incident and will closely coordinate efforts with appropriate local law enforcement agencies and other emergency authorities.

Based on the specific details of an incident, at some time during the crisis, the responsibility for consequence management and public safety will be transferred from the FBI to FEMA when the Attorney General (AG) determines that the priority law enforcement goals and objectives have been set or are outweighed by the consequence management concerns. The FBI's C/B Incident Contingency Plan attempts to clarify and address this issue and provides guidance regarding the Federal management transition from the FBI to another Federal agency in this context.

The probability of a major chemical/biological (C/B) incident occurring in the United States is difficult to quantify. However, the inevitability of a significant C/B incident is heightened by a number of factors including:

- 1) Chemical/Biological agents are relatively inexpensive to produce.
- 2) Basic chemical precursors and biological production processes are relatively easy to acquire.
- 3) The basic knowledge required to manufacture such substances is readily available.
- 4) The impact to the public is intensified by the inability to quickly identify and/or contain the affects of such substances (particularly biological agents).
- 5) Media coverage has increased the visibility and public knowledge of the use of chemical/biological weapons, thus creating a more likely scenario for their use.
- 6) The portability of small amounts of C/B agents,(especially biological agents), make them especially useful for clandestine purposes.
- 7) The proliferation of C/B agent technology and development efforts worldwide have increased the stockpile of such weapons, thus elevating the potential for the acquisition or theft of the C/B weapons by terrorist groups.

The public safety community must be prepared to address a chemical/biological event with regard to the evacuation, containment, neutralization, removal, cleanup and disposal. Some possible scenarios may include:

- 1) The sabotage of a hazardous chemical production or storage facility.
- 2) The hijacking or premeditated destruction of a tractor-trailer or railroad tanker containing hazardous materials.
- 3) Discovering an individual or a group of individuals involved in the manufacturing or possession of a chemical/biological weapon.
- 4) The dispersal of a chemical/biological agent among the civilian population, livestock or agricultural industry.
- 5) The contamination of a municipal water or public food supply with a chemical/biological agent.
- 6) The credible threat to accomplish one of the above.

GRADUATED RESPONSE:

In order to be effective, and for law enforcement to react safely to a chemical/biological agent incident, a graduated response is appropriate. Since the first priority is public safety and the preservation of life, this graduated response by knowledgeable public safety personnel would consist of the following:

- 1) Assessment of the incident by trained responders in specialized clothing and breathing apparatus.
- 2) Emergency deployment of technical personnel and resources to the incident site.
- 3) Response and establishment of known management resources to a command post area near the incident site.

JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:

As each Chemical/Biological incident will have its own specific identity, the precedence of law enforcement responsibilities may be displaced by significant health and safety issues. At such a time, the lead role will be transferred to another agency with consequence management responsibility for the incident.

Within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been assigned the lead law enforcement role in responding to acts of Chemical/Biological (C/B) terrorism or other criminal-related C/B incidents in which the FBI maintains jurisdiction. The FBI derives its fundamental legal jurisdiction to deter, investigate, direct, organize and prepare for a C/B incident from an assortment of Federal statutes and executive branch directives. Some of these include the following:

- 1) Title 18, USC, Section 1365 - Tampering with Consumer Products;
- 2) Title 18, USC, Sections 871-879 - Extortion and Threats;
- 3) Title 18, USC, Sections 371-373 - Conspiracy;
- 4) Title 18, USC, Sections 175-178 - Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (BWAT);
- 5) Title 18, USC, Section 2332a - Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Pursuant to this jurisdictional responsibility, the FBI will respond to all C/B incidents by marshaling specialized FBI and other Federal resources to support the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) when faced with a potential C/B incident. Recent legislation has made the use, attempt to use or conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction a Federal offense.

In addition, in 1990, the BWAT Act of 1989, was signed into law. This statute makes it illegal to manufacture or possess biological agents for use as a weapon or to assist a foreign country in the development of such a weapon. It also contains extraterritorial provisions, as well as the ability to seize and destroy biological weapons.

C/B RESPONSE PROTOCOL

In a major release of a C/B agent with or without warning, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will assume the lead role in crisis management in the interest of public safety. The FBI will continue to fulfill its law enforcement role as the situation dictates. However, these efforts will be secondary to, and in support of, the consequence management agency designated to coordinate Federal efforts in support of state and local public entities.

Activation of a C/B Threat Assessment Plan, should begin by taking the following steps:

- 1) Make contact with the FBI FIELD OFFICE C/B Coordinator who will immediately contact FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC
- 2) The FBI C/B Coordinator in Washington, DC will contact the appropriate FBIHQ Units having responsibility in a number of areas to include tactical, hostage negotiation, criminal investigative analysis, aviation support, Bomb Technicians, FBI Laboratory and other specialized resources within the FBI.
- 3) The FBI C/B Coordinator in Washington, DC will contact other Federal agencies having C/B support capabilities and include some of the following:
 - A) Department of Defense, C/B Defense Agency;
 - B) Department of Defense, U.S. Army Technical Escort;
 - C) Health and Human Services, U.S. Public Health service;
 - D) Environmental Protection Agency;
 - E) Department of Agriculture, Emergency Programs;
 - F) Federal Emergency Management Agency;
 - G) Secretary of Defense;
 - H) Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control;
 - I) Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration.

POSSIBLE INCIDENT SCENARIOS

- 1) A verbal or written threat only;

- 2) The confirmed presence of a C/B weapon, (without dissemination of the agent);
- 3) The release of a C/B agent, resulting in limited death or injury, requiring limited consequence management;
- 4) The release of a C/B agent (with or without prior warning), resulting in substantial injury or death, and requiring significant consequence management efforts.

FBI COMMAND POST STRUCTURE
(The Joint Operations Center Concept)

The SAC in charge of the FBI's response to a C/B incident will establish an on scene FBI command post designed to effectively coordinate and direct FBI actions and the actions of other agencies in response to the crisis. As the lead Federal agency, it is the FBI's responsibility to recognize, understand and coordinate other federal agencies that have a duty to respond to a C/B incident. The standard FBI command post will be modified and function as a Joint Operations Center (JOC) under the direction of the SAC.

The JOC will be structured to include both Federal and state agencies and to enhance interagency cooperation. This command post concept has been designed to reflect the FBI's responsibility and authority as the lead Federal agency during a terrorist or criminal-related C/B incident and to facilitate the FBI management of such a complex interagency operation.

The JOC will be composed of four main groups: Command, Operations, Consequence Management and Support. Some of these groups will contain other components to assist that group in fulfilling its responsibilities. The group and components are described as follows:

COMMAND GROUP: This group will be comprised of senior officials of the FBI, DOD, USPHS, FEMA and other Federal, state and local agencies as selected by the FBI, to provide the SAC with a means to quickly coordinate and reach-decisions on interagency matters that affect the resolution of the incident. Representation of agencies at Command Group briefings and meetings will be determined by the FBI SAC.

In addition, the SAC will designate a single individual to act as the point of contact (POC) between the Command Group (CG) and the FBIHQ Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC). All incoming and outgoing requests for information must go through the POC. The POC is responsible for keeping the CG and the FBIHQ/SIOC apprised of the status of the incident. Any communication occurring outside this channel should be immediately reported to the POC in order for them to keep FBIHQ/SIOC and the CG advised.

OPERATIONS GROUP: Depending on the crisis, some or all of these Command Group components within the FBI or appropriate Federal, state or local public safety entity may be staffed and used to resolve the C/B crisis:

- 1) Intelligence Component: Collects, processes analyzes and disseminates current and valid intelligence data. Provides situational briefings to the individuals/groups designated by the Command Group.

- 2) Investigative Component: Initiates and perpetuates the investigative activity. Documents crisis response and develops, assigns and ensures completion of investigative leads.
- 3) Tactical Component: Directs and coordinates all tactical personnel at the crisis site. Makes recommendations and provides situational briefs to the Command Group.
- 4) Technical Component: Directs and coordinates all technical personnel at the crisis site. Makes recommendations and provides situational briefs to the Command Group.
- 5) Surveillance Component: Directs and coordinates both ground and air surveillance units. Determines feasible options, makes recommendations, and provides situational briefs to the Command Group.
- 6) Negotiations Component: Directs and coordinates all negotiations personnel at the crisis site. Develops appropriate negotiation options and makes recommendations to the Command Group.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT GROUP: Established by, and under the direction of the FBI to manage the additional Federal, state, and local assets that will respond to any incident that has the potential for generating mass casualties or destruction.

SUPPORT GROUP: This group will be established by and under the direction of the FBI. This group will contain representatives of organizations whose primary task is to support crisis organizations represented in the operations Group and will be asked for personnel to staff various support components. Some of these support components include: Logistics, Legal, Media, Administrative and Liaison.

DEFINITIONS

One of the fundamental obstacles associated with the control and regulation of C/B weapons and agents is the difficulty in defining what constitutes such a weapon or agent. Due to the extensive civil uses of raw materials employed in the production of these weapons, a practical definition of what constitutes a weapon is crucial to enforcement efforts. The central factor in such a definition is the issue of intent.

Additionally, to be utilized effectively as a weapon, C/B agents must be delivered to the target. This requires some type of delivery system, usually designed to minimize contact and exposure to the perpetrator(s). Such a delivery system may include a vector, which is a living organism capable of transferring a biological agent to a victim (such as mosquitoes, rats, etc.); an aerosol dispersal device; or an explosive charge designed to vaporize the substance.

The following definitions have been adopted to describe the basic nature of C/B agents:

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons are defined as compounds which through their chemical properties produce lethal or damaging effects in man, animal, plants or materials. They exist as solids, liquids or gas and are classified by their effects: nerve, blood, choking or blister agents.

Chemical agents are also generally divided into three broad classifications, sometimes referred to as lethal agents, incapacitating agents and harassing agents. Lethal agents are designed to kill or severely injure. Incapacitating agents are designed to disable the victim for at least several hours. These substances include those previously mentioned: nerve, blood, choking and blister agents. Harassing agents, which include police riot agents, are designed to force people to retreat. Depending on the circumstances and conditions, even harassing agents can result in serious medical complications.

Nerve agents, according to the World Health Organization, such as Tabun, Sarin or VX, may be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. Exposure to nerve agents causes a disruption of nerve impulse transmissions and in sufficient quantities may cause almost instant death. Therefore, full protective clothing and a protective breathing mask are required to ensure safety. The substances are stored as liquids and are usually disseminated as aerosols by means of an explosive charge. They also may be circulated by aerosol dispensers.

Blood agents, such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride, are generally colorless liquids widely used in commercial chemical manufacturing. Their danger lies in the fact that they interfere with cell respiration. These agents attack the body through the respiratory system and if inhaled in sufficient quantities act almost immediately. Cardiac arrest can occur almost instantly.

Even though blood agents are fast acting, they dissipate quickly, and therefore are not as effective as nerve agents, particularly in a battlefield environment. A protective mask will provide short term protection. However, these agents tend to saturate charcoal filters faster than most chemical warfare agents. They are disseminated by aerosol sprayer or vaporized by explosive charge.

Choking agents cause damage to the tissues of the respiratory system and the eyes. In sufficient amounts, secondary infections can take place and in higher concentrations death occurs. A protective mask is sufficient to provide protection, provided that the atmosphere contains sufficient oxygen to support life.

Blister agents are tissue irritants. The most common blister agent is mustard gas. This substance is a liquid with the consistency of motor oil. Significant exposure will result in death between the second day and the fourth week. In lesser amounts, exposure to blister agents causes symptoms similar to severe burns and may result in secondary infections. Although generally not lethal unless exposure is significant, inhalation or contact with the eyes results in immediate searing pain. Therefore, full protective clothing and a protective breathing mask are required to ensure safety.

The lethality of chemical warfare agents is dependent on the concentration of the agent and on the method of induction into the body.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological agents are generally divided into either replicating (infectious) agents, or non-replicating (noninfecting or intoxicating) agents. Replicating agents are pathogenic bacteria, viruses or fungus. Non-replicating agents are produced from replicating agents, other living organisms and plants and are called "toxins".

Biological Weapons are regarded as infectious agents or toxins which are pathogenic to man. These may include numerous naturally occurring viruses, bacteria or fungi previously known to science as well as genetically engineered organisms previously unknown to man. These substances possess the common ability to kill or incapacitate large numbers of people. Biological weapons are defined as any micro-organism, virus, infectious substance or toxin, capable of causing death, disease or other biological malfunction in a human, animal, plant or other living organism. Toxins are a poisonous substance produced by a living organism, but in some cases can also be man-made.

The danger of biological weapons is amplified by the fact that exposure to the agents would probably not be diagnosed until symptoms appeared. Comprehensive quick field detection and identification methods do not currently exist for these agents. Not only may an accurate diagnosis be difficult to quickly accomplish, but the value of medical treatment for some agents may be diminished once symptoms have developed. Personal protection generally consists of immunization or the application of some other post-incident medical treatment, such as the use of antibiotics. A chemical protective mask also protects personnel from biological agents.

Viruses primarily cause diseases in man. Transmission of these viruses in a weapon system would most likely be accomplished by aerosol dissemination, or the use of a vector (a living organism capable of delivering a biological weapon to a victim, such as fever, headache, nausea and vomiting, following an incubation period of a matter of days) . These illnesses can be fatal if untreated.

Bacterial agents can be produced in the laboratory or purchased from a number of medical research firms. Dissemination would probably be accomplished by aerosol or natural dispersal such as food contamination. Infections are introduced through the respiratory tract. An incubation period may last from one day to several weeks and the fatality rate for untreated cases may exceed 80 percent. Water supplies are particularly susceptible to contamination by strains of certain bacteria. It is important to note, however, that it is extremely difficult to contaminate most municipal waste systems. The number of purification and filtering procedures and treatments built into municipal water systems would rid the water of any contamination. Private water supplies or water supplies that are not subjected to a rigorous purification process are at risk.

Fungal infections usually are induced through the respiratory system by breathing infected spores. Fungal infections can be spread through the civilian or agricultural population, and would be extremely difficult to detect prior to the first casualty. At this time, there are no known applications of fungal infections which would lend themselves to being used as a biological agent for a weapon.

Toxins are defined as poisonous substances made by living organisms, and can cause incapacitation or death quickly. Toxins can now be reproduced through new advances in biotechnology and pose a new problem for new generations of C/B weapons.

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**Appendix B:
Supplemental
Information on Self-
Protection**

**UNIVERSAL PRECAUTIONS FOR PREVENTION OF
TRANSMISSION OF HIV AND OTHER
BLOODBORNE INFECTIONS**

"Universal precautions," as defined by CDC, are a set of precautions designed to prevent transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and other blood borne pathogens when providing first aid or health care. Under universal precautions, blood and certain body fluids of all patients are considered potentially infectious for HIV, HBV and other bloodborne pathogens.

Universal precautions took the place of and eliminated the need for the isolation category "Blood and Body Fluid Precautions" in the 1983 CDC Guidelines for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals. However, implementing universal precautions does not eliminate the need for other isolation precautions, such as droplet precautions for influenza, airborne isolation for pulmonary tuberculosis, or contact isolation for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*.

In 1996, CDC published new guidelines (standard precautions) for isolation precautions in hospitals. Standard precautions synthesize the major features of BSI and universal precautions to prevent transmission of a variety of organisms. Standard precautions were developed for use in hospitals and may not necessarily be indicated in other settings where universal precautions are used, such as child care settings and schools.

Universal precautions apply to blood, other body fluids containing visible blood, semen, and vaginal secretions. Universal precautions also apply to tissues and to the following fluids: cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, and amniotic fluids. Universal precautions do not apply to feces, nasal secretions, sputum, sweat, tears, urine, and vomitus unless they contain visible blood. Universal precautions do not apply to saliva except when visibly contaminated with blood or in the dental setting where blood contamination of saliva is predictable.

Universal precautions involve the use of protective barriers such as gloves, gowns, aprons, masks, or protective eyewear, which can reduce the risk of exposure of the health care worker's skin or mucous membranes to potentially infective materials. In addition, under universal precautions, it is recommended that all health care workers take precautions to prevent injuries caused by needles, scalpels, and other sharp instruments or devices.

**GLOVING, GOWNING, MASKING, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE BARRIERS
ASPART OF UNIVERSAL PRECAUTIONS**

All health care workers should routinely use appropriate barrier precautions to prevent skin and mucous membrane exposure during contact with any patient's blood or body fluids that require universal precautions.

Gloves should be worn:

- for touching blood and body fluids requiring universal precautions, mucous membranes, or no intact skin of all patients, and
- for handling items or surfaces soiled with blood or body fluids to which universal precautions apply.

Gloves should be changed after contact with each patient. Hands and other skin surfaces should be washed immediately or as soon as patient safety permits if contaminated with blood or body fluids requiring universal precautions. Hands should be washed immediately after gloves are removed. Gloves should reduce the incidence of blood contamination of hands during phlebotomy, but they cannot prevent penetrating injuries caused by needles or other sharp instruments. Institutions that judge routine gloving for all phlebotomies is not necessary should periodically reevaluate their policy. Gloves should always be available to health care workers who wish to use them for phlebotomy. In addition, the following general guidelines apply:

Use gloves for performing phlebotomy when the health care worker has cuts, scratches, or other breaks in his/her skin. Use gloves in situations where the health care worker judges that hand contamination with blood may occur, e.g., when performing phlebotomy on an uncooperative patient. Use gloves for performing finger and/or heel sticks on infants and children. Use gloves when persons are receiving training in phlebotomy.

The Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), has responsibility for regulating the medical glove industry. For more information about selection of gloves, call FDA at 301-443-8913.

Masks and protective eyewear or face shields should be worn by health care workers to prevent exposure of mucous membranes of the mouth, nose, and eyes during procedures that are likely to generate droplets of blood or body fluids requiring universal precautions. Gowns or aprons should be worn during procedures that are likely to generate splashes of blood or body fluids requiring universal precautions.

All health care workers should take precautions to prevent injuries caused by needles, scalpels, and other sharp instruments or devices during procedures; when cleaning used instruments; during disposal of used needles; and when handling sharp instruments after procedures. To prevent needlestick injuries, needles should not be recapped by hand, purposely bent or broken by hand, removed from disposable syringes, or otherwise manipulated by hand. After they are used, disposable syringes and needles, scalpel blades, and other sharp items should be placed in puncture-resistant containers for disposal. The puncture-resistant containers should be located as close as practical to the use area. All reusable needles should be placed in a puncture-resistant container for transport to the reprocessing area.

General infection control practices should further minimize the already minute risk for salivary transmission of HIV. These infection control practices include the use of gloves

for digital examination of mucous membranes and end tracheal suctioning, hand washing after exposure to saliva, and minimizing the need for emergency mouth-to-mouth resuscitation by making mouthpieces and other ventilation devices available for use in areas where the need for resuscitation is predictable.

National Center for Infectious Diseases
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, GA
Updated: 03/19/97 10:42:26

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**Appendix C:
Glossary**

Absorption	The process of an agent being taken in by a surface (clothing, fabrics, wood, etc.) much like a sponge and water.
Acetylcholine	A chemical compound formed from an acid and an alcohol which causes muscles to contract (neurotransmitter). It is found in various organs and tissues of the body. It is rapidly broken down by the enzyme cholinesterase.
Acetylcholinesterase	An enzyme (a protein produced in the cells) which stops (inactivates) the action of acetylcholine by separating the acetylcholine into its components of acetic and choline. This occurs as soon as acetylcholine has produced a muscle contraction. Nerve agents combine with acetylcholinesterase to prevent it from performing its inactivation of acetylcholine.
Adsorption	The process of an agent sticking to or becoming chemically attached to a surface.
Aerosol	Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in air; for example, fog or smoke.
Agent dosage	The concentration of a toxic vapor in the air multiplied by the time that the concentration is present.
Alpha radiation	The least penetrating type of nuclear radiation; not considered dangerous unless alpha-contaminated particles enter the body.
Ammonia Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO)	A blasting agent.
AMS	Aerial Measuring System.
Antibiotic	A substance that inhibits the growth of or kills microorganisms.
Anticholinergic	An agent or chemical that blocks or impedes the action of acetylcholine, such as the (also cholinolytic) antidote atropine.
Anticholinesterase	A substance which blocks the action of cholinesterase (acetylcholinesterase), such as nerve agents.

Antidote	A substance which neutralizes toxic agents or their effects.
Antisera	The liquid part of blood containing antibodies.
Arsenical	Pertaining to or containing arsenic; a reference to the vesicant Lewisite.
Asphyxiants	Substances that interfere with oxygen flow during normal breathing. There are two types of asphyxiants: simple and chemical.
Atropine	An anticholinergic used as an antidote for nerve agents to counteract excessive amounts of acetylcholine. It also has other medical uses.
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
Bacteria	Single-celled organisms that multiply by cell division and that can cause disease in humans, plants or animals.
BDO	Battle Dress Overgarment; multi-piece suit used by the military for protection against chemical warfare agents.
Beta radiation	A type of nuclear radiation that is more penetrating than alpha radiation, and can damage skin tissue and harm internal organs.
B-NICE	Pertaining to biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, or explosives.
Biochemicals	The chemicals that make up or are produced by living things.
Biological warfare agents	Living organisms or the materials derived from them that cause disease in or harm humans, animals, or plants, or cause deterioration of material. Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders.
Biological warfare	The intentional use of biological agents as weapons to kill or injure humans, animals, or plants, or to damage equipment.
Bioregulators	Biochemicals that regulate bodily functions. Bioregulators that are produced by the body are termed "endogenous." Some of these same bioregulators can be chemically synthesized.

Blister agent	A chemical warfare agent which produces local irritation and damage to the skin (vesicant) and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract.
Blood agent	A chemical warfare agent which is inhaled and absorbed into the blood. The blood (cyanogen) carries the agent to all body tissues where it interferes with the tissue oxygenation process.
CAM	Chemical Agent Meter.
Causative agent	The organism or toxin that is responsible for causing a specific disease or harmful effect.
CBIRF	Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force.
CCFD	Central City Fire Department.
CDBCOM	Chemical and Biological Defense Command.
Ceiling exposure value	The maximum airborne concentration of a biological or chemical agent to which a worker may be exposed at any time.
Chemical agent	A chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through its physiological effects. Excluded from consideration are riot control agents, and smoke and flame materials. The agent may appear as a vapor, aerosol, or liquid; it can either be a casualty/toxic agent or an incapacitating agent.
Chemical agent symbol	A code usually consisting of two letters that are used as a designation to identify chemical agents, e.g., GB for the chemical agent sarin.
Chemical asphyxiant	Referred to as blood poisons, these are compounds that interrupt the flow of oxygen in the blood or the tissue in three ways: (1) They react more readily than oxygen with the blood. Carbon monoxide is the best-known example. (2) They liberate the hemoglobin from red blood cells, resulting in a lack of transport for oxygen. Hydrazine is one such asphyxiant. (3) They cause a malfunction in the oxygen-carrying capability of the red blood cells. Benzene and toluene are two of these.

Chemical contamination	The presence of a chemical agent on a person, object, or area.
Chemical warfare agent	A chemical substance which, because of its physiological, psychological, or pharmacological effects, is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans (or animals) through its toxicological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, chemical herbicides, and smoke and flame agents.
Choking agents	These agents exert their effects solely on the lungs and result in the irritation of the alveoli of the lungs. Agents cause the alveoli to constantly secrete watery fluid into the air sacs, which is called pulmonary edema. When a lethal amount of a choking agent is received, the air sacs become so flooded that the air cannot enter and the victim dies of anoxia (oxygen deficiency); also known as dry land drowning.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
CIRG	Critical Incident Response Group.
CISD	Critical Incident Stress Debriefing.
Classification of chemical agents	Chemical agents are classified according to their physical state, use and physical action.
CNS	Pertaining to the central nervous system.
COG	Continuity of Government.
Cold (support) zone	Clean area outside the incident control line where command and support functions take place. Special protective clothing is not required in this area.
Concentration	The amount of a chemical agent present in a unit volume of air; usually expressed in milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m^3).
Concentration time	The amount of a chemical agent present in a unit volume of air multiplied by the time an individual is exposed to that concentration.
Contagious	Capable of being transmitted from one person to another.

Conjunctivitis	Redness in the eye.
Consequence management	Measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies. It includes measures to restore essential government service, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. This role is assigned to FEMA in the FRP.
Containment	The attempt to prevent the spreading of contamination by holding it in, enclosing, encapsulating, or by controlling it.
Corrosive materials	A type of chemical, found in liquid or solid form, which causes visible destruction or irreversible alterations in human tissue at the site of contact.
Crisis management	Measures to resolve the hostile situation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under Federal law. This role is assigned to the FBI in the FRP.
Cross contamination	Secondary contamination caused when a person or object is contaminated by coming into contact with another person or object which has not been properly or fully decontaminated. Elements of contamination can be nuclear, biological or chemical.
Cryogenics	Materials which exist at extremely low temperatures, such as nitrogen.
Culture	A population of microorganisms grown in a medium.
Cumulative	Additional exposure rather than repeated exposure. For example, a one hour exposure of HD followed within a few hours by another exposure of one hour, had the same effect as a single exposure lasting for two hours.
Cutaneous	Pertaining to the skin.
CWA	Chemical Warfare Agents.
Decontamination	The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing the hazardous material.

Defensive Staging	An active function of the Incident Command System. This provides for all personnel to remain on the assigned apparatus, ready to respond or move at a moment's notice. It means stopping short of intersections, always having two means of egress from the staging area, having multiple staging areas, and generally being prepared for the unexpected.
Desorption	The reverse process of absorption. The agent will be "removed" from the surface (outgassing).
Dilution factor	Dilution of contaminated air with uncontaminated air in a general area, room, or building for the purpose of health hazard or nuisance control, and/or for heating and cooling.
Distance	One of the three components of the time, distance, and shielding (TDS) response; it refers to the recommendation that one should maintain distance from a hazard if at all possible. Refer to the <i>North American Emergency Response Guidebook</i> (NAERG) as an appropriate resource.
DOD	Department of Defense.
DOE	Department of Energy.
Dosage	The concentration of a chemical agent in the atmosphere (C) multiplied by the time (t) the concentration remains, expressed as mg-min/m. The dosage (Ct) received by a person depends upon how long he is exposed to the concentration. That is, the respiratory dosage in mg-min/m is equal to the time in minutes an individual is unmasked in an agent cloud multiplied by the concentration of the cloud.
DOT	Department of Transportation.
Downwind distance	The distance a toxic agent vapor cloud will travel from its point of origin, with the wind.
EOC	Emergency Operations Center.
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
EMA	Emergency Management Agency.
EMS	Emergency Medical Services.

Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)	An EOP is a document that (1) assigns responsibility to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions at projected times and places in an emergency that exceeds the capability or routine responsibility of any one agency; (2) sets forth lines of authority and organizational relationships, and shows how all actions will be coordinated; (3) describes how people and property will be protected in emergencies and disasters; (4) identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available for use during response and recovery operations; and (5) identifies steps to address mitigation concerns during response and recovery activities.
ERT	Evidence Recovery Team.
Emergency Support Functions (ESF)	The Federal Response Plan (FRP) details 12 ESF's to coordinate operations during Federal involvement in an incident: transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy.
ESE	Emergency Services Environment.
Etiological harm	Involves exposure to a living microorganism, or its toxins, which causes, or may cause, human disease. Biological agents are the most obvious examples of etiological agents.
Evaporation rate	The rate at which a liquid changes to vapor at normal room temperature.
Explosive	As defined by the US Department of Transportation, "a substance fitting into one of these two categories: (1) any substance or article, including a device, designed to function by explosion; or (2) any substance or article, including a device, which, by chemical reaction within itself, can function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by explosion."
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Federal Response Plan (FRP)	Developed to help expedite Federal support to disasters. Generally, the FRP is activated when the State's resources are not sufficient to cope with a disaster, and the governor has requested Federal assistance.

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency.
First responder	Personnel, such as firefighters, police officers and EMS teams, who have responsibility to initially respond to emergencies. They will be the first on the scene of an incident and will be responsible for the size-up and determining if additional resources are needed.
Fungi	Any group of plants mainly characterized by the absence of chlorophyll, the green colored compound found in other plants. Fungi range from microscopic single-celled plants (such as mold and mildews) to large plants (such as mushrooms).
Gamma radiation	Gamma rays are high-energy, ionizing radiation that travels at the speed of light and has great penetrating power. Gamma rays can cause skin burns, severely injure internal organs, and have long-term, physiological effects.
GEDAPER	An acronym used to describe an incident analysis process. The steps include (1) Gathering information, (2) Estimating course and harm, (3) Determining strategic goals, (4) Assessing tactical options and resources, (5) Planning and implementing action, (6) Evaluating, and (7) Reviewing.
G-series nerve Agents	Chemical agents of moderate to high toxicity that were developed in the 1930s. Examples are Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), and Soman (GD).
Haz Mat	Hazardous Materials.
Host	An animal or plant that harbors or nourishes another organism.
Hot (exclusion) zone	Area immediately around the incident where serious threat of harm exists. It should extend far enough to prevent adverse effects from B-NICE agents to personnel outside the zone. Entry into the hot zone requires the use of proper personal protective equipment.
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning.
Hydration	The combining of a substance with water.

Hydrolysis	The reaction of any chemical substance with water by which decomposition of the substance occurs and one or more new substances are produced.
IC	Incident Commander.
ICP	Incident Command Post.
IDLH	Concentrations immediately dangerous to life and health.
Incapacitating agents	Produce temporary physiological and/or mental effects via action on the central nervous system. Effects may persist for hours or days, but victims usually do not require medical treatment. However, such treatment speeds recovery.
Incendiary device	Any mechanical, electrical or chemical device used intentionally to initiate combustion and start a fire.
Incident Command System (ICS)	The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident.
Industrial agents	Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for use by man. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, chloropicrin and many herbicides and pesticides are industrial chemicals that also can be chemical agents.
Infectious agents	Biological agents capable of reproducing in an infected host.
Infectivity	(1) The ability of an organism to spread. (2) The number of organisms required to cause an infection to secondary hosts. (3) The capability of an organism to spread out from the site of infection and cause disease in the host organism.
IG	Instructor Guide.

Initial downwind vapor hazard area	Areas initially established to evacuate all unprotected personnel and to prevent other unprotected personnel from entering and thus encountering agent vapors or any other type of contamination.
Integrated Emergency Command Structure (IECS)	A system that allows for the integration of both career and volunteer fire/rescue personnel by equal rank for purposes of on scene incident command (Montgomery County fire service definition).
IMC	Incident Management Chart.
Latent period	Specifically, in the case of mustard, the period between exposure and onset of signs and symptoms; otherwise, an incubation period.
Lethal chemical agent	An agent that may be used effectively in a field concentration to produce death.
Level "A" protection	The level of protective equipment required in situations where the material is considered acutely vapor toxic to the skin and hazards are unknown. Full encapsulation, air tight chemical suit with SCBA or SABA.
Level "B" protection	The level of protective equipment required in situations where the environment is not considered acutely vapor toxic to skin but may cause respiratory effects. Chemical splash suit or full coverage non-air tight chemical suit with SCBA or SABA.
Level "C" protection	The level of protective equipment required to prevent respiratory exposure but not to exclude possible skin contact. Chemical splash suit with cartridge respirator.
Level "D" protection	The level of protective equipment required when the atmosphere contains no known hazard, when splashes, immersions, inhalation, or contact with hazardous levels of any chemical is precluded. Work uniform such as coveralls, boots, leather gloves, and hard hat.
Liquid agent	A chemical agent that appears to be an oily film or droplets. The color ranges from clear to brownish amber.

Local EOP	The local Emergency Operations Plan focuses on essential measures for protecting the public, to include warning, emergency public information, evacuation and shelter. Local EOP's should include a mechanism for emergency responders and managers to notify and activate State resources.
Median incapacitating dosage (ICT50)	The volume of a chemical agent vapor or aerosol inhaled that is sufficient to disable 50 percent of exposed, unprotected people (expressed as mg-min/m ³).
Median lethal dosage (LCT50)	The amount of liquid chemical agent expected to kill 50 percent of a group of exposed, unprotected individuals.
Methods of dissemination	The way a chemical agent or compound is released into the atmosphere.
Micro-organism	Any organism, such as bacteria, viruses, and some fungi, that can be seen only with a microscope.
Miosis	A condition where the pupil of the eye becomes contracted (pinpointed). This condition impairs night-vision.
M8 chemical agent detector paper	A paper used to detect and identify liquid V- and G-type nerve agents and H-type blister agents.
M256 kit	A kit that detects and identifies vapor concentrations of nerve, blister, and blood agents.
Mycotoxin	A toxin produced by fungi.
MAC	Multi-Agency Committee.
Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS)	The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications integrated into a common system with responsibility for coordination of assisting agency resources and support to agency emergency operations.
MATTS	Mobile Air Transportable Telecommunications System.
MERS	Mobile Emergency Response System.
Mustard (vesicants) agent	See Blister agent.

NAERG	<i>The North American Emergency Response Guidebook.</i>
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical.
Nerve agents	Substances that interfere with the central nervous system. Exposure is primarily through contact with the liquid (skin and eyes) and secondarily through inhalation of the vapor. Three distinct symptoms associated with nerve agents are: pinpoint pupils, an extreme headache, and severe tightness in the chest.
NEST	Nuclear Emergency Search Team.
NFA	National Fire Academy.
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association.
NMRI	Naval Medical Research Institute.
Nonpersistent agent	An agent that upon release loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high evaporation rate and is lighter than air and will disperse rapidly. It is considered to be a short-term hazard. However, in small unventilated areas, the agent will be more persistent.
Organism	Any individual living thing, whether animal or plant.
Organophosphate	A compound with a specific phosphate group which inhibits acetylcholinesterase. Used in chemical warfare and as an insecticide.
Organophosphorus compound	A compound, containing the elements phosphorus and carbon, whose physiological effects include inhibition of acetylcholinesterase. Man-made pesticides (malathion and parathion) and virtually all nerve agents are organophosphorus compounds.
OSHA	Occupational Safety, and Health Administration.
Overpacking	The placement of the agent or its container within another container.
Parasite	Any organism that lives in or on another organism without providing benefit in return.

GLOSSARY

Pathogen	Any organism (usually living) capable of producing serious disease or death, such as bacteria, fungi, and viruses.
Pathogenic agent	Biological agents capable of causing serious diseases.
PEL	Permissible exposure limit. An occupational health term used to describe exposure limits for employees. Usually described in time weighted averages (TWA) or short term exposure limits (STEL).
Percutaneous agent	Able to be absorbed through the body.
Permeation	The process by which a chemical moves through protective clothing.
Permeation rate	The rate at which a chemical permeates a solid, such as fabric.
Persistent agent	An agent that upon release retains its casualty-producing effects for an extended period of time, usually anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A persistent agent usually has a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier than air. Therefore, its vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution should be taken to avoid skin contact as well.
Physiological action	Most toxic chemical agents are used for their toxic effects that is to produce a harmful physiological reaction when applied to the human body externally, or when breathed, or taken internally. This reaction of chemical agents, within the body or on the body, is the physiological action.
PID	Photoionization Detectors.
PIO	Public Information Officer.
Plan of Action	A written document that consolidates all of the operational actions to be taken by various personnel in order to stabilize an incident.
PPE	Personal protective equipment.
Precursor	A chemical substance required for the manufacture of chemical agent.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39)	Issued in June 1995, PDD-39, <i>United States Policy on Counterterrorism</i> , directed a number of measures to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, to deter and respond to terrorist acts, and to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
PSA	Public Safety Announcements.
Radiation	This course is concerned with nuclear, not heat, radiation. There are three types of nuclear radiation: (1) alpha, (2) beta, and (3) gamma.
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)	A conventional explosive device incorporating radioactive material(s); sometimes referred to as a "dirty" bomb.
RAP	Radiological Assistance Program.
Rate of action	The rate at which the body reacts to or is affected by a chemical substance or material.
Rate of detoxification	The rate at which the body can counteract the effects of a poisonous chemical substance.
Rate of hydrolysis	The rate at which the various chemical agents or compounds are decomposed by water.
Reconnaissance (RECON)	A primary survey used to gather information.
Respiratory dosage	This is equal to the time in minutes an individual is unmasked in an agent cloud multiplied by the concentration of the cloud.
Rickettsia	Any of a family (Rickettsiaceae) of pleomorphic rod-shaped nonfilterable microorganisms that cause various diseases (such as typhus).
Rhinorrhea	A runny nose.
SABA	Supplied air breathing apparatus.
Safe Refuge Area (SRA)	An area within the contamination reduction zone for the assemblage of individuals who are witnesses to the incident. This assemblage will provide for the separation of contaminated persons from non-contaminated persons.

SAC	Special Agent in Charge.
SARA	Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.
SCBA	Self-contained breathing apparatus.
Secondary device	A device placed by perpetrators at the scene of an incident, specifically designed to harm responders.
SEE Principle:	The idea of establishing strategies based on the principle that actions required will be Safe, Effective, and Efficient.
Sensitize	To become highly responsive or easily receptive to the effects of toxic chemical agents after the initial exposure.
Shielding	On of the three components of TDS; it refers to maintaining significant physical barriers between the responders and the hazard. Examples include vehicles, buildings, walls and PPE.
Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL)	A 15-minute time-weighted average exposure which should not be exceeded at any time during a work day even if the 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA) is within the threshold limit value (TLV). Exposures at the STEL should not be repeated more than four times a day and there should be at least 60 minutes between successive exposures at the STEL.
Simple asphyxiant	Generally, an inert gas that displaces the oxygen necessary for breathing or dilutes the oxygen concentration below the level that is useful to the human body.
Site safety plan (SSP)	An Emergency Response Plan describing the general safety procedures to be followed at an incident involving hazardous materials.
Sizeup	The rapid evaluation of the factors that influence an incident. Sizeup is the first step in determining a course of action.
Skin dosage	This is equal to the time of exposure in minutes of an individual's unprotected skin multiplied by the concentration of the agent cloud.
SLUDGE syndrome	Acronym for salivation, lacrimation, urination, defecation, gastric distress, emesis. These symptoms are often present in a person exposed to organophosphates, such as nerve agents.

SM	Student Manual.
SOG	Standard Operating Guidelines.
Solubility	The ability of a material to dissolve in water or another liquid.
Solvent	A material which is capable of dissolving another chemical.
Source strength	The weight of a chemical agent that is at the chemical accident/incident site and may be released into the environment.
Specific gravity	The weight of a liquid compared to the weight of an equal volume of water.
Spore	A reproductive form some microorganisms can take to become resistant to environmental conditions, such as extreme heat or cold, while in a "resting phase."
State EOP	The State EOP is the framework within which local EOPs are created and through which the Federal government becomes involved. The States play three roles: (1) they assist local jurisdictions whose capabilities are overwhelmed by an emergency, (2) they themselves respond first to certain emergencies, and (3) they work with the Federal government when Federal assistance is necessary.
Tear agents	Produce irritating or disabling effects such as a large flow of tears and intense eye pain and irritation of the skin that rapidly disappear within minutes after exposure.
Terrorism	A violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any segment, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (US Department of Justice).
Terrorism Incident Annex	The annex to the FRP that describes the Federal concept of operations to implement PDD-39 when necessary to respond to terrorist incidents within the US.
Terrorist incident	A violent act, or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (FBI definition).

Time	One of the three components of TDS; it refers to the amount of time a responders should be exposed to an incident. It is recommended that one should spend the shortest amount of time possible in the hazard area.
Time, Distance and Shielding (TDS)	Three types of protective measures commonly associated with hazardous materials training.
TIMPS	Terrorist Incident Management Plan Study.
Time-Weighted Average (TWA)	The average concentration for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed without adverse effect.
Toxicity	A measure of the harmful effect produced by a given amount of toxin on a living organism. The relative toxicity of an agent can be expressed in milligrams of toxin needed per kilogram of body weight to kill experimental animals.
Toxins	Toxic substances of natural origin produced by an animal, plant or microbe. They differ from chemical substances in that they are not manmade. Toxins include botulism, ricin, and mycotoxins.
TRACEM	The acronym used to identify the six types of harm one may encounter at a terrorist incident: Thermal, Radioactive, Asphyxiation, Chemical, Etiological and Mechanical.
Triage sorting	A technique of establishing rescue, decontamination, treatment and transportation priorities in any event where the number of casualties overwhelms the resources of the emergency response organizations.
Unified command	In ICS, Unified Command is a unified team effort which allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, either geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating agency authority, responsibility or accountability.
Upwind	In or toward the direction from which the wind blows. To be upwind of an item, the wind would be blowing from your position to the item.

Urticant	A chemical agent that produces irritation at the point of contact, resembling a stinging sensation, such as a bee sting. For example, the initial physiological effects of phosgene oxime (CX) upon contact with a person's skin.
Urticaria	A skin condition characterized by intensely itching, red, raised patches.
USAMRIID	US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
USAR/US&R	Urban search and rescue. A team specifically trained and equipped for large or complex urban search and rescue operations. The multi-disciplinary organization provides five functional elements which include command, search, rescue, medical and technical.
V-series nerve agents	Chemical agents of moderate-to-high toxicity developed in the 1950s. They are generally persistent.
Vaccine	A preparation of killed or weakened microorganism products used to artificially induce immunity against a disease.
Vapor agent	A gaseous form of a chemical agent. If heavier than air, the cloud will be close to the ground; if lighter than air, the cloud will rise and disperse more quickly.
Vapor density	A comparison of any gas or vapor to the weight of an equal amount of air. Vapor density < 1 means the substance is lighter than air; vapor density > 1 means the substance is heavier than air.
VEE	Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis.
Vesicant agent	An agent that acts on the eyes and lungs and blisters the skin.
Vesicles	Blisters on the skin.
Virus	An infectious microorganism that exists as a particle rather than as a complete cell. Particle sizes range from 200 to 400 nanometers (one-billionth of a meter). Viruses are not capable of reproducing outside of a host cell.
Viscosity	The degree to which a fluid resists flow.

Volatility	With chemical agents, it refers to their ability to change from a liquid state into a gaseous state (the ability of a material to evaporate).
Vomiting agents	Substances that produce nausea and vomiting effects, and can also cause coughing, sneezing, pain in the nose and throat, nasal discharge, and tears.
Warm Zone	A buffer area between the hot and cold zones. Personnel in this area are removed from immediate threat, but are not considered completely safe from harm. In haz mat incidents, this zone is also the contamination reduction zone where initial decontamination activities occur. This zone requires the use of proper personal protective equipment once contaminated people or equipment enter the zone.
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)	(1) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above. (2) Poison gas. (3) Any weapon involving a disease organism. (4) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to human life.
Wheal	An acute swelling of the skin. This condition is common to a bee sting.

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Student Manual**

**Appendix D:
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**Appendix E:
Supplemental Reading**



National
Center for
Environmental
Health

Emergency Response Planning and Coordination

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) emergency preparedness and response activities are coordinated by the Emergency Response Coordination Group (ERCG) of the National Center for Environmental Health.

ERCG has two main functions:

- We help local, state, and federal agencies plan their responses to emergency situations.
- We respond to requests for emergency and recovery assistance after technologic disaster such as radiation, chemical, or biologic releases and after natural disasters such as hurricanes, wind storms earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or floods.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Public Health Service

- Within 8 hours of receiving a call for assistance (if immediate on-scene response is required), an emergency response coordinator and other team members can be on site with the appropriate equipment.

Resources Available During Emergencies

The ERCG is prepared to address a broad range of issues associated with public health emergencies.

- We have access to all CDC's scientific expertise, which includes expertise in the following fields:
 - ✓ Disease Control
 - ✓ Environmental Science
 - ✓ Epidemiology
 - ✓ Health Physics
 - ✓ Industrial Hygiene
 - ✓ Injury Control
 - ✓ Laboratory Science
 - ✓ Statistics
 - ✓ Toxicology
- We can perform any necessary laboratory tests related to infectious diseases or environmental health.
- We have a network of staff in many locations around the country, which often means that we can respond sooner than 8 hours after receiving a request for help.
- We have the most up-to-date communications equipment.

Services Provided by ERCG

ERCG supports local, state, or other federal agencies during an emergency in many ways:

- By offering consultation and advice on public health matters.
- By supporting the local public health response or by coordinating the responses of several agencies, whichever is most appropriate for the situation.
- By establishing protocols for environmental and biologic tests and by assisting in collecting appropriate environmental and biologic specimens.

FA-142 / February 1994

**Report of the
Joint Fire/Police
Task Force on**



**CIVIL
UNREST**

**Recommendations for
Organization and
Operations During
Civil Disturbance**



**FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY**



**United States
Fire Administration**

4

PREPAREDNESS

HOW POLICE CHIEFS AND FIRE CHIEFS WORKED TOGETHER

During the course of their deliberations, the Task Force on Civil Unrest developed the following lists, prepared by each agency (fire and police), which outline a two-way flow of actions and data/information in response to a given situation. The lists appear in order of priority.

Fire Personnel—support expected from the Police Department

1. Protection of fire personnel, both en route and on the scene
2. Information regarding resource capabilities of police personnel
3. Accurate, up-to-date intelligence briefings
4. Better communications/coordination with police, at all levels
5. Knowledge of police needs from fire personnel
6. Joint training on incident command, according to accepted and agreed upon standards
7. Delineation of each agency's responsibilities (who is in charge of what)

8. Financial responsibilities of each department

Police Personnel—support expected from the Fire Department

1. Protection of police personnel (by EMS/rescue)
2. Realistic expectations, based on resources available
3. Immediate liaison-sharing between fire/EMS and police
4. Intelligence liaisons
5. Sharing of critical information—floor plans, elevators, etc.
6. Joint training on incident command and other issues (exercises)
7. Mutual aid agreements between police and fire personnel, a.k.a. Emergency Operation Plan (EOP)

PRIORITIZATION

Police and fire agencies must maintain close liaison with local agencies and private entities to prepare for civil unrest. These preparations include mutual aid agreements with other agencies,

plans for easy access to utilities (electricity, gas, and water companies), and contracts for the services of food preparers and distributors.

The following guidelines to combat civil unrest are listed in order of suggested priority.

1. Study all reports on previous civil unrest documented by each agency to identify any common predictors of events that can trigger violent reactions from residents.
2. Adopt a policy approach, through consultation with city administrators, the district attorney's office, and the mayor. This is crucial to avoid any legal ramifications that may complicate joint action by law enforcement and fire personnel.
3. Establish the extent of compatibility of the two agencies—careful documentation of a common language and the design of an agreeable command structure to ensure that personnel from both agencies can work together effectively. The agencies may have solid execution plans before coming together to formulate a joint plan or both agencies may start from ground zero to develop and establish a solid plan for joint action. The definition of professional terms is crucial at this point of preparing for civil unrest.
4. Present the final plan to the city administrators for administrative and financial considerations. At this juncture, questions as to who will finance the plan and where to procure the hardware should be answered.

COMMUNICATIONS

Technology has progressed faster than any other type of scientific advance in this century. Today, it is not unusual to hear about floating holograms, "head-up" displays that project images on nearby surfaces, computers integrated into the dashboards of vehicles, patrol cars carrying optical laser disks capable of storing millions of pages of information, voice-activated systems and video monitors that allow callers to see the person on the other end of the telephone.

The 911 operating system

In some states, the changeover to a 911 operating

system was mandated by legislation. However, some agencies have had to battle the telephone company for access to residential phone numbers and addresses. Others could not afford to maintain such a database and were happy to allow the telephone company to handle it. Some jurisdictions have had to decide whether a public service answering point (PSAP) would route calls or if the calls would be sent directly to the agency involved. Each telephone number in a 911 system has to be assigned to a particular law enforcement agency, fire department, or ambulance service. Funding has to be secured, hardware purchased, and consultants engaged, which could take from two to five years, and there are still many cities and counties that have not yet begun the process.

The 911 system is a simple concept, although implementing it can be difficult, expensive, and complicated. It consists of a telephone system hooked to a computer: when the phone rings, the computer checks its database to find the telephone number of the incoming caller and displays it on a monitor. The system is further enhanced when the computer gets smarter and automatically identifies and displays the telephone number, address, and, in some cases, the name of the person who owns that number. In some cases, accompanying information includes the fire department and ambulance service responsible for handling emergencies in the caller's area. If the jurisdiction uses a PSAP, the call taker simply pushes a button on the console to transfer the call to the appropriate police, fire, or ambulance dispatcher. The entire process takes less than fifteen seconds.

Before a changeover to the 911 system, administrators first must find an individual with both computer expertise and emergency service experience. They should observe systems already in operation in other jurisdictions in order to assess their own needs. Detailed and specific needs should be documented and a consultant retained to review the specifications, design the system, and help procure the desired hardware. Administrators should not attempt to become experts in all the different technologies involved. Several companies offer a variety of services associated with the implementation of a 911 system. GTE offers classes on 911 implementation and services and

products for creating a master street guide; computer-aided dispatch systems; and personnel who will conduct a site survey, determine how big the system should be, and work with the local telephone company and other vendors to implement the 911 system.

A highly tuned communications preparedness plan is invaluable to ensuring rapid and efficient response efforts. The Austin, Texas, Fire Department has averaged under five minutes citywide response time. The city is divided into five geographic regions or battalions, with a battalion chief in charge of all companies and alarms within the region. Operations companies are assigned a specific number of target sites within their district each year. Plans were developed for each district, using standard information forms in combination with site and floor plans. Copies were distributed to all affected companies, and a copy of each plan within a battalion chief's district was carried in that chief's vehicle. As the city grew, the files expanded from one or two binders to a specially designed field box which fit into the back of the battalion chief's car, a suburban-type vehicle. The file box could take up fully one-half of the space in the back of the car. Because of the size of the file box, the battalion chiefs carried only those plans relevant to their own district, which created problems when simultaneous incidents in a district required the response of an alternate battalion chief who might not have on-hand the plans associated with the second incident. With a total of 2,500 to 3,000 plans for the entire city (and more to come), it was impractical for each chief to carry all the plans for a particular district.

To resolve this problem, the department equipped its vehicles with cellular phones, purchased twelve portable fax machines, and updated communications procedures. The department was determined to find a more efficient way to store large amounts of data that could be recalled at a moment's notice to provide specific information for an incident commander. This information, in turn, had to be transmitted via fax machines linked to the cellular phones in the commanders' cars. To meet this challenge, operations personnel provided the latest site and floor plans. Other relevant site information was entered into the database specifi-

cally developed for this task. As now designed, the system has the potential to include photographs of buildings, hazardous areas, fire-alarm control panels and other objects, and could be invaluable as intelligence information to be shared among mutual aid partners during any crisis. The ultimate goal is efficiency—providing the greatest amount of information in the shortest amount of time to those who need it quickly.

Radios

In some departments, radio dispatch is still the best and most affordable system. Mobile and portable radios are not the behemoths of ten years ago. Crystals have been replaced by micro-processors, and where once an 8-channel system was considered sophisticated, today's equivalent may carry as many as 300 channels. Modern units are considerably smaller and more durable and feature numerous options, such as a message relay system and a scrambler that prevents eavesdropping and offers high-quality recovered audio. Other units offer such features as emergency access, priority queuing, and the ability to interface with other conventional channels, such as mutual aid frequencies.

Historically, emergency communication frequency assignments have been made so a fire department has its own unshared frequency for primary operations communications, if possible. A second frequency for administrative communications may be assigned. The same radio operating environment operates in police, public works, and utilities agencies. Each of the many departments in a jurisdiction has been assigned a radio channel for its almost exclusive use. Traditionally, radio channels have been assigned to government users based on the specific types of services they provide, such as fire, police, medical, or general local government. Orderly communications were the principal reason for this approach; also, it was important that public safety communications paths benefit from open communication lines whenever they were needed.

Decades ago, the telephone industry switched from its conventional wire-line system to a trunking system to meet the escalating demands for advanced technology and service. The same

technology today is applied to radio communication. The goal of a radio trunking system is to increase the percentage of time a radio channel is used for communications, by allowing that channel to broadcast any type of service communications rather than being dedicated to a single service. The trunking system does have some drawbacks. The major shortcoming is that all of the field fleets or base agencies sharing the system might transmit communications simultaneously, thus overloading the system.

Videotape systems

Videotape and photographic equipment used to film riot participants are helpful in assisting agencies to identify rioters for future reference, legal purposes, and historical documentation. Extreme caution should be used by individuals video-taping or photographing riot scenes, due to the probability of attack by the rioters.

Mobile data terminals

Mobile data terminals (MDTs), also known as mobile digital terminals or mobile computer terminals, extend to the officer in the field the capabilities available to the dispatcher. MDTs basically are dumb terminals (i.e., they can transmit and receive data but cannot process information in the same way as a personal computer). Accessing the state and national computers for warrants, checks, and intelligence information is executed via the terminal in the working vehicle, a process that bypasses the dispatcher and clears the air for other important transmissions. In some cases, personnel have access to calls which the CAD system holds in a pending file and can query the database for various types of information. The installation of MDTs assumes the department's computer system is capable of handling the extra workload. Traffic can increase substantially and the system should be designed to handle the additional load.

Laptop computers

Agencies should consider allowing their personnel to use laptop computers. These small, generally lightweight computers are usually less expensive than MDTs and can be used in place of or in

combination with them. Laptops allow officers in the field to complete incident reports and store the information or transmit it to the department's main computer via a modem hooked into telephone or radio lines. If the computer system is designed for it, personnel can access the main database as well as state and national computers in much the same way as those using MDTs.

Cellular phones

Cellular phones are another example of communications equipment that has grown in use and importance in the past several years. They allow the user to handle details that may not require their appearance at the scene. The disadvantage of cellular phones is their high cost and lack of confidentiality.

Logging equipment

Logging equipment is vital to communications units. Just as electronic technology has not replaced the traditional radio dispatch system, it is still necessary to record every call that comes into the department. There has been much progress in the development of high-tech equipment to address this need.

Hand-held computers

Although computers continue to shrink in size, they are still expected to perform bigger and more complex tasks. Hand-held computers epitomize sophisticated technology—small but powerful. This lightweight computer can be used to prepare short reports when an officer needs a paper copy, such as field interviews and abandoned vehicle or towing reports.

Regardless of the type of system procured, it is important to provide continuing support and maintenance of the units. While agencies spend thousands of dollars to upgrade systems, they hold back on expending money to recruit, train, and compensate those who operate and maintain them. Technology is indispensable in curtailing a dangerous riot situation, but personnel are still in control, and they should be adequately trained to use these new advances, both efficiently and knowledgeably.

of the Los Angeles riot attests to the premise that riots have become more warlike. This was evident also after the McDuffie trial in Miami in 1980 and in a major disturbance in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood of Washington, D.C., in 1991.

Today, bands of protesters, rioters, looters, and arsonists are well organized and mobile. They move quickly through an area and have easy access to weapons, which they use freely and frequently (Pilant 1993).

Mobile field tactics present the biggest change for police in controlling a riot situation. Known also as the mobile field-force concept, it is essentially a change in the way law enforcement responds to civil disturbances. In general, the goal is to quickly and effectively disperse large crowds by removing them from the scene or separating them into small, manageable groups. These actions require a different response tactic on the part of law enforcement and fire officials than employed twenty to thirty years ago. Officers need special training in dealing with current "trends" in riots.

Mobile field tactics have changed law enforcement's response to civil disturbances in numerous ways. In Los Angeles, for example, a skirmish line used to be made up of a squad of ten officers, with one sergeant in charge, and two officers acting as line backers, thereby reducing the number on the front line to seven. Generally, they were on foot, in the open, and had no other tactical support. If they came under fire, there was no place to take cover and no way to defend themselves other than with their sidearms. Today, the primary tactical component of the mobile force is still the squad, but its number may be as many as sixteen. Each vehicle carries four officers and the cars become a support tool for the officers. The vehicles are driven behind the line and can be used with lights and sirens to intimidate and/or direct crowds, recover injured officers or members of the public, and pursue suspects. They also serve as an effective public address system and as a blocking or maneuvering force.

Tactics employed by different jurisdictions vary. In Miami, for example, police draw a well-ordered line formation. They also apply a variety of mobile tactics to riot situations in urban areas. In Los Angeles, an advancing line of officers is

followed by several vehicles. In Miami, only one car follows a line—the rest are parked nearby, with an officer standing guard.

Firefighting tactics

In order to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fire and quickly exit the impact area. Selective fire damage plans should be adopted to ensure that units are first dispatched to the most critical areas. The use of large diameter hoses and heavy stream appliances should be maximized, and sprinkler systems should be required, particularly in buildings of over 5,000 square feet. The number of burnable items should be reduced as much as possible, for example, abandoned vehicles, trash, and debris. Abandoned buildings should be assessed for razing, since they are prime targets for covert activity and arson during riot situations.

"...to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics."

Fire departments should use engine companies in the impact area. Trucks or aerial ladders should be available in the area. All personnel with the potential of entering the impact area should always be protected with body armor. There should be no interior firefighting in impact areas, and a plan should be devised to control the spread of hazardous materials, such as pesticides, asbestos, and petroleum parts, into the sewage systems. Departments should ensure that there are enough bullet-proof vests to outfit all personnel who may potentially operate in the impact area. Suppliers should be identified (e.g., the military) in case there is an unforeseen need for more body armor and other protective gear.

It is useful to have "bird-dog" personnel on stand-by to direct and assist mutual aid response, as outside firefighting units and the National Guard may not have proper directions to designated impact areas.

INSTITUTING A MISSION STATEMENT

As police and firefighters plan to work together, both agencies need to establish a mission statement detailing staffing priorities. The Miami Police Department has established such a document, which serves as a basic guideline for joint operations between the agencies. The Department's guidelines in reference to Fire Department escorts are as follows:

Rationale

During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department units often come under attack from hostile elements. Fire units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescue element, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the community and to the Police Department.

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmental mobilization.

Mobilization Priority

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations. All fire stations will receive one two-man unit first. . . if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in [a specified] priority order. The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units:

(Prior to perimeters being closed)

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. Fire and police units responding to requests for medical services will not use emergency equipment when going into and out of the affected areas.
2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort fire trucks to fire scenes. In this case, the Fire Department will respond in what they call a Task Force configuration. This is generally a task force commander's vehicle and three fire trucks. The police unit escorting should be immediately behind the task force commander's vehicle.
3. Under no circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. You are expected to remain with the rescue or task force at all times.

(When a perimeter is set)

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedures will be in effect:

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, receive clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area.
2. If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specific intersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT may be assigned to assist.
3. A no lights or siren response will be the order of the day.
4. Once again, police units will remain with their fire personnel at all times.

Before actual training begins, administrators should conduct an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the organization and community. Is the organization set up to handle a major disturbance? How will it go about it? What is the feeling of the community relative to the handling of major disturbances? What resources can each department call upon when responding to critical incidents? Answering these questions should give command staff a better idea of the type of training needed and the type of equipment to be added to the department's arsenal.

Command staff need to know what type of training is available locally, in the county and the state, through universities and community colleges, private vendors, or other police and fire departments, and the military. Crucial areas to focus on include:

- **Risk analysis.** Teaching personnel how to look at what is happening in the community and evaluate that against the potential for problems.
- **Operational planning.** Understanding the principles of tactical operations and learning how to put an operational plan together.
- **Command structure.** Setting up a workable command structure and learning how to communicate the operation's mission, goals, and the tactical plans devised to accomplish them.
- **Tactics.** Adapting and using the mobile field-force and hit-and-run concepts, reviewing riot-control formations, the purpose and strategies for effective and appropriate use; understanding psychological factors and undergoing cultural sensitivity training; reviewing tactics for dispersing the crowd, rescuing victims or fallen personnel; infiltrating a crowd and removing its leaders; and utilizing ground and air support.

Other important areas to be covered include legal ramifications, methods of preventing and predicting civil disturbances, and strategies for improving relationships with the community.

Training should include every member of an agency. All personnel must be thoroughly apprised of the department's overall mission and the

mission of their partner agency.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment is a critical consideration, especially at times of civil unrest. Administrators should decide initially on the philosophy, purpose, and operational guidelines of the mobile force. These basic principles will help determine what type of equipment the department needs. Examples include:

Specialty vests. The standard issue vest is generally worn by most officers. Special weapons officers, those charged with tactical support and who expect to be in high-risk situations, may opt for a vest with a higher protection level than the standard issue. It should provide upper torso protection, enough freedom for arm movement, neck protection, and pockets for carrying special equipment.

"Specialty vests...should provide upper torso protection...freedom for arm movement...neck protection, and pockets for special equipment."

Helmets. Helmets should cover the back of the neck (minimally) and the ears, block out noise, and, ideally, have enough room for a radio component or earpiece. For maximum efficiency, officers should be able to move the face shield up or out of the way and still get in and out of their patrol cars easily. Officers should be able to wear a gas mask with the helmet, which does not need to be ballistic unless the department expects officers to come under fire. Civil unrest police helmets are designed with a visor and a low center of gravity for stability.

Chemical agents. Chemical agents have a number of uses, including dispersing crowds, denying access, or giving an outnumbered force the advantage, as in the case of routing large groups of looters from stores. Smoke can be used to cover officers' movements, as well as to warn crowds that police will be using more serious weapons such as CS gas. While smoke is generally used as a warning or cover, it can also be used in

conjunction with CS gas to carry the chemical agent further into the crowd.

Although distraction devices such as the 37 mm foam rubber baton rounds, rubber pellet rounds, and bean bags fall in the category of chemical munitions, they may not be appropriate for use during a civil disturbance. Generally, noise-flash diversionary devices are used only by specially trained personnel in barricade situations.

Aircraft. Air support can be a vital component to both agencies and their mutual aid partners for crowd control. Rotary-wing aircraft can be used as spotters to provide intelligence information on violent and potentially dangerous situations. By giving ground commanders an instant snapshot of a wide area, motor-craft surveillance significantly enhances command and control functions. When properly equipped with sirens and a public address system, they can be used for diversion or distraction. They also can work in concert with a mobile field force for rapid deployment of rescue efforts and can provide platforms for video coverage of disturbances.

Specialty vehicles. The new Cobra, a riot-control vehicle, has been designed to disperse gatherings with a minimum of discomfort while providing maximum protection for the vehicle's occupants. Features include a water tank capable of propelling dye or pepper gas and a remote-controlled water turret with a 360 degree halogen lighting system.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The issue of who is the primary agency-in-charge during civil unrest is not to be determined on the emergency scene. However, even when resolved during the preparedness stage, command can be

"The issue of who is the primary agency-in-charge during civil unrest is not to be determined on the emergency scene."

usurped in situations where there is not a strong command presence with effective incident com-

manders at work. An incident commander's presence must inspire people to perform on the emergency scene; it must set a standard for the management of the emergency.

During civil unrest, an incident commander must be prepared to face a multitude of technical, managerial, and political issues. Incidents that are effectively directed from technical and managerial perspectives can be perceived by the public and mutual aid partners as poorly managed because political issues associated with the incident are not adequately addressed.

ACCEPTING RISK

Incident commanders must be able to distinguish between assumptions and facts. They are responsible for the entire operation and welfare of everyone involved. If command is unsure or uncomfortable with any part of the plan or information received, further action should be delayed until incident command is satisfied. The incident commander should be a risk evaluator, not a risk taker. While the final decision will always rest with the incident commander, it should be based on input from the entire command staff.

Command officers must be cognizant of the legal implications of their decision making. This is an issue that should be addressed during the preparedness stage.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

The Incident Command System is an effective vehicle for ensuring that commanders address the technical and political issues of civil disorder. A key officer in this regard is the public information liaison or Public Information Officer (PIO). This individual serves as the point of contact for all mutual aid representatives, allowing the incident commander and the command staff to focus on problem resolution while ensuring that political sensitivities continue to be addressed. The PIO's ability to effectively coordinate, handle, and "stroke" individual agencies and their representatives and the press will impact on how the incident is perceived from a political viewpoint.

Documentation speeds the reporting process. It is important to document everything during the

incident, particularly relevant details which may be lost in the confusion of the incident. Details such as times, locations, and names will aid in reconstructing what actually happened.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

An organizational philosophy and management goal of each agency's emergency response program for civil disturbance should be to develop operational procedures that will bring consistency to executing the response. The components of this system include:

- Developing SOPs
- Training all personnel in the scope, application, and implementation of SOPs
- Executing SOPs on the riot scene
- Reviewing and critiquing the effectiveness of operations
- Revising and updating SOPs during response and at the recovery stage

Over time, this standard management cycle ensures self-improvement.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Building a strong bond of understanding and cooperation should be an ongoing process between fire and police agencies and their jurisdictions. Community-oriented programs and constant feedback should be an integral part of the work of these agencies. Agency representatives, along with the PIO, should work to develop these programs and respond to the concerns expressed by members of the community.

The community outreach program adopted by the Philadelphia Fire Department in 1989 has contributed to the largest decrease in fatalities in Philadelphia in over thirty years. Activities like those listed below are always useful and have a high success rate in building a spirit of trust and cooperation between the community and fire and police agencies.

- Attend police community workshops to discuss pertinent fire safety issues
- Establish programs at Get-Set preschools, day care centers, and nursery schools
- Publish fire prevention articles in neigh-

borhood newspapers, written in English and Spanish by members of local companies

- Distribute fire prevention literature at area shopping centers on weekends
- Coordinate fire education programs with area hospitals so that blood pressure and cholesterol screenings can be conducted by local fire personnel
- Display fire prevention/safety messages on outdoor marquees or signs of businesses in the district
- Print fire prevention/safety messages on the pay stubs, advertisements, and shopping bags of participating local businesses
- Present programs at all houses of worship in the neighborhood
- "Adopt" elementary schools in respective local districts and participate in their programs—such as Career Day
- Become involved with local hospitals—pay a Christmas visit, for example
- Identify homes lacking smoke detectors, and purchase and install them in conjunction with the Fire Prevention Division
- Follow-up on a periodic basis to ensure that smoke detectors are operational. Replacement batteries could be made available through the fire prevention division and donated by battery manufacturers, community organizations, and businesses.

Public access media also are a valuable resource for developing community activities. Police and fire agencies could produce and/or sponsor informative programming on their "worlds"; or they could sponsor entertainment programming geared to both adults and children.

HOW AGENCIES CAN BUILD A RELATIONSHIP

It is imperative to build bonds of respect and trust between fire and police agencies, especially since they must work as one unit during crisis and unrest situations.

On the night of April 29, 1992, when the Los Angeles riots were escalating, the job of escorting firefighters was given to Metro, the police department's elite division that includes its SWAT teams

and other specialized units. Although this decision might be questionable, when protection ultimately was provided, firefighters praised the courage and dedication of their police escorts. Interagency communication was a major problem in this situation. Firefighters use different radio channels from those assigned to the police and there was no way to link them. The two agencies were unfamiliar with each other's equipment and methods of operation, and this proved to be a major handicap in the execution of their jobs during the emergency.

Each agency needs to fully understand how the other sees the world. They need to build relationships for the welfare of the community. Atlanta fire and police chiefs, for example, meet for dinner once a week. They share their experiences, compare notes, and get to know and understand

each other. The weekly dinners have helped to build and strengthen the strong cooperation and trust that exists between police and fire personnel in the city.

Another successful program first developed by the Miami Police Department in 1981 is the SWAT media program. Under this program, firefighters trained as paramedics attend the Miami Police Department SWAT school. After completing this program, the firefighters are fully trained in the defensive use of firearms and SWAT tactics. This training qualifies them to move into hostile areas to render urgent life-saving aid. The program is very effective during a civil disorder, where police and/or fire personnel can be injured. It has positive benefits for both agencies and builds stronger, firmer ties between the two.

Crime Scene Response Guidelines

Overview

This information was adapted from the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training's workbook for the "Forensic Technology for Law Enforcement" Telecourse presented on May 13, 1993. Please see the acknowledgments.

The purpose of crime scene investigation is to help establish what happened (crime scene reconstruction) and to identify the responsible person. This is done by carefully documenting the conditions at a crime scene and recognizing all relevant physical evidence. The ability to recognize and properly collect physical evidence is oftentimes critical to both solving and prosecuting violent crimes. It is no exaggeration to say that in the majority of cases, the law enforcement officer who protects and searches a crime scene plays a critical role in determining whether physical evidence will be used in solving or prosecuting violent crimes.

Despite Hollywood's portrayal, crime scene investigation is a difficult and time consuming job. There is no substitute for a careful and thoughtful approach. An investigator must not leap to an immediate conclusion as to what happened based upon limited information but must generate several different theories of the crime, keeping the ones that are not eliminated by incoming information at the scene. Reasonable inferences about what happened are produced from the scene appearance and information from witnesses. These theories will help guide the investigator to document specific conditions and recognize valuable evidence.

Documenting crime scene conditions can include immediately recording transient details such as lighting (on/off), drapes (open/closed), weather, or furniture moved by medical teams. Certain evidence such as shoeprints or gunshot residue is fragile and if not collected immediately can easily be destroyed or lost. The scope of the investigation also extends to considerations of arguments which might be generated in this case (suicide/self defense) and documenting conditions which would support or refute these arguments.

In addition, it is important to be able to recognize what should be present at a scene but is not (victim's vehicle/wallet) and objects which appear to be out of place (ski mask) and might have been left by the assailant. It is also important to determine the full extent of a crime scene. A crime scene is not merely the immediate area where a body is located or where an assailant concentrated his activities but can also encompass a vehicle and access/escape routes.

Although there are common items which are frequently collected as evidence (fingerprints, shoeprints, or bloodstains), literally any object can be physical evidence. Anything which can be used to connect a victim to a suspect or a suspect to a victim or crime scene is relevant physical evidence. Using the "shopping list" approach (collecting all bloodstains, hairs, or shoeprints) will probably not result in recognizing the best evidence. For example, collecting bloodstains under a victim's body or shoeprints from emergency personnel will rarely answer important questions. Conversely, a single matchstick (not usually mentioned as physical evidence) recovered on the floor near a victim's body can be excellent physical evidence since it can be directly tied to a matchbook found in a suspect's pocket.

Since a weapon or burglar tool is easily recognized as significant physical evidence, it is frequently destroyed by the perpetrator. Sometimes the only remaining evidence is microscopic evidence consisting of hairs, fibers, or other small traces the assailant unknowingly leaves behind or takes

with him. Although this evidence is effectively collected when the clothing of the victim or suspect is taken, protocols (involving tape lifts) should be in place to process nude bodies so as not to lose this fragile evidence.

The following pages will discuss how crime scene duties can be divided among personnel, procedures for crime scene search, and finally basic crime scene documentation.

Personnel Duties and Responsibilities

- Team Leader
- Photographer and Photographic Log Recorder
- Sketch Preparer
- Evidence Recorder/Evidence Recovery Personnel
- Specialists

Organization and Procedures for Search Operations

- Preparation
- Basic Stages in a Search
- Approach Scene
- Secure and Protect Scene
- Initiate Preliminary Survey
- Evaluate Physical Evidence Possibilities
- Prepare Narrative Description
- Photograph Scene
- Prepare Diagram/Sketch of Scene
- Conduct Detailed Search/Record and Collect Physical Evidence
- Conduct Final Survey
- Release Crime Scene

Documentation Procedures

- Administrative Worksheet
- Narrative Description
- Photographic Log
- Diagram/Sketch
- Evidence Recovery Log
- Latent Print Lift Log



Continue to: Personnel Duties and Responsibilities

Crime Scene Response Guidelines

Personnel Duties and Responsibilities

This information was adapted from the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training's workbook for the "Forensic Technology for Law Enforcement" Telecourse presented on May 13, 1993. Please see the acknowledgments.

There are certain personnel duties and responsibilities which are necessary in almost any major search operation. Those enumerated in these guidelines concentrate on the ones which are typically crucial to ensure that search efforts are conducted in an organized and methodical fashion. It is important to note it may not be feasible to have one person assigned to each duty. It is relatively common for one person to accomplish two or more duties.

For all positions, interest and attitude of personnel are paramount concerns. Training and experience will only be used to best potential when team members possess a positive attitude. This human side of evidence response teams is significant due to the long hours and attention to detail often required of personnel.

The major assignments, as well as corresponding general duties and responsibilities, are set forth as follows:

1. Team Leader
2. Photographer and Photographic Log Recorder
3. Sketch Preparer
4. Evidence Recorder/Evidence Recovery Personnel
5. Specialists

Team Leader

1. Assume control - ensure safety of personnel and security at scene. Ensure personnel use appropriate protective equipment and follow standard recommendations to protect them from any health hazard which might be presented by blood or any other human body fluid.
2. Conduct initial walk-through for purposes of making a preliminary survey, evaluating potential evidence, and preparing a narrative description.
3. Determine search patterns, and make appropriate assignments for team members.
4. Designate command post location and ensure exchange of information between search and investigative personnel.
5. Coordinate with other law enforcement agencies and make sure a cooperative spirit is maintained.
6. Ensure that sufficient supplies and equipment are available for personnel.
7. Control access to the scene and designate an individual to log everyone into the scene.
8. Continuously reevaluate efficiency of search during entire course of operation.

9. Release the scene after a final survey and inventory of the evidence has been done.

Photographer and Photographic Log Recorder

1. Photograph entire area before it is entered.
2. Photograph victims, crowd, and vehicles.
3. Photograph entire scene with overall, medium and close-up coverage, using measurement scale when appropriate.
4. Photograph major evidence items before they are moved; coordinate this effort with Sketch Preparer, Evidence Recorder, and Evidence Recovery Personnel.
5. Photograph all latent fingerprints and other impression evidence before lifting and casting are accomplished.
6. Prepare photographic log and photographic sketch.

Sketch Preparer

1. Diagram immediate area of scene and orient diagram with sketch.
2. Set forth major items of evidence on sketch.
3. Designate and label areas to be searched and advise team leader and all other search members of nomenclature for designated areas.
4. Obtain appropriate assistance for taking measurements and double check measurements.
5. Ensure necessary administrative information, such as scale disclaimer (not drawn to scale), is recorded on sketch.

Evidence Recorder/Custodian

1. Have significant evidence photographed before collection.
2. Describe evidence and its location on appropriate bag or envelope.
3. Sign and date evidence container/maintain chain of custody.
4. Appropriately collect and package evidence to maximize evidence integrity.
5. Maintain evidence log.
6. Use appropriate protective equipment (gloves) and methods when dealing with potentially infective evidence (blood).

Specialists

It is sometimes necessary to bring in expertise from an outside agency. The field of forensic science is so broad today that no agency will have every form of specialty service available from among its ranks. Typically, specialists are brought in from industry, the academic community, private scientific laboratories, and similar concerns.

When dealing with outside specialists some pertinent aspects to consider are:

1. The competence and reliability of the specialist.
2. The ability of the specialist to work at a scene within law enforcement guidelines.
3. The role of the specialist in presenting expert testimony in court.

Specialists should be identified before they are needed in an actual case. A current list should be maintained, if possible. The agency should meet with these individuals to determine the best manner to jointly conduct search planning, operations, and follow-up activity.

The following list provides examples of specialty assistance to be considered (it is not meant to be completely inclusive):

- Anthropologist
- Blood Pattern Analyst
- Bomb Technician
- Criminalist
- Engineer
- Entomologist
- Medical Examiner
- Odontologist
- Surveyor



Continue to: Organization and Procedures for Search Operations

Crime Scene Response Guidelines
Organization and Procedures
for Search Operations

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Preparation

1. Evaluate the current legal ramifications of crime scene searches (e.g., obtaining of search warrants).
2. Discuss upcoming search with involved personnel before arrival at scene, if possible.
3. Select, when feasible, person-in-charge prior to arrival at scene.
4. Consider the safety and comfort of search personnel - do not be caught unprepared when encountering a potentially dangerous scene or inclement weather- examples are:
 - Clothing
 - Communication
 - Lighting assistance
 - Shelter
 - Transportation
 - Food
 - Medical assistance
 - Scene security
 - Equipment
5. Organize communication with services of an ancillary nature (e.g., medical examiner, prosecutive attorney) in order that questions which surface during crime scene search may be resolved. Take steps to organize a "command post" headquarters for communication, decision-making, etc., in major/complicated investigations.

Basic Stages in a Search

1. Approach scene Secure and protect scene
2. Initiate preliminary survey/determine scene boundaries
3. Evaluate physical evidence possibilities
4. Prepare narrative description
5. Depict scene photographically
6. Prepare diagram/sketch of scene

7. Conduct detailed search
8. Record and collect physical evidence
9. Conduct final survey
10. Release crime scene

Approach Scene

1. Be alert for discarded evidence
2. Make pertinent notes as to possible approach/escape routes

Secure and Protect Scene

1. Take control of scene on arrival.
2. Determine extent to which scene has thus far been protected.
3. Ensure adequate scene security.
4. Obtain information from personnel who have entered scene and have knowledge relative to its original conditions -- document who has been at scene.
5. Take extensive notes - do not rely on memory.
6. Keep out unauthorized personnel - begin recording who enters and leaves.

Initiate Preliminary Survey

1. The survey is an organizational stage to plan for the entire search.
2. A cautious walk-through of the scene is accomplished.
3. Person-in-charge maintains definite administrative and emotional control.
4. Select appropriate narrative description technique.
5. Acquire preliminary photographs.
6. Delineate extent of the search area - usually expand initial perimeter.
7. Organize methods and procedures needed recognize special problem areas.
8. Determine personnel and equipment needs make specific assignments.
9. Identify and protect transient physical evidence.
10. Develop a general theory of the crime.
11. Make extensive notes to document scene physical and environmental conditions, assignments, movement of personnel, etc.
12. On vehicles get VIN number, license number, position of key, odometer reading, gear shift

PROTECTING THE CRIME SCENE

by
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Very early in their careers, most law enforcement officers realize that the police work they see depicted on television and in the movies bears little resemblance to their jobs. It is something of an anomaly, therefore, that many of these same officers seem to believe that crime scene work should be performed as it is on the screen--murder scenes filled with loitering blue uniforms and multitudes of detectives hovering over bodies, with crime scene personnel appearing just long enough to snap an occasional picture or to dust a piece of furniture for fingerprints. Officers who work under this misconception do not seem to understand that a crime scene is no place for a crowd.

Widespread trampling of crime scenes can prove very damaging to investigations. Often it results in several of the more sensitive forensic techniques--such as trace analysis, bloodspatter interpretation, and DNA not being used to their fullest potential.

Not long ago a sheriff's department was forced to conduct a mass fingerprinting of its detective unit after a particularly sensational homicide crime scene became overrun with curious personnel. Considerable time and effort went into eliminating officers' fingerprints from the pool of legitimate prints. In another case involving a different agency, a set of crime scene photographs showed supervisory personnel standing on a blood-soaked carpet.

The role of detectives and supervisors in protecting crime scenes cannot be over stressed. These individuals ultimately are responsible for an investigation. Investigators who conscientiously limit the number of visitors to a crime scene ultimately may save themselves a great deal of legwork.

The simplest and most productive way for supervisors and detectives to discourage crime scene contamination is to set a good example by their own behavior. If a lieutenant walks around a crime scene at will, opening drawers and rifling through closets, what could be the harm in other officers doing the same? If a detective sergeant fails to implement a sign-in log for scene visitors, what is there to limit "drop in" visits by curious patrol officers. It is in the best interest of case investigators to set a good example and to make sure others follow it.

To further enhance the protection of evidence, police administrators should draft and enforce a written policy regarding crime scene protection and preservation. The policy not only must be clear but also must carry the same weight as any other departmental rule. Police administrators should not tolerate curiosity as an excuse for unchecked visits to the scene of a crime. Administrators, perhaps in conjunction with the local prosecutor's office, should

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

write and enforce the rules and, like supervisors and investigators, set an example by their own behavior.

The primary responsibilities of initial responders to a crime are to preserve life and to control suspects and witnesses. Then, shifting their focus somewhat, responding officers must take steps to preserve the integrity of the scene's physical boundaries. While this may not be a problem for those officers who were once taught the importance of protecting crime scenes, others--including supervisors, media relations personnel, and administrators--sometimes have trouble leaving well enough alone at a crime scene.

A department's written policy should provide a uniform procedure to restrict unnecessary access to crime scenes. A crime scene policy should contain the following elements:

The officer assigned to the crime scene's main entry must log in all visitors, including name, rank, stated purpose, and arrival and departure times. Absolutely no undocumented visitors should be allowed in the crime scene area.

Every officer at the scene must complete a standard report describing their involvement and their specific actions while at the scene.

All visitors must make available any requested exemplar (hair, blood, shoeprints, fingerprints, etc.) for elimination purposes.

The highest ranking officer entering a crime scene must assume responsibility for all subsequent visitors to the scene.

This final element means that any supervisory officer who visits the scene to "have a look around" must stay at the site until either the crime scene technicians finish their work or a higher ranking officer arrives. Needless to say, this simple requirement goes a long way to discourage pointless tourism.

An officer attempting to secure a crime scene who finds the post regularly overrun by curious commanders must have the means to protect the scene, enforce department rules, and deal with superior officers. This is often a difficult balancing act. A clearly written, well-enforced policy helps to level the playing field.

In addition to a clearly defined written policy, departments should also address the problem of crime scene contamination by instructing new officers to follow approved practices. This is best accomplished during basic academy instruction by having crime scene specialists discuss the department's policy and the importance of protecting forensic evidence. As more officers become trained in proper practices, the risk of future crime scene contamination steadily diminishes.

Crime scenes often yield forensic evidence that leads to the apprehension of dangerous criminals. Perhaps just as often, though, potentially valuable evidence is destroyed or rendered useless by careless behavior at the crime scene. Clearly written directives and training for new officers in this area will help agencies to resolve the problem. However, the ultimate responsibility rests with administrators, supervisors, and detectives to reinforce positive

SUPPLEMENTAL READING

conduct by setting a good example for other officers to follow.

[This article originally appeared in the FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, September 1994.]



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position, amount of fuel in tank, lights turned on or off.

Evaluate Physical Evidence Possibilities

1. Based upon what is known from the preliminary survey, determine what evidence is likely to be present.
2. Concentrate on the most transient evidence and work to the least transient forms of this material.
3. Focus first on the easily accessible areas in open view and progress eventually to possible out-of-view locations - look for purposely hidden items.
4. Consider whether the evidence appears to have been moved inadvertently.
5. Evaluate whether or not the scene and evidence appears intentionally "contrived".

Prepare Narrative Description

1. The purpose of this step is to provide a running narrative of the conditions at the crime scene. Consider what should be present at a scene (victim's purse or vehicle) and is not observed and what is out of place (ski mask).
2. Represent scene in a "general to specific" scheme. Consider situational factors: lights on/off, heat on/off, newspaper on driveway/in house, drapes pulled, open or shut.
3. Do not permit narrative effort to degenerate into a sporadic and unorganized attempt to recover physical evidence - it is recommended that evidence not be collected at this point, under most circumstances.
4. Methods of narrative - written, audio, video.

Photograph Scene

1. Begin photography as soon as possible - plan before photographing.
2. Document the photographic effort with a photographic log.
3. Insure that a progression of overall, medium and close-up views of the scene is established.
4. Use recognized scale device for size determination when applicable.
5. When a scale device is used, first take a photograph without the inclusion of this device.
6. Photograph evidence in place before its collection and packaging.
7. Be observant of and photograph areas adjacent to the crime scene - points of entry, exits, windows, attics, etc.
8. Consider feasibility of aerial photography.
9. Photograph items, places, etc., to corroborate the statements of witnesses, victims, suspects.
10. Take photographs from eye-level, when feasible, to represent scene as it would be observed by normal view.

11. Film is relatively cheap compared to the rewards obtained - do not hesitate to photograph something which has no apparent significance at that time - it may later prove to be a key element in the investigation.
12. Prior to lifting latent fingerprints, photographs should be taken 1:1, or use appropriate scale.

Prepare diagram/sketch of scene

1. The diagram establishes permanent record of items, conditions, and distance/size relationships - diagrams supplement photographs
2. Rough sketch is drawn at scene (normally not drawn to scale) and is used as a model for finished sketch.
3. Typical material on rough sketch:
 - Specific location
 - Date
 - Time
 - Case identifier
 - Preparer
 - Weather conditions
 - Lighting conditions
 - Scale or scale disclaimer
 - Compass orientation
 - Evidence
 - Measurements
 - Key or legend
4. Number designations on sketch can be coordinated with same number designations on evidence log in many instances.
5. General progression of sketches:
 - Lay out basic perimeter
 - Set forth fixed objects, furniture, etc.
 - Record position of evidence
 - Record appropriate measurements- double check
 - Set forth key/legend, compass orientation, etc.

Conduct Detailed Search/Record, and Collect Physical Evidence

1. Accomplish search based on previous evaluation of evidence possibilities.
2. Conduct search in a general manner and work to the specifics regarding evidence items.
3. Use of specialized search patterns (e.g., grid, strip/lane, spiral) are recommended when possible.
4. Photograph all items before collection and enter notations in photographic log (remember- use scale when necessary).
5. Mark evidence locations on diagram/sketch
6. Complete evidence log with appropriate notations for each item of evidence.

7. Ensure that evidence or the container of evidence is initialed by investigator collecting the evidence.
8. Do not handle evidence excessively after recovery.
9. Seal all evidence containers at the crime scene.
10. Do not guess on packaging requirements different types of evidence can necessitate different containers.
11. Do not forget entrance and exit areas at scene for potential evidence.
12. Be sure to obtain appropriate "Known" standards (e.g., fiber sample from carpet).
13. Constantly check paperwork, packaging notations, and other pertinent recordings of information for possible errors which may cause confusion or problems at a later time.
14. Four basic premises:
 - The best search options are typically the most difficult and time consuming.
 - You cannot "over-document" the physical evidence.
 - There is only one chance to perform the job properly.
 - There are two basic search approaches, in this order:
 - A "cautious" search of visible areas, taking steps to avoid evidence loss or contamination.
 - After the "cautious" search, a vigorous search for hidden/concealed areas.

Conduct Final Survey

1. This survey is a critical review of all aspects of the search.
2. Discuss the search jointly with all personnel for completeness.
3. Double check documentation to detect inadvertent errors.
4. Check to ensure all evidence is accounted for before departing scene.
5. Ensure all equipment used in the search is gathered.
6. Make sure possible hiding places of difficult access areas have not been overlooked in detailed search.
7. Critical issues: have you gone far enough in the search for evidence, documented all essential things, and made no assumptions which may prove to be incorrect in the future?

Release Crime Scene

1. Release is accomplished only after completion of the final survey.
2. At minimum, documentation should be made of :
 - Time and date of release
 - To whom released
 - By whom released

3. Ensure that appropriate inventory has been provided as necessary, considering legal requirements, to person to whom scene is released .
4. Once the scene has been formally released, reentry may require a warrant.
5. Only the person-in-charge should have the authority to release the scene. This precept should be known and adhered to by all personnel.
6. Consider the need to have certain specialists serve the scene before it is released (e.g., blood pattern analysts, medical examiner).



Continue to: Documentation Procedures

Crime Scene Response Guidelines

Documentation Procedures

This information was adapted from the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training's workbook for the "Forensic Technology for Law Enforcement" Telecourse presented on May 13, 1993. Please see the acknowledgments.

Many law enforcement agencies use a variety of preprinted documents or forms, designed to record certain aspects of crime scene investigation. These documents normally have resulted from a trial-and-error approach based on actual case experiences. Despite variations in the design of these documents, the purpose and goals behind their use are usually identical from one agency to another.

There is an important point to consider when forms, are being drafted for routine use. Often, there is a tendency to regard forms as means to cover every possibility that personnel may confront, such documents normally serve only as reminders of the minimum pertinent information needed to perform a task. Each scene will require some ?l of deviation from the norm, based on the complexities at hand. Forms are not substitutes for thinking; they are merely tools to assist personnel to fully exercise training and experience to meet the needs of a given situation.

There are normally six important categories of documentation that are considered applicable to any search:

Administrative Worksheet

Documentation of major events, times and movements relating to the search efforts; documentation of initial and continuing management and administrative steps which are taken to insure that an organized search is accomplished.

Narrative Description

Documentation of the general appearance of the scene as first observed; extreme detail regarding evidence or actual collection of evidence, is normally beyond the scope of the Narrative Description

Photographic Log

Documentation of the process of scene photography which records the overall, medium, and close-up views of the scene; a log is produced representing the technical and descriptive information concerning the photographic task.

Diagram/Sketch

Documentation of physical evidence locations, as well as measurements showing pertinent size and distance relationships in the crime scene area.

Evidence Recovery Log

Documentation of the recognition, collection, marking, and packaging of physical evidence for administrative and chain of custody purposes.

Latent Print Lift Log

Documentation of the recognition, collection, marking, and packaging of lifts made of latent prints discovered at the scene.


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Protecting the Crime Scene

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The most important aspect of evidence collection and preservation is protecting the crime scene. This is to keep the pertinent evidence uncontaminated until it can be recorded and collected. The successful prosecution of a case can hinge on the state of the physical evidence at the time it is collected. The protection of the scene begins with the arrival of the first police officer at the scene and ends when the scene is released from police custody.

All police departments and sheriff's offices should include intensive training for its personnel on how to properly protect crime scenes. Potentially, any police officer can be put into the position of first responding officer to a crime scene. The first officer on the scene of a crime should approach the scene slowly and methodically. In some cases this is not altogether practical. The first officer may also be involved in arresting an uncooperative suspect or performing life saving measures on an injured victim. In either case the officer should make mental or written notes (as is practical in each situation) about the condition of the scene as it was upon the officer's arrival and after the scene has been stabilized. The officer should keep notes on the significant times involved in responding to the crime scene (time dispatched to scene, time left for scene, time arrived at scene, time left scene, etc.). An effort must be made to disturb things as little as possible in assessing the situation. Particular attention should be paid to the floor since this is the most common repository for evidence and it poses the greatest potential for contamination. Notes should also be taken if the officer has to alter something in the investigation. Some things the officer should note include: the condition of the doors, windows, and lighting (both natural and manmade); if there are any odors present; if there are any signs of activity; how EMS or fire personnel have altered the scene; anything essential about the suspect (description, statements, physical condition, mental condition, intoxication, etc.); and anything essential about the victim. Once the scene has been stabilized, the scene and any other areas which may yield valuable evidence (driveways, surrounding yards, pathways, etc.) should be roped off to prevent unauthorized people from entering the area and potentially contaminating it. Investigators and other necessary personnel should be contacted and dispatched to the scene, however, under no circumstances should the telephone at the scene be used. Once the officer has secured the scene, he or she could do the following: record witness names and others who may have entered or been at the scene; separate witnesses and suspect(s); do not discuss the events or the crime with witnesses or bystanders or let the witnesses discuss these events; listen attentively but discreetly; and protect evidence which may be in danger of being destroyed. Any actions taken should be reported to the investigators.

Many times the arrival of additional personnel can cause problems in protecting the scene. Only those people responsible for the immediate investigation of the crime, the securing of the crime scene, and the processing of the crime scene should be present. Non-essential police officers, district attorney investigators, federal agents, politicians, etc. should never be allowed into a secured crime scene unless they can add something (other than contamination) to the crime scene investigation. One way to dissuade unnecessary people from entering the crime scene is to have only one entrance/exit into the crime scene. An officer can be placed here with a notebook to take the names of all of the people entering the crime scene. The officer can then inform them that by entering the crime scene they may pose a problem by adding potential contamination, and the reason that the officer is taking their names is in case the crime scene investigators need to collect fingerprints,

this problem was a protocol between statutory social services and voluntary organizations.

The protocol states that help from voluntary organizations is essential and that information on voluntary services should be disseminated, but it argues that there is no need for all voluntary organizations to converge on the disaster site. Although social services departments take the lead role in offering counselling, voluntary organizations offer a valued alternative source of assistance, as some people are deterred from seeking help from social service departments because of traditional stigma attached to interventions by social workers. Voluntary activity is so diverse and unstructured that there may be other inputs at times. For example, churches are also an important source of interpersonal support and churches and community groups may often provide emergency accommodation.

Physical or psychological help

The main focus of emergency planning has focused on medical aid and physical assistance and recovery but, in recent years there has been a growing acknowledgement of the emotional, psychological and social consequences of disasters. The emergence of a role for social workers in providing counselling and support for victims and relatives took place after a series of disasters in Great Britain. In the early years of civil disturbance in Northern Ireland, social services and social workers concentrated on practical material assistance or *ad hoc* counselling. Northern Ireland did not really set a lead in this field but trauma counselling developed rapidly in the 1980s, partly in response to developments in Britain and partly as a result of research in Northern Ireland. Several studies had shown evidence of psychological stress among the victims of civil and terrorist violence. Lyons (1974: 15) found evidence of affective disturbance in 92 per cent of a sample of people directly involved in a bomb explosion. More recent studies have concentrated on the identification of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a special type of psychological reaction to stress. Loughrey, Bell, Kee, Roddy and Curran (1988: 544-560) found 23 per cent of a group of 499 studied had PTSD and the results supported the face and predictive validities of PTSD.

Social service departments have now developed trauma counselling teams and they have increasingly adopted a pro-active response. Survivors may not be aware of the need for support or have difficulty asking for help or experience delayed reaction. Such a pro-active response constitutes a departure from traditional social work practice which is

essentially reactive. The pro-active role involves direct approaches to all victims and it is an unusual departure for social workers to relate to everyone in a neighbourhood rather than individuals (Barry, 1989: 23). It also involves the distribution of leaflets, letters and contact information. Trauma counselling teams believe the distribution of information on crisis support after incidents is as valuable as the actual physical assistance given. The need for continuing support has also been stressed as often there is an over-provision of offers of help at the post-impact stage and a dearth of provision in the long-term (Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991). Social work departments are organized for crisis intervention and associated roles such as working with the bereaved and they can be seen as filling a need for generalized helping which no other agency can provide and they can offer a wide range of support (Tumelty and Seed, 1990).

There has been some evidence in Northern Ireland that the incidence of PTSD can be overstressed. Clearly not everyone suffers from PTSD. Curran, Bell, Murray, Loughrey, Roddy and Roche (1990: 479-482) found, six months after the incident, that 50 per cent of the survivors of the Enniskillen bombing satisfied the criteria for PTSD. Hadden, Rutherford and Merrett (1978), in a study of 1,532 consecutive patients who had been admitted to a major Belfast hospital because of their exposure to a bomb, reported few signs of emotional shock.

Thus there is some evidence that there are important coping mechanisms within the population. Cairns and Wilson (1989) have speculated on the role that denial might play in coping with violence in Northern Ireland; people cope with stress by denying the existence of violence. Loughrey and Curran (1987) suggest that perceptions of violence may depend upon perceptions of the outcome in political terms and, in reality, one section of the community may approve or feel better after a bombing. Curran (1988) also suggests that violent emergencies may bind people or the local community together, engender a feeling of us against them and this may protect communities against psychological disturbance in the face of terrorist violence. Cairns and Wilson (1992), in a review of the literature, comment that it appears that people in Northern Ireland have coped well with the stress of living in midst of political violence.

Some other questions have been asked about the appropriateness of counselling and social work intervention. Brook (1990) has raised questions about the appropriateness of social work intervention and the relevance of social

"This article appeared on the internet and is reprinted with George Schiro's (author) approval."

Examination and Documentation of the Crime Scene

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Examination of the Crime Scene

Before the investigators begin examining the scene of the crime, they should gather as much information as possible about the scene. Once again, a slow and methodical approach is recommended. Information is gathered to prevent destruction of valuable and/or fragile evidence such as shoeprints, trace evidence, etc. Once all of the information is gathered, a mental plan is formulated as to how the crime scene will be analyzed. Copious notes and relevant times should be kept on every aspect of the crime scene investigation. The examination of the scene will usually begin with a walk through of the area along the "trail" of the crime. The trail is that area which all apparent actions associated with the crime took place. The trail is usually marked by the presence of physical evidence. This may include the point of entry, the location of the crime, areas where a suspect may have cleaned up, and the point of exit. In some cases, a walk through may become secondary if potential evidence is in danger of being destroyed. In that case, this evidence should be preserved, or documented and collected as quickly as possible.

The purpose of the walk through is to note the location of potential evidence and to mentally outline how the scene will be examined. The walk through begins as close to the point of entry as possible. The first place the investigators should examine is the ground on which they are about to tread. If any evidence is observed, then a marker should be placed at the location as a warning to others not to step on the item of interest.

A good technique to use indoors on hard floors is the oblique lighting technique (also known as side lighting). A good flashlight with a strong concentrated beam is the only tool needed. The room should be darkened as much as possible. If a light switch which a suspect may have touched needs to be turned off, then make sure the switch has been dusted for fingerprints first. Do not close any blinds or shades until after all general photographs have been taken. In the side lighting technique, a flashlight is held about one inch from the floor. The beam is then angled so that it just sweeps over the floor surface and is almost parallel to the surface. The light is then fanned back and forth. Any evidence, such as trace evidence and shoeprints, will show up dramatically. Under normal lighting conditions, this evidence may be barely visible or completely invisible.

As the walk through progresses, the investigators should make sure their hands are occupied by either carrying notebooks, flashlights, pens, etc. or by keeping them in their pockets. This is to prevent depositing of unwanted fingerprints at the scene. As a final note on the walk through, the investigators should examine whatever is over their heads (ceiling, tree branches, etc.). These areas may yield such valuable evidence as blood spatters and bullet holes. Once the walk through is completed, the scene should be documented with videotape, photographs, and/or sketches.

Documenting the Crime Scene

Videotaping the Crime Scene

If available, a video camera is the first step to documenting a crime scene. Videotape can provide a perspective on the crime scene layout which cannot be as easily perceived in photographs and sketches. It is a more natural viewing medium to which people can readily relate, especially in demonstrating the structure of the crime scene and how the evidence relates to the crime. The video camera should have a fully charged battery as well as date and time videotape display functions. A title generator and "shake free" operations are also nice options. If a title generator is not available, then about 15 seconds at the beginning of the tape should be left blank. This will allow the addition of a title card with any pertinent information to the beginning of the crime scene tape. The condition of the scene should remain unaltered with the exception of markers placed by the investigators and any lights turned on during the walk through. These alterations can be noted on the audio portion of the tape. Before taping, the camera range should be cleared of all personnel. Any people in the area should be forewarned that taping is about to commence and they should remain silent for the duration of the tape. This prevents recording any potentially embarrassing statements.

Once the video camera begins recording, it should not be stopped until the taping is complete. The key to good videotaping is slow camera movement. A person can never move too slowly when videotaping, yet it is all too easy to move the camera fast without realizing it. This is why videotaping is not ideal for viewing detail. People have a tendency to pan past objects in a manner that does not allow the camera to properly capture the object. This is why slow panning of an area is necessary and it should be panned twice in order to prevent unnecessary rewinding of the tape when viewing.

The taping should begin with a general overview of the scene and surrounding area. The taping should continue throughout the crime scene using wide angle, close up, and even macro (extreme close up) shots to demonstrate the layout of the evidence and its relevance to the crime scene. If videotaping in a residence, the camera can show how the pertinent rooms are laid out in relation to each other and how they can be accessed. This is sometimes lost in photographs and sketches. After the taping is complete, it is wise to leave about 15 seconds of blank tape to prevent the crime scene tape from running into anything else previously recorded on the tape. The tape should then be transferred to a high quality master tape. The recording tabs should be removed from the master tape after transferring the crime scene tape and the master should be stored in a safe place. This is to prevent accidental erasure of the crime scene tape. Copies can then be made from the master tape.

Still Photography

Whether a video camera is available or not, it is absolutely essential that still photographs be taken to document the crime scene. If a video camera is available, then photographs will be the second step in recording the crime scene. If video is not available, then still photography will be the first step. Photographs can demonstrate the same type of things that the videotape does, but photographs from the crime scene can also be used in direct comparison situations. For example, actual size photographs (also known as one-to-one photos) can be used to compare fingerprint and shoeprints photographed at the crime scene to known fingerprints or shoes from a suspect. This is the advantage of photographs over videotape.

Almost any type of camera with interchangeable lenses and a format of 35mm or larger will do in crime scene photography. The lenses should include a 28mm wide angle lens, a normal 55mm lens, and a lens with macro capabilities (1:4 or better). The flash unit used with the camera should be one that is not fixed to the camera. It should be able to function at various angles and distances from the camera. This is to allow lighting of certain areas to provide maximum contrast, place the flash in hard to reach areas, and reduce flash wash out which can render the item photographed invisible. Print and/or slide color film (25-400 ISO) should be used. A tripod, a level, and a small ruler should also be available for one-to-one photography. It may be of help to the investigation to have a Polaroid camera handy for instant photographs. For example, an instant photograph of a shoeprint found at a crime scene can be provided to investigators who are running a search warrant on a suspect's residence. The photo will tell them the type of shoe for which they are searching.

The photography of the crime scene should begin with wide angle photos of the crime scene and surrounding areas. When shooting the general overall scene, the photos should show the layout of the crime scene and the overall spatial relationships of the various pieces of evidence to each other. A good technique to use indoors is to shoot from all four corners of a room to show its overall arrangement. The next set of photos should be medium range to show the relationships of individual pieces of evidence to other pieces of evidence or structures in the crime scene. Finally, close up photos should be taken of key pieces of evidence. A ruler should be photographed with items where relative size is important or on items which need to have one-to-one comparison photographs. The object should first be photographed as is, then photographed with the ruler. It is important that when doing one-to-one photography that the ruler is on the same plane as the object being photographed and the film plane is parallel to the ruler. This is why a level and a tripod are necessary. Notes should also be taken as to what the investigator is photographing or wishes to demonstrate in each photograph. This is to prevent the investigator from getting the picture back at a later date and trying to figure out what he or she was trying to accomplish with the photo. The same areas should be photographed in the same sequence as mentioned above in the paragraphs on videotaping.

Crime Scene Sketching

The final phase in documenting the scene is making a crime scene sketch. The drawback of photographs is that they are two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional objects. As a result, most photographs can distort the spatial relationships of the photographed objects causing items to appear closer together or farther apart than they actually are. If spatial relationships of the evidence are important or if something needs to have proportional measurements included in it for calculations (such as bullet trajectory angles, accident reconstructions, etc.) then a sketch must be made of the crime scene.

A sketch is usually made of the scene as if one is looking straight down (overhead sketch) or straight ahead (elevation sketch) at a crime scene. A rough sketch at the scene is usually made first on graph paper in pencil with so many squares representing so many square feet or inches. Directionality of the overhead view is determined by using a compass. Using a tape measure or other measuring devices, measurements are taken at crime scene of the distances between objects and/or structures at the crime scene. These measurements are proportionally reduced on the rough sketch and the objects are drawn in. Two measurements taken at right angles to each other or from two reference points will usually suffice in placing the objects where they belong in a sketch. Double measurements should also be taken to make sure they are correct. This is especially true where calculations will later be used. A final sketch can be made later using inks, paper, and ruler, or a computer. The original rough sketch should be retained and preserved in case it is needed at a later date. Once the scene has been thoroughly documented then the evidence collection can commence.

RECOMMENDED READING:

Moreau, Dale M. "Fundamental Principles and Theory of Crime Scene Photography" Quantico: Forensic Science Training Unit, FBI Academy.

Redsicker, David R. "The Practical Methodology of Forensic Photography" Elsevier: New York. 1991.

"Sketching Crime Scenes" U.S. Dept. of Justice, FBI.



Collection and Preservation of Evidence

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Collection and Preservation of Evidence

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Once the crime scene has been thoroughly documented and the locations of the evidence noted, then the collection process can begin. The collection process will usually start with the collection of the most fragile or most easily lost evidence. Special consideration can also be given to any evidence or objects which need to be moved. Collection can then continue along the crime scene trail or in some other logical manner. Photographs should also continue to be taken if the investigator is revealing layers of evidence which were not previously documented because they were hidden from sight.

Most items of evidence will be collected in paper containers such as packets, envelopes, and bags. Liquid items can be transported in non-breakable, leakproof containers. Arson evidence is usually collected in air-tight, clean metal cans. Only large quantities of dry powder should be collected and stored in plastic bags. Moist or wet evidence (blood, plants, etc.) from a crime scene can be collected in plastic containers at the scene and transported back to an evidence receiving area if the storage time in plastic is two hours or less and this is done to prevent contamination of other evidence. Once in a secure location, wet evidence, whether packaged in plastic or paper, must be removed and allowed to completely air dry. That evidence can then be repackaged in a new, dry paper container. **UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD EVIDENCE CONTAINING MOISTURE BE PACKAGED IN PLASTIC OR PAPER CONTAINERS FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS.** Moisture allows the growth of microorganisms which can destroy or alter evidence.

Any items which may cross contaminate each other must be packaged separately. The containers should be closed and secured to prevent the mixture of evidence during transportation. Each container should have: the collecting person's initials; the date and time it was collected; a complete description of the evidence and where it was found; and the investigating agency's name and their file number.

Each type of evidence has a specific value in an investigation. The value of evidence should be kept in mind by the investigator when doing a crime scene investigation. For example, when investigating a crime he or she should spend more time on collecting good fingerprints than trying to find fibers left by a suspect's clothing. The reason is that fingerprints can positively identify a person as having been at the scene of a crime, whereas fibers could have come from anyone wearing clothes made out of the same material. Of course if obvious or numerous fibers are found at the point of entry, on a victim's body, etc., then they should be collected in case no fingerprints of value are found. It is also wise to collect more evidence at a crime scene than not to collect enough evidence. An investigator usually only has one shot at a crime scene, so the most should be made of it.

The following is a breakdown of the types of evidence encountered and how the evidence should be handled:

Fingerprints

Fingerprints (also includes palm prints and bare footprints) are the best evidence to place an individual at the scene of a crime. Collecting fingerprints at a crime scene requires very few

materials, making it ideal from a cost standpoint. All non-movable items at a crime scene should be processed at the scene using gray powder, black powder, or black magnetic powder. Polaroid 665 black and white film loaded in a Polaroid CU-5 camera with detachable flash should be used to make one-to-one photographs of prints which do not readily lift. All small transportable items should be packaged in paper bags or envelopes and sent to the crime lab for processing. Because of the "package it up and send it to the lab" mentality, some investigators skim over collecting prints at a crime scene. Collecting prints at the crime scene should be every investigator's top priority. Fingerprints from the suspect as well as elimination fingerprints from the victim will also be needed for comparison (the same holds true for palm and bare footprints).

Bite Marks

Bite marks are found many times in sexual assaults and can be matched back to the individual who did the biting. They should be photographed using an ABFO No. 2 Scale with normal lighting conditions, side lighting, UV light, and alternate light sources. Color slide and print film as well as black and white film should be used. The more photographs under a variety of conditions, the better. Older bitemarks which are no longer visible on the skin may sometimes be visualized and photographed using UV light and alternate light sources. If the bitemark has left an impression then maybe a cast can be made of it. Casts and photographs of the suspect's teeth and maybe the victim's teeth will be needed for comparison. For more information consult a forensic odontologist.

Broken Fingernails

Much like a bullet that has individualizing striations on it, natural fingernails have individualizing striations on them. A broken fingernail found at a crime scene can be matched to the individual it came from many months after the crime has been committed. Broken fingernails should be placed in a paper packet which is then placed in a paper envelope. It can then be transported to the crime lab for analysis. Known samples from the suspect and maybe from the victim will be needed for comparison.

Questioned Documents

Handwriting samples can also be matched back to the individual that produced them. Known exemplars of the suspected person's handwriting must be submitted for comparison to the unknown samples. Questioned documents can also be processed for fingerprints. All items should be collected in paper containers. For more information consult a questioned documents examiner.

Blood and Body Fluids

If using the RFLP method of DNA analysis, then blood and seminal fluid can be matched back to an individual with a high degree of probability. Currently, if using the PCR method of DNA analysis or conventional serological techniques then blood and some body fluids can be said to come from a certain population group to which the individual belongs. As PCR technology advances, these population groups will become smaller, eventually giving it the same discriminating power as RFLP analysis has today. Dried blood and body fluid stains should be collected in the following manner: If the stained object can be transported back to the crime lab, then package it in a paper bag or envelope and send it to the lab; if the object cannot be transported, then either use fingerprint tape and lift it like a fingerprint and place the tape on a lift back; scrape the stain into a paper packet and package it in a paper envelope; or absorb the stain onto 1/2" long threads moistened with distilled water. The threads must be air dried before permanently packaging. For transportation purposes and to prevent cross contamination, the threads may be placed into a plastic container for no more than two hours. Once in a secure location, the threads must be removed from the plastic and allowed to air dry. They may then be repackaged into a paper packet and placed in a paper envelope. Wet blood and body fluid stains should be collected in the following manner: all items should be packaged separately to prevent cross contamination, if the item can be transported to the crime lab, then package it in a

paper bag (or plastic bag if the transportation time is under two hours), bring it to a secure place and allow it to thoroughly air dry, then repackage it in a paper bag. If the item cannot be transported back to the lab, then absorb the stain onto a small (1"x1") square of pre-cleaned 100% cotton sheeting. Package it in paper (or plastic if the transportation time is less than two hours), bring it to a secure place and allow it to thoroughly air dry; then repackage it in a paper envelope. **UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD WET OR MOIST ITEMS REMAIN IN PLASTIC OR PAPER CONTAINERS FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS.** Victim and suspect's known whole blood samples will have to be collected in yellow, red, or purple top "Vacutainers." Contact the lab to which the samples will be submitted for specific information.

Firearms and Toolmarks

Bullets and casings found at the crime scene can be positively matched back to a gun in the possession of a suspect. Bullets and casings can also be examined at the crime lab and sometimes tell an investigator what make and model of weapons may have expended the casing or bullet. A bullet found at the crime scene can sometimes be matched back to the same lot of ammunition found in a suspect's possession. Toolmarks can be positively matched to a tool in the suspect's possession. Firearm safety is a must at any crime scene. If a firearm must be moved at a crime scene, never move it by placing a pencil in the barrel or inside the trigger guard. Not only is this unsafe, but it could damage potential evidence. The gun can be picked up by the textured surface on the grips without fear of placing unnecessary fingerprints on the weapon. Before picking up the gun, make sure that the gun barrel is not pointed at anyone. Keep notes on the condition of the weapon as found and steps taken to render it as safe as possible without damaging potential evidence. The firearm can then be processed for prints and finally rendered completely safe. **FIREARMS MUST BE RENDERED SAFE BEFORE SUBMISSION TO THE CRIME LAB.** The firearm should be packaged in an envelope or paper bag separately from the ammunition and/or magazine. The ammunition and/or magazine should be placed in a paper envelope or bag. It is important that the ammunition found in the gun be submitted to the crime lab. Any boxes of similar ammunition found in a suspect's possession should also be placed in a paper container and sent to the crime lab. Casings and/or bullets found at the crime scene should be packaged separately and placed in paper envelopes or small cardboard pillboxes. If knives (or other sharp objects) are being submitted to the lab (for toolmarks, fingerprints, serology, etc.), then the blade and point should be wrapped in stiff unmovable cardboard and placed in a paper bag or envelope. The container should be labeled to warn that the contents are sharp and precautions should be taken. This is to prevent anyone from being injured.

Shoepprints and Tire Tracks

Shoepprints and tire tracks can be matched positively to a pair of shoes or to tires in a suspect's possession. Shoepprints and tire tracks can sometimes tell investigators what type of shoes or tires to look for when searching a suspect's residence or vehicles. Before any attempt is made at collecting shoepprints or tire tracks, one-to-one photographs should be made using a tripod, ruler, and level. The flash should be held at about 45 degree angles from the surface containing an impression. Casts can be made of impressions using dental stone. Once hardened, the cast can be packaged in paper and submitted to the lab. When photographing prints on hard flat surfaces the flash should be used as side lighting. Shoepprints on hard flat surfaces can also sometimes be lifted like a fingerprint. Dust prints on certain surfaces can be lifted with an electrostatic dustprint lifter.

Fracture Matches

Fracture matches can positively link broken pieces at the scene with pieces found in the possession of a suspect. For example, headlight fragments found at the scene of a hit and run could be positively matched to a broken headlight (just like putting together a jigsaw puzzle) on a suspect's vehicle. Larger fragments should be placed in paper bags or envelopes. Smaller fragments should be placed in a paper packet and then placed in an envelope.

Hair

If a root sheath is attached, then DNA analysis using PCR technology can say that this hair came from a certain percentage of the population to which the suspect belongs. If there is no root sheath, then a microscopic analysis can say that the hair has the same characteristics as the suspect's hair and is similar to his or her hair. At this point, no one can say that a hair came from a particular individual. Hair found at the scene should be placed in a paper packet and then placed in an envelope. If a microscopic examination is required, then 15-20 representative hairs from the suspect must be submitted to the lab for comparison. If DNA analysis is going to be used, then a whole blood sample from the suspect must be submitted to the lab in a "Vacutainer." Contact a DNA lab for more information.

Fibers

Fibers can be said that they are the same type and color as those found in a suspect's clothes, residence, vehicle, etc. Fibers should be collected in a paper packet and placed in an envelope. Representative fibers should be collected from a suspect and submitted to the lab for comparison.

Paint

Paint can be said that it is the same type and color as paint found in the possession of a suspect. Paint fragments should be collected in a paper packet and placed in an envelope. Representative paint chips or samples should be collected from the suspect and submitted to the lab for comparison.

Glass

Glass can be said that it has the same characteristics as glass found in the possession of a suspect. Smaller glass fragments should be placed in a paper packet and then in an envelope. Larger pieces should be wrapped securely in paper or cardboard and then placed in a padded cardboard box to prevent further breakage. Representative samples from the suspect should be submitted to the lab for comparison.

Other Trace Evidence

Sometimes during the commission of a crime, there are other items which may be transferred to a perpetrator from the scene or from the perpetrator to the scene (sheetrock, safe insulation, etc.). The guidelines for collecting the evidence and obtaining known samples is about the same as for paint and fibers. For specific information, contact your crime lab.

RECOMMENDED READING:

"Evidence Handling Guide" LA. Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police, Crime Laboratory

 *Special Considerations for Sexual Assault Evidence*

"This article appeared on the internet and is reprinted with George Schiro's (author) approval."

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers**
Student Manual

**Appendix F:
ICS Forms Catalog**

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

NATIONAL TRAINING CURRICULUM

ICS FORMS CATALOG



OCTOBER 1994

**INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
NATIONAL TRAINING CURRICULUM**

ICS FORMS CATALOG

OCTOBER 1994

PREFACE

Within this ICS Forms Catalog are forms developed by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) for use on wildfires. Over the years they have been modified slightly so that they may be used in other application areas, such as search and rescue, law enforcement, etc.

Evaluate the forms from your particular application area to see if they meet your needs. They are intended as a tool to assist in completing a specific job(s) on an incident and have been proven to be very effective on wildfires.

INCIDENT BRIEFING (ICS FORM 201)


Purpose. The Incident Briefing form provides the Incident Commander (and the Command and General Staffs assuming command of the incident) with basic information regarding the incident situation and the resources allocated to the incident. It also serves as a permanent record of the initial response to the incident.

Preparation. The briefing form is prepared by the Incident Commander for presentation to the incoming Incident Commander along with a more detailed oral briefing. Proper symbology should be used when preparing a map of the incident.

Distribution. After the initial briefing of the Incident Commander and General Staff members, the Incident Briefing is duplicated and distributed to the Command Staff, Section Chiefs, Branch Directors, Division/Group Supervisors, and appropriate Planning and Logistics Section Unit Leaders. The sketch map and summary of current action portions of the briefing form are given to the Situation Unit while the Current Organization and Resources Summary portion are given to the Resources Unit.

INCIDENT DEBRIEFING	1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED
4. MAP SKETCH			
ICS 201 (12/93) NFES 1325	PAGE 1	5. PREPARED BY (NAME AND POSITION)	

7. CURRENT ORGANIZATION



8. RESOURCES SUMMARY

RESOURCES ORDERED	RESOURCES IDENTIFICATION	ETA	ON SCENE √	LOCATION/ASSIGNMENT
ICS 201 (12/93) NFES 1325	PAGE 4			

Instructions for Completing the Incident Briefing (ICS Form 201).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Map Sketch	Show perimeter and control lines, resources assignments, incident facilities, and other special information on a sketch map or attached to the topographic or orthophoto map.
5.	Resources Summary	Enter the following information about the resources allocated to the incident. Enter the number and type of resource ordered.
	Resources Ordered	Enter the number and type of resource ordered.
	Resource Identification	Enter the agency three-letter designator, S/T, Kind/Type and resource designator.
	ETA/On Scene	Enter the estimated arrival time and place the arrival time or a checkmark in the "on scene" column upon arrival.
	Location/Assignment	Enter the assigned location of the resource and/or the actual assignment.
6.	Current Organization	Enter on the organization chart the names of the individuals assigned to each position. Modify the chart as necessary.
7.	Summary of Current Actions	Enter the strategy and tactics used on the incident and note any specific problem areas.
8.	Prepared By	Enter the name and position of the person completing the form.
*Note		Additional pages may be added to ICS Form 201 if needed.

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN AND INCIDENT OBJECTIVES FORM

Purpose. An Incident Action Plan documents the actions developed by the Incident Commander and Command and General Staffs during the Planning Meeting. When all attachments are included, the plan specifies control objectives, tactics to meet the objectives, resources, organization, communications plan, medical plan, and other appropriate information for use in tactical operations.

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

1. Incident Objectives (ICS Form 202)
2. Organization Assignment List (ICS Form 203)
3. Incident Map (top section or sketch)
4. Assignment List (ICS Form 204)
5. Radio Communications Plan (ICS Form 205)
6. Traffic Plan (internal and external to the incident)
7. Medical Plan (ICS Form 206)

Preparation. An Incident Action Plan is completed following each formal planning meeting conducted by the Incident Commander and the Command and General Staff. The plan must be approved by the Incident Commander prior to distribution.

Distribution. Sufficient copies of the Incident Action Plan will be reproduced and given to all supervisory personnel at the Section, Branch, Division/Group, and Unit leader levels.

The Incident Objectives Form (ICS Form 202) is the first page of an Incident Action Plan. The Incident Objectives Form describes the basic incident strategy, control objectives, and provides weather information and safety considerations for use during the next operational period.

INCIDENT OBJECTIVES	1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED									
4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME)												
5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES)												
6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD												
7. GENERAL SAFETY MESSAGE												
8. ATTACHMENTS (√ IF ATTACHED) <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS 204)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> _____</td> </tr> </table>				<input type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)	<input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS 204)	<input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)	<input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION LIST (ICS 203)	<input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL PLAN (ICS 206)	<input type="checkbox"/> _____										
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS 204)	<input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT MAP	<input type="checkbox"/> _____										
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS 205)	<input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC PLAN	<input type="checkbox"/> _____										
202 ICS 3-80	9. PREPARED BY (PLANNING SECTION CHIEF)	10. APPROVED BY (INCIDENT COMMANDER)										

Instructions for Completing the Incident Objectives (ICS Form 202).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
		Note: ICS Form 202, Incident Objectives, serves only as a cover sheet and is not considered complete until attachments are included.
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the form applies. Record the start time and end time and include date(s).
5.	General Control Objectives (include alternatives)	Enter short, clear, and concise statements of the objectives for managing the incident, including alternatives. The control objectives usually apply for the duration of the incident.
6.	Weather Forecast for Operational Period	Enter weather prediction information for the specified operational period.
7.	General/Safety Message	Enter information such as known safety hazards and specific precautions to be observed during this operational period. If available, a safety message should be referenced and attached.
8.	Attachments	The form is ready for distribution when appropriate attachments are completed and attached to the form.
9.	Prepared By	Enter the name and position of the person completing the form (usually the Planning Section Chief).
10.	Approved By	Enter the name and position of the person approving the form (usually the Incident Commander).

ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS FORM 203)

Purpose. The Organization Assignment List provides ICS personnel with information on the units that are currently activated and the names of personnel staffing each position/unit. It is used to complete the Incident Organization Chart (ICS Form 207) which is posted on the Incident Command Post display.

Preparation. The list is prepared and maintained by the Resources Unit under the direction of the Planning Section Chief.

Distribution. The Organization Assignment List is duplicated and attached to the Incident Objectives form and given to all recipients of the Incident Action Plan.

Instructions for Completing the Organization Assignment List (ICS Form 203).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
		An Organization Assignment List may be completed any time the number of personnel assigned to the incident increases or decreases or a change in assignment occurs.
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment list applies. Record the start time and end time and include date(s).
4. thru 8.		Enter the names of personnel staffing each of the listed positions. Use at least first initial and last name. For Units indicate Unit Leader and for Divisions/Groups indicate Division/Group Supervisor. Use an additional page if more than three branches are activated.
9.	Prepared By	Enter the name of the Resources Unit member preparing the form. Attach form to the Incident Objectives.

ASSIGNMENT LIST (ICS FORM 204)

Purpose. The Assignment List(s) is used to inform Operations Section personnel of incident assignments. Once the assignments are agreed to by the Incident Commander and General Staff, the assignment information is given to the appropriate Units and Divisions via the Communications Center.

Preparation. The Assignment List normally is prepared by the Resources Unit using guidance by the Incident Objectives (ICS Form 202), Operational Planning Worksheet (ICS Form 215), and Operations Section Chief. The Assignment List must be approved by the Planning Section Chief. When approved, it is attached to the Incident Objectives as part of the Incident Action Plan.

Distribution. The Assignment List is duplicated and attached to the Incident Objectives and given to all recipients of the Incident Action Plan. In some cases, assignments may be communicated via radio.

Instructions for Completing the Assignment List (ICS Form 204).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
		A separate sheet is used for each Division or Group. The identification letter of the Division is entered in the form title. Also enter the number (roman numeral) assigned to the Branch.
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the form applies. Record the start time and end time and include date(s).
5.	Operations Personnel	Enter the name of the Operations Chief, applicable Branch Director, and Division Supervisor.
6.	Resources Assigned Strike Team/Task Force/Resource Designator	List resource designators, leader name, and total number of personnel for strike teams, task forces, or single resources assigned.
7.	Control Operations	Provide a statement of the tactical objectives to be achieved within the operational period. Include any special instructions for individual resources.
8.	Special Instructions	Enter statement calling attention to any safety problems or specific precautions to be exercised or other important information.
9.	Division Communication Summary	The Communications Unit provides this information on the form for Command, Division, Tactical, Support, and Ground-to-Air frequencies.
10.	Prepared By	Enter the name of the Resources Unit Member preparing the form.
11.	Approved By	Enter the name of the person approving the form (usually the Planning Section Chief).

INCIDENT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PLAN (ICS FORM 205)

Purpose. The Incident Radio Communications Plan provides in one location information on all radio frequency assignments for each operational period. The plan is a summary of information obtained from the Radio Requirement Worksheet (ICS Form 216) and the Radio Frequency Assignment Worksheet (ICS Form 217). Information from the Radio Communications Plan on frequency assignments normally is placed on the appropriate Assignment List (ICS Form 204).

Preparation. The Incident Radio Communications Plan is prepared by the Communications Unit Leader and given to the Planning Section Chief. Detailed instructions on preparing this form may be found in ICS 223-5, Communications Unit Position Manual.

Distribution. The Incident Radio Communications Plan is duplicated and given to all recipients of the Incident Objectives form, including the Incident Communications Center. Information from the plan is placed on Assignment Lists.

Instructions for Completing the Incident Radio Communications Plan (ICS Form 205).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date/Time Prepared	Enter date (month, day, year) and time prepared (24-hour clock).
3.	Operational Period Date/Time	Enter the date and time interval for which the Radio Communications Plan applies. Record the start time and end time and include date(s).
4.	Basic Radio Channel Utilization System/Cache	Enter the radio cache system(s) assigned and used on the incident (e.g., Boise Cache, FIREMARS, Region 5 Emergency Cache, etc.).
	Channel Number	Enter the radio channel numbers assigned.
	Function	Enter the function each channel number is assigned (i.e., command, support, division tactical, and ground-to-air).
	Frequency	Enter the radio frequency tone number assigned to each specified function (e.g., 153.400).
	Assignment	Enter the ICS organization assigned to each of the designated frequencies (e.g., Branch I, Division A).
	Remarks	This section should include narrative information regarding special situations.
5.	Prepared By	Enter the name of the Communications Unit Leader preparing the form.

MEDICAL PLAN (ICS FORM 206)

Purpose. The Medical Plan provides information on incident medical aid stations, transportation services, hospitals, and medical emergency procedures.

Preparation. The Medical Plan is prepared by the Medical Unit Leader and reviewed by the Safety Officer.

Distribution. The Medical Plan may be an attachment to the Incident Objectives, or information from the plan pertaining to incident medical aid stations and medical emergency procedures may be taken from the plan and placed on Assignment Lists.

MEDICAL PLAN	1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED	3. TIME PREPARED	4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD				
	5. INCIDENT MEDICAL AID STATIONS							
MEDICAL AID STATIONS		LOCATION		PARAMEDICS				
				YES	NO			
6. TRANSPORTATION								
A. AMBULANCE SERVICES								
NAME		ADDRESS		PHONE	PARAMEDICS			
					YES	NO		
B. INCIDENT AMBULANCES								
NAME		LOCATION			PARAMEDICS			
					YES	NO		
7. HOSPITALS								
NAME	ADDRESS	TRAVEL TIME		PHONE	HELIPAD		BURN CENTER	
		AIR	GRND		YES	NO	YES	NO
8. MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES								
206 ICS 8-78		9. PREPARED BY (MEDICAL UNIT LEADER)			10. REVIEWED BY (SAFETY OFFICER)			

NPES 1331

Instructions for Completing the Medical Plan (ICS Form 206).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Operational Period Date/Time	Record the date and time of the operational period for which this plan is in effect.
5.	Incident Medical Aid Stations	Enter name and location of incident medical aid stations (e.g., Cajon Staging Area, Cajon Campground) and indicate with a √ if paramedics are located at the site.
6.	Transportation	
	A. Ambulance Services	List name and address of ambulance services (e.g., Shaeffer, 4358 Brown Parkway, Corona). Provide phone number and indicate if ambulance company has paramedics.
	B. Incident Ambulances	Name of organization providing ambulances and the incident location. Also indicate if paramedics are aboard.
7.	Hospitals	List hospitals which could serve this incident. Incident name, address, the travel time by air and ground from the incident to the hospital, phone number, and indicate with a √ if the hospital is a burn center and has a helipad.
8.	Medical Emergency Procedures	Note any special emergency instructions for use by incident personnel.
9.	Prepared By	Enter the name of the Medical Unit Leader preparing the form.
10.	Reviewed By	Obtain the name of the Safety Officer who must review the plan.

INCIDENT ORGANIZATION CHART (ICS FORM 207)


Purpose. The Incident Organization Chart is used to indicate what ICS organizational elements are currently activated and the names of personnel staffing each element. The attached chart is an example of the kind of Organizational Chart used in the ICS. Personnel responsible for managing organizational positions would be listed in each box as appropriate.

Preparation. The organization chart is prepared by the Resources Unit and posted along with other displays at the Incident Command Post. A chart is completed for each operational period and updated when organizational changes occur.

Distribution. When completed, the chart is posted on the display board located at the Incident Command Post.

Wall Size Chart. The ICS Form 207 WS is a large chart that is used primarily to post on the Command Post display board for better visibility.

Incident Name _____
 Operational Period _____
 Date _____ Time _____



INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY (ICS FORM 209)

Purpose. The Incident Status Summary serves the following purposes:

1. It is used by Situation Unit personnel for posting information on Incident Command Post displays.
2. When duplicated and provided to Command Staff members, it provides them with basic information for use in planning for the next operational period.
3. It provides basic information to the Information Officer for preparation of media releases.
4. It provides incident information to agency dispatch and off-incident coordination centers.

Preparation. The Incident Status Summary is prepared by the Situation Unit. Resource information should be obtained from the Resources Unit. It is scheduled for presentation to the Planning Section Chief and other General Staff members prior to each Planning Meeting and may be required at more frequent intervals by the Incident Commander or Planning Section Chief.

Distribution. When completed, the form is duplicated and copies are distributed to the Incident Commander and staff, and all Section Chiefs, Planning Section Unit Leaders, and Agency Dispatch Centers. It is also posted on the display board located at the Incident Command Post.

Completion of the Incident Status Summary will be as specified by agency or municipality. Report by telephone, teletype, computer, or facsimile to the local agency or municipality headquarters by 2100 daily on incidents as required by agency or municipality (reports are normally required on life-threatening situations, real property threatened or destroyed, high resource damage potential, and complex incidents that could have political ramifications). Normally wildland agencies require a report on all Class D (100 acres plus) and larger incidents (unless primarily grass type in which case report Class E, 300 acres or larger). The first summary will cover the period from the start of the incident to 2100 the first day of the incident, if at least four hours have elapsed; thereafter the summary will cover the 24-hour period ending at 1900 (this reporting time will enable compilation of reporting data and submission of report to local agency or municipality headquarters by 2100) daily until incident is under control. Wildland fire agencies will send the summary to the National Interagency Fire Center by 2400 Mountain Time.

INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY (See reverse for general instructions.)																											
1. Date				Time				2. INITIAL <input type="checkbox"/> UPDATE <input type="checkbox"/> FINAL <input type="checkbox"/>				3. Incident Name						4. Incident Number (8)									
5. Incident Commander (12)				6. Jurisdictions (5)				7. County (14)				8. Type Incident (20)				9. Location (64)						10. Started Date _____ Time _____ (6/4)					
11. Cause (28)				12. Area Involved (28)				13. % Contained (4)				14. Expected Containment Date _____ Time _____ (6/4)				15. Ext. Control Date _____ Time _____ (6/4)						16. Declared Controlled Date _____ Time _____ (6/4)					
17. Current Threat (66)												18. Current Problems (64)															
19. Est. Loss (12)				20. Est. Savings (12)				21. Injuries (4)				Deaths (4)				22. Line Built (6)						23. Line to Build (6)					
24. Current Weather WS WD				Temp RH (14)				25. Predicted Weather WS WD				Temp RH (14)				26. Costs to Date (12)						27. Est. Total Cost (12)					
28. AGENCIES																											
29. RESOURCES (4)																						TOTALS					
KIND OF RESOURCE	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST					
ENGINES																											
DOZERS																											
CREWS																											
HELICOPTERS																											
AIR TANKERS																											
TRUCK COS.																											
RESCUE/MED.																											
WATER TENDERS																											
OTHER																											
OVERHEAD PERSONNEL																											
TOTAL PERSONNEL																											
30. Cooperating Agencies (52)																											
31. Remarks (8 Lines/80)																											
32. Prepared By (12)								33. Approved By (12)								34. Sent To											
																Date		Time		By							

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Completion of the Incident Status Summary will be as specified by Agency or municipality. Report by telephone, teletype, computer, or facsimile to the local Agency or municipality headquarters by 2100 daily on incidents as required by Agency or municipality (reports are normally required on life-threatening situations, real property threatened or destroyed, high resource damage potential, and complex incidents that could have political ramifications). Normally wildland agencies require a report on all Class D (100 acres plus) and larger incidents (unless primarily grass type in which case report Class E, 300 acres or larger). The first summary will cover the period from the start of the incident to 2100 the first day of the incident, if at least four hours have elapsed; thereafter, the summary will cover the 24-hour period ending at 1900 (this reporting time will enable compilation of reporting data and submission of report to local Agency or municipality headquarters by 2100) daily until incident is under control. Wildland fire agencies will send the summary to the National Interagency Fire Center by 2400 Mountain Time.

1. Enter date and time report completed (mandatory).
2. Check appropriate space (mandatory--no computer entry).
3. Provide name given to incident by Incident Commander or Agency (mandatory).
4. Enter number assigned to incident by Agency (mandatory).
5. Enter first initial and last name of Incident Commander (optional).
6. Enter Agency or Municipality (mandatory).
7. Enter County where incident is occurring (optional).
8. Enter type incident, e.g., wildland fire (enter fuel type), structure fire, hazardous chemical spill, etc. (mandatory).
9. Enter legal description and general location. Use remarks for additional data if necessary (mandatory).
10. Enter date and Zulu time incident started (mandatory--maximum of 6 characters for date and 4 characters for time).
11. Enter specific cause or under investigation (mandatory).
12. Enter area involved, e.g., 50 acres, top 3 floors of building, etc. (mandatory).
13. Enter estimate of percent of containment (mandatory).
14. Enter estimate of date and time of total containment (mandatory).
15. Enter estimated date and time of control (mandatory).
16. Enter actual date and time fire was declared controlled (mandatory).
17. Report significant threat to structures, watershed, timber, wildlife habitat, or other valuable resources (mandatory).
18. Enter control problems, e.g., accessibility, fuels, rocky terrain, high winds, structures (mandatory).
19. Enter estimated dollar value of total damage to date. Include structures, watershed, timber, etc. Be specific in remarks (mandatory).
20. Enter estimate of values saved as result of all suppression efforts (optional).
21. Enter any serious injuries or deaths which have occurred since the last report. Be specific in remarks (mandatory).
22. Indicate the extent of line completed by chains or other units of measurement (optional).
23. Indicate line to be constructed by chains or other units of measurement (optional).
24. Indicate current weather conditions at the incident (mandatory).
25. Indicate predicted weather conditions for the next operational period (mandatory).
26. Provide total incident cost to date (optional).
27. Provide estimated total cost for entire incident (optional).
28. List agencies which have resources assigned to the incident (mandatory).
29. Enter resource information under appropriate Agency column by single resource or strike team (mandatory).
30. List by name those agencies which are providing support, e.g., Salvation Army, Red Cross, law enforcement, National Weather Service, etc. (mandatory).
31. The Remarks space can be used to (1) list additional resources not covered in Section 28/29; (2) provide more information on location; (3) enter additional information regarding threat control problems, anticipated release, or demobilization, etc. (mandatory).
32. This will normally be the incident Situation Unit Leader (mandatory).
33. This will normally be the incident Planning Section Chief (mandatory).
34. The ID of the Agency entering the report will be entered (optional--no computer entry).

FOR THOSE AREAS USING EXISTING COMPUTER SYSTEM REFER TO USER'S MANUAL.
Maximum number of characters allowed for each block are specified in parenthesis on front of form.

Instructions for Completing the Incident Status Summary (ICS Form 209).

ITEM NUMBER	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Enter date and time report completed (mandatory).
2.	Check appropriate space (mandatory-no computer entry).
3.	Provide name given to incident by Incident Commander or Agency (mandatory).
4.	Enter number assigned to incident by Agency (mandatory).
5.	Enter first initial and last name of Incident Commander (optional).
6.	Enter Agency or Municipality (mandatory).
7.	Enter County where incident is occurring (optional).
8.	Enter type incident, e.g., wildland fire (enter fuel type), structure fire, hazardous chemical spill, etc. (mandatory).
9.	Enter legal description and general location. Use remarks for additional data if necessary (mandatory).
10.	Enter date and Zulu time incident started (mandatory--maximum of 6 characters for date and 4 characters for time).
11.	Enter specific cause or under investigation (mandatory).
12.	Enter area involved, e.g., 50 acres, top three floors of building, etc. (mandatory).
13.	Enter estimate of percent of containment (mandatory).
14.	Enter estimate of date and time of total containment (mandatory).
15.	Enter estimated date and time of control (mandatory).
16.	Enter actual date and time fire was declared controlled (mandatory).
17.	Report significant threat to structures, watershed, timber, wildlife habitat, or other valuable resources (mandatory).
18.	Enter control problems, e.g., accessibility, fuels, rocky terrain, high winds, structures (mandatory).
19.	Enter estimated dollar value of total damage to date. Include structures, watershed, timber, etc. Be specific in remarks (mandatory).
20.	Enter estimate of values saved as result of all suppression efforts (optional).

21.	Enter any serious injuries or deaths which have occurred since the last report. Be specific in remarks (mandatory).
22.	Indicate the extent of line completed by chains or other units of measurement (optional).
23.	Indicate line to be constructed by chains or other units of measurement (optional).
24.	Indicate current weather conditions at the incident (mandatory).
25.	Indicate predicted weather conditions for the next operational period (mandatory).
26.	Provide total incident cost to date (optional).
27.	Provide estimated total cost for entire incident (optional).
28.	List agencies which have resources assigned to the incident (mandatory).
29.	Enter resource information under appropriate Agency column by single resource or strike team (mandatory).
30.	List by name those agencies which are providing support, e.g., Salvation Army, Red Cross, law enforcement, National Weather Service, etc. (mandatory).
31.	The remarks space can be used to (1) list additional resources not covered in Section 28/29; (2) provide more information on location; (3) enter additional information regarding threat control problems, anticipated release, or demobilization, etc. (mandatory).
32.	This will normally be the incident Situation Unit Leader (mandatory).
33.	This will normally be the incident Planning Section Chief (mandatory).
34.	The ID of the Agency entering the report will be entered (optional-no computer entry).

STATUS CHANGE CARD (ICS FORM 210)

Purpose. The Status Change Card is used by the incident Communications Center Manager to record status change information received on resources assigned to the incident.

Preparation. The form is completed by radio/telephone operators who receive status change information from individual resources, Task Forces, Strike Teams, and Division/Group Supervisors. Status information could also be reported by Staging Area and Helibase Managers and fixed-wing facilities.

Distribution. The Status Change Card is a two-part form. The original copy is given to the Resources Unit, and the second (pink) copy is retained by the Communications Unit.

DESIGNATOR NAME/ID.NO. _____								
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 100px; padding: 2px;">STATUS</td> <td colspan="2"></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3" style="padding: 2px;"> <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECHANICAL <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MANNING _____ ETR (O/S=Out-of-Service) </td> </tr> </table>			STATUS			<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECHANICAL <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MANNING _____ ETR (O/S=Out-of-Service)		
STATUS								
<input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECHANICAL <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MANNING _____ ETR (O/S=Out-of-Service)								
FROM	LOCATION	TO						
	DIVISION/GROUP							
	STAGING AREA							
	BASE/ICP							
	CAMP							
	EN ROUTE	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"><tr><td style="padding: 2px;">ETA</td></tr></table>	ETA					
ETA								
	HOME AGENCY							
<u>MESSAGE</u>								
TIME _____ RESOURCES PROCESS <input type="checkbox"/>								
ICS STATUS CHANGE CARD FORM 210 6/83								
☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986-695-272								

Instructions for Completing the Status Change Card (ICS Form 210).

ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
Designator Name/ID No.	Enter the appropriate designator for the kind of resource. The resource type codes are in ICS 020-1, <u>Resource Listings</u> .
Status	Determine the current status of the resource. If out-of-service status is checked, enter the time when the resource will return to service (ETR).
From/Location/To	Place a checkmark in the FROM column indicating the current location of the resource (where it came from). Also place a check in the TO column indicating the assigned location of the resource. When more than one Division, Staging Area, or Camp is used, identify the specific location (e.g., Division A, Redfern Staging Area, Camp Hood).
Message	Enter any special information provided by the resource or dispatch center such as individual designators of strike teams and task forces.
Time	Enter the time of the status change (24-hour clock).
Resources Process	This box is checked by Resources Unit personnel after the Unit has transferred the information to a Resource Status Card (ICS Form 219).

CHECK-IN LIST (ICS FORM 211)

Purpose. Personnel and equipment arriving at the incident can check in at various incident locations. Check-in consists of reporting specific information which is recorded on the Check-In List. The Check-in List serves several purposes:

1. Used for recording arrival times at the incident of all overhead personnel and equipment.
2. Used for recording the initial location of personnel and equipment and thus a subsequent assignment can be made.
3. Used to support demobilization by recording the home base, method of travel, etc., on all check-ins.

Preparation. The Check-in List is initiated at a number of incident locations, including

1. Staging areas, base, camps, helibases, and ICP. Managers at these locations record the information and give it to the Resources Unit as soon as possible.
2. Incident Communications Center Manager located in the Communications Center records the information and also gives it to the Resources Unit as soon as possible.
3. Check-in at the ICP will be done by a recorder at the Resources Unit.

Distribution. Check-in Lists, which are completed by personnel at the various check-in locations, are provided to both the Resources Unit and the Finance Section. The Resources Unit maintains a master list of all equipment and personnel that have reported to the incident.

Instructions for Completing the Check-in List (ICS Form 211).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
		Incident Dispatchers, upon receipt of a check-in message by radio, record the information on the Check-in List (ICS Form 211) and then give the information to the Resources Unit.
		Resources Unit Recorders, upon receipt of information on an in-person check in, record the information directly onto the Check-in List form.
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Check-in Location	Place a checkmark in the appropriate box indicating where the resource or person checked in at the incident.
3.	Date/Time Prepared	Enter date (month, day, year) and time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	List Personnel (Overhead) by Agency & Name	Use this section to list agency three-letter designator and individual names for all overhead (supervisory) personnel. When listing equipment, use three-letter designator, indicate if resource is a single resource, task force or strike team; enter kind of resource (letter for single resources, Number 1-3 for Strike Team); enter type of resource (1-4), and designated identification number.
5.	Order/Request Number	Order number will be assigned by Agency dispatching the resources or personnel to the incident.
6.	Date/Time Check-In	Self-explanatory.
7.	Leader's Name	Self-explanatory.
8.	Total Number Personnel	Enter total number of personnel in strike teams, task forces, or manning single resources. Include leaders.
9.	Manifest	Indicate if a manifest was prepared.
10.	Crew Weight or Individual's Weight	Self-explanatory.
11.	Home Base	Location at which the resource/individual is normally assigned. (May not be departure location.)
12.	Departure Point	Location from which resource/individual departed for this incident.

13.	Method of Travel	Means of travel to incident (bus, truck, engine, personal vehicle, etc.).
14.	Incident Assignment	Assignment at time of dispatch.
15.	Other Qualifications	List any other ICS position the individual has been trained to fill.
16.	Sent to	Enter initials and time that the information pertaining to that entry was sent to the Resources Unit.
17.	Page	Indicate page number and number of pages being used for Check-In at this location.
18.	Prepared by	Enter name of Check-In Recorder.

GENERAL MESSAGE (ICS FORM 213)

The General Message form in use within the ICS is a three-part form.

Purpose. The General Message form is used by:

1. Incident dispatchers to record incoming messages which cannot be orally transmitted to the intended recipients.
2. Command Post and other incident personnel to transmit messages to the Incident Communications Center for transmission via radio or telephone to the addressee.
3. Incident personnel to send any message or notification to incident personnel which requires hard-copy delivery.

Initiation of Form. The General Message form may be initiated by incident dispatchers for any other personnel on an incident.

Distribution. Upon completion, the General Message may be:

1. Hand carried to the addressee.
2. Hand carried to the incident Communications Center for transmission.

Instructions for Completing the General Message (ICS Form 213).

ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
To	Indicate Unit/Person the General Message is intended for. Be specific.
Office	Indicate the location where the Unit/Person is located, e.g., Ground Support Unit Leader, Simpson Camp, Communications, etc.
From	Indicate appropriate designation and location of sender.
Subject	Fill in if applicable.
Date	List the date and time.
Message	Briefly complete. Think through your message before writing it down. Try to be as concise as possible.
Reply	This section is intended to be used by the Unit/Person who receives the message to reply to your message.
Date	Record the date and time of reply.
Signature	Record the signature and title of person replying.
White Copy/Pink Copy	Both copies are sent by person who initiates the message.
Yellow Copy	Retained by the person who initiates the message.
Pink Copy	May be returned to the person who initiates the message.

UNIT LOG (ICS FORM 214)

Purpose. The Unit Log is used to record details of unit activity including strike team activity. The file of these logs provides a basic reference from which to extract information for inclusion in any after-action report.

Initiation of Log. A Unit Log is initiated and maintained by Command Staff members, Division/Group Supervisors, Air Operations Groups, Strike Team/Task Force Leaders, and Unit Leaders. Completed logs are forwarded to supervisors who provide copies to the Documentation Unit.

Distribution. The Documentation Unit maintains a file of all Unit Logs. It is necessary that one copy of each log be submitted to the Documentation Unit.

Instructions for Completing the Unit Log (ICS Form 214).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date prepared (month, day, year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Unit Name	Enter the title of the organizational unit or resource designator (e.g., Facilities Unit, Safety Officer, Strike Team).
5.	Unit Leader	Enter the name of the individual in charge of the Unit.
6.	Operational Period	Enter the time span covered by the log (e.g., 1800 Oct. 12 to 0600 Oct. 13).
7.	Personnel Roster	List the name, position, and home base of each member assigned to the unit during the operational period.
8.	Activity Log	Enter the time and briefly describe each significant occurrence or event (e.g., task assignments, task completions, injuries, difficulties encountered, etc.).
9.	Prepared By	Enter the name and title of the person approving the log. Provide log to immediate supervisor at the end of each operational period.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING WORKSHEET (ICS FORM 215)

Purpose. The purpose of the Operational Planning Worksheet is to communicate the decisions made during the Planning Meeting concerning resource assignments to the Resources Unit. The Worksheet is used by the Resources Unit to complete Assignment Lists and by the Logistics Section Chief for ordering resources for the incident.

Initiation of Form. The Operational Planning Worksheet is initiated by the Incident Commander and General Staff at each Planning Meeting. It is recommended that the format be drawn on the chalkboard, and when decisions are reached, the information is recorded on the Operational Planning Worksheet.

Distribution. When the division work assignments and accompanying resource allocations are agreed to, the form is distributed to the Resources Unit to assist in the preparation of the Assignment Lists. The Planning Section will use a copy of this worksheet for preparing requests for resources required for the next operational period.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING WORKSHEET				1. INCIDENT NAME	2. DATE PREPARED TIME PREPARED	3. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME)
4. DIVISION OR OTHER LOCATION	5. WORK ASSIGNMENTS	6. RESOURCES BY TYPE (SHOW STRIKE TEAM AS ST)			7. REPORTING LOCATION	8. REQUESTED ARRIVAL TIME
		RESOURCE TYPE				
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Instructions for Completing the Operational Planning Worksheet (ICS Form 215).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date/Time Prepared	Enter date (month, day, year) and time prepared (24-hour clock).
3.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the information applies. Record the start time and end time and date(s).
4.	Division or Other Location	Enter the Division letter or location of the work assignment for the resources.
5.	Work Assignments	Enter the specific work assignments given to each of the Divisions.
6.	Resource	Complete resource headings, both for kind and type appropriate for the incident. Enter, for the appropriate resources, the number of resources by type (engines, crew, etc.) required "REQ," and the number of resources available "HAVE" to perform the work assignment. Then record the number of resources needed "NEED" by subtracting the number in the "HAVE" row from the number in the "REQ" row.
7.	Reporting Location	Enter the specific location the "needed" resources are to report for the work assignment (staging area, location on the fire line, etc.).
8.	Requested Arrival Time	Enter time resources are requested to arrive at the reporting location.
9.	Total Resources Required, On Hand, Ordered	Enter the total number of resources by type (engines, crews, dozers, etc.) required, on hand, and ordered.
10.	Prepared By	Record the name and position of the person completing the form.

RADIO REQUIREMENTS WORKSHEET (ICS FORM 216)

Purpose. The Radio Requirements Worksheet is used to develop the total number of personal portable radios required for each Division/Group and Branch. It provides a listing of all units assigned to each Division, and thus depicts the total incident radio needs.

Initiation of Form. The worksheet is prepared by the Communications Unit for each operational period and can only be completed after specific resource assignments are made and designated on Assignment Lists. This worksheet need not be used if the Communications Unit Leader can easily obtain the information directly from Assignment Lists.

Distribution. The worksheet is for internal use by the Communications Unit and therefore there is no distribution of the form.

Instructions for Completing the Radio Requirements Worksheet (ICS Form 216).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date	Enter date (month, day, year) prepared.
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Branch	Enter the Branch number (I, II, etc.) for which radio requirements are being prepared.
5.	Agency	Enter the three-letter designator of the agency staffing the Branch Director position (e.g., VNC, CDF, ANF, LFD, etc.).
6.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment applies. Record the start date/time and end date/time.
7.	Tactical Frequency	Enter the radio frequency to be used by the Branch Director to communicate with each Division/Group Supervisor in the Branch.
8.	Division/Group	Enter for each Division/Group in the Branch the Division/Group identifier (A, B, etc.) and the agency assigned (e.g., LAC, VNC, etc.).
9.	Agency/ID No./Radio Requirements	List all units assigned to each Division/Group. Record the agency designator, unit or resource identification, and total number of radios needed for each unit or resource.
10.	Prepared By	Enter the name and position of the person completing the worksheet.

*Note: Detailed instructions for the completion of the Worksheet are found in ICS 223-5 Communications Unit Position Manual, Chapter 3.

RADIO FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT WORKSHEET (ICS FORM 217)

Purpose. The Radio Frequency Assignment Worksheet is used by the Communications Unit Leader to assist in determining frequency allocations.

Preparation. Cache radio frequencies available to the incident are listed on the form. Major agency frequencies assigned to the incident should be added to the bottom of the worksheet.

Distribution. The worksheet, prepared by the Communications Unit, is for internal use.

Instructions for Completing the Radio Frequency Assignment Worksheet (ICS Form 217).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date	Enter date (month, day, year) prepared.
3.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment applies. Record the start date/time and end date/time.
4.	Incident Organization	List frequencies allocated for each channel for each organizational element activated, record the <u>number</u> of radios required to perform the designated function on the specified frequency.
5.	Radio Data	For each radio cache and frequency assigned, record the associated function. Functional assignments are Command Support Division tactical Ground-to-air
6.	Agency	List the <u>frequencies</u> for each major agency assigned to the incident. Also list the function and channel number assigned.
7.	Total Radios Required	Total each column. This provides the number of radios required by each organizational unit. Also total each row, which provides the number of radios using each available frequency.
8.	Prepared By	Enter the name and position of the person completing the worksheet.

SUPPORT VEHICLE INVENTORY (ICS FORM 218)

Purpose. The Support Vehicle Inventory form provides an inventory of all transportation and support vehicles assigned to the incident. The information is used by the Ground Support Unit to maintain a record of the types and locations of vehicles on the incident. The Resources Unit uses the information to initiate and maintain status/resources information on these resources.

Preparation. The form is prepared by Ground Support Unit personnel at intervals specified by the Ground Support Unit Leader.

Distribution. Initial inventory information recorded on the form should be given to the Resources Unit. Subsequent changes to the status or location of transportation and support vehicles should be provided to the Resources Unit immediately.

Instructions for Completing the Support Vehicle Inventory (ICS Form 218).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
		<p>Note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Ground Support Unit Leader may prefer to use separate sheets for each type of support vehicle (e.g., buses, pickups, and food tenders). b. More than one line may be used to record information on each vehicle. If this is done, separate individual vehicle entries with a heavy line. c. Several pages may be used. When this occurs, number the pages consecutively (in the page number box at bottom of the form).
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Date Prepared	Enter date (month, day, year) prepared.
3.	Time Prepared	Enter time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Vehicle Information	Record the following vehicle information:
	Type	a. Specific vehicle type (e.g., bus, stakeside, etc.).
	Make	b. Vehicle manufacturer name (e.g., GMC, International).
	Capacity/Size	c. Vehicle capacity/size, (e.g., 30-person bus, 3/4 ton truck).
	Owner	d. Owner of vehicle (agency or private owner).
	ID Number	e. Serial or other identification number.
	Location	f. Location of vehicle.
	Release Time	g. Time vehicle is released from the incident.
5.	Prepared By	Enter the name and position of the person completing the form.

RESOURCE STATUS CARD (ICS FORM 219)

Purpose. Resource Status Cards are used by the Resources Unit to record status and location information on resources, transportation, and support vehicles and personnel. The Resource Status Cards provide a visual display of the status and location of resources assigned to the incident.

Format. There are eight different status cards (see below). Each card is a different color and used for a different purpose. The format and content of information on each card will vary depending upon the use of the card.

ICS FORM 219	USE	COLOR
1	Labels	Gray (used only as label cards in racks)
2	Handcrews	Green
3	Engines	Rose
4	Helicopter	Blue
5	Personnel	White
6	Aircraft	Orange
7	Dozers	Yellow
8	Task Forces	Tan
	Miscellaneous Equipment	

Preparation. Information to be placed on the cards may be obtained from several sources including, but not limited to:

1. ICS Briefing (ICS Form 201).
2. Check-In List (ICS Form 211).
3. Status Change Card (ICS Form 210).
4. Agency supplied information.

Detailed information on preparing status cards is found in Resources Unit Position Manual (ICS 221-3).

Distribution. The cards are displayed in resource status racks where they can be easily retrieved. Cards will be retained by the Resources Unit until demobilization. At demobilization all cards will be turned into the Documentation Unit.

Instructions for Completing the Resource Status Card

An example of each kind of card is shown in the following list. Instructions for filling in each block on the card are included where necessary and are not repeated on each example unless needed for clarification.

ICS 219-1 LABEL CARD. The label cards (gray) are used to designate either location or status in the card racks. The organization of the card racks will vary depending upon the type and size of incident. Resources Unit personnel can print location data (e.g., BRANCH 1 DIVISION C, SUNSET BASE), and/or status information (e.g., AVAILABLE, EN ROUTE, OUT-OF-SERVICE, etc.) on the tops of the cards with felt-tip pens. The label cards may then be placed into the racks at appropriate locations as determined by Resources Unit Personnel.

ICS 219-2 HANDCREWS--GREEN-COLORED CARD

The Handcrew Card is depicted below. (Incident location data on the Handcrew Card is on the back of the card and not shown in the example.)

ORDER/REQUEST NO.

Number assigned by dispatching agency.

HOME BASE

Location at which Handcrew is normally located.

DEPARTURE POINT

Location from which Handcrew left to reach this incident.

CREW ID. NO./NAME (FOR STRIKE TEAMS)

List commonly used names or numbers to identify the crews which make up the Strike Team.

NO. PERSONNEL

Total number of personnel (including Leader) in Crew or in Strike Team (as appropriate).

MANIFEST

Was a manifest prepared for the Crew/Strike Team?

WEIGHT

Total weight (including equipment and personal belongings) of the Crew/Strike Team.

DESIGNATION POINT

Next location to which Crew/Strike Team is being sent from the incident.

ICS 219-3 ENGINE--ROSE-COLORED CARD

The Engine Card when used for Strike Teams will have the right tab blacked out. This provides an immediate indication to Resources Unit that the card represents a Strike Team.

RESOURCE ID. Numbers: Names

For Strike Teams, list all individual engine numbers which make up the Strike Team. Engine Co. Captains may be included as appropriate. For mixed agency Strike Teams, list the 3-letter ID. for each resource.

INCIDENT LOCATION

Write in the location that the resource is assigned to on the incident (e.g., DIVISION A, SUNSET BASE, etc.).

STATUS

Check appropriate line. If Engine is O/S (out-of-service), give the ETR (estimated time of return) when known.

NOTE

Provide any information that may be needed or useful (e.g., Engine MRV 6183 carries a 120 channel synthesizer).

ICS 219-4 HELICOPTER--BLUE-COLORED CARD

MANUFACTURER NAME/NO.

e.g., Bell 206.

INCIDENT LOCATION

Assigned location information on helicopters may be the same as other resources (e.g., Division A). However, location could also indicate a "general" working location (e.g., water-dropping in Branch 1; or Crew Transport - Wilson Staging Area).

ICS 219-5 PERSONNEL--WHITE-COLORED CARD

TRANSPORTATION NEEDS

If an individual was picked up and brought to the incident, it is important to check what transportation is needed to return home.

DATE/TIME ORDER

Important to show the specific means by which personnel will depart the incident. Note that this may vary from the way the individual arrived.

REMARKS (Include other qualifications)

Use this space to indicate ICS positions individuals may fill in addition to Incident Assignment (e.g., Situation Unit Leader, Demobilization Unit Leader, etc.).

ORANGE CARD STOCK (AIRCRAFT)

AGENCY	TYPE	MANUFACTURER	I.D. NO.
ORDER/REQUEST NO.		DATE/TIME CHECK IN	
HOME BASE			
DATE TIME RELEASED			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
ICS 219-6 (4/82) AIRCRAFT			

AGENCY	TYPE	MANUFACTURER NAME/NO.	I.D. NO.
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
INCIDENT LOCATION		TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR			
NOTE			
*U.S. GPO: 695-162-1966			

ICS 219-6 AIRCRAFT--ORANGE-COLORED CARD

INCIDENT LOCATION

Reflect the area of the incident to which the aircraft is primarily assigned (e.g., Branch 1).

ICS 219-7 DOZERS--YELLOW-COLORED CARD

RESOURCE ID. NUMBERS/NAMES

List dozer numbers and Operator names for dozers in Strike Teams. Show contractor name as appropriate.

ICS 219-8 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT/TASK FORCE--TAN-COLORED CARD

This card is used for a variety of miscellaneous equipment (e.g., buses, trucks, water tenders, etc.). The card is also used to show Task Forces. (Task Forces may be several different kinds of resources assembled for a specific purpose.) When the card is used to indicate a Task Force, the left tab should be blacked out. Also, the specific resources making up the Task Force should be listed in the Resource ID. No./Names section of the card. The cards of the resources making up the Task Force can be clipped together with the Tan Task Force card or stored separately as desired. When a single resource is being used in a Task Force, a notation should be made on that Resources' Card to include the Task Force number.

YELLOW CARD STOCK (DOZERS)

AGENCY	ST	TF	KIND	TYPE	I.D. NO.
ORDER/REQUEST NO.			DATE/TIME CHECK IN		
HOME BASE					
DEPARTURE POINT					
LEADER NAME					
RESOURCE ID. NO.S/NAMES					
DESTINATION POINT				ETA	
REMARKS					
INCIDENT LOCATION				TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR					
NOTE					
ICS 219-7 (REV. 4/82) DOZERS NFES 1349					

AGENCY	ST	TF	KIND	TYPE	I.D. NO.
INCIDENT LOCATION				TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR					
NOTE					
INCIDENT LOCATION				TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR					
NOTE					
INCIDENT LOCATION				TIME	
STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> ASSIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> O/S REST <input type="checkbox"/> O/S PERS. <input type="checkbox"/> AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> O/S MECH <input type="checkbox"/> ETR					
NOTE					
*U.S. GPO: 1990-794-006					

AIR OPERATIONS SUMMARY WORKSHEET (ICS FORM 220)

Purpose. The Air Operations Summary Worksheet provides the Air Operations Branch with the number, type, location, and specific assignments of helicopters and air tankers.

Initiation of Form. The worksheet is completed by the Operations Section Chief or the Air Operations Branch Director during each Planning Meeting. General air resources assignment information is obtained from the Operational Planning Worksheet (ICS Form 215) which also is completed during each Planning Meeting. Specific designators of the air resources assigned to the incident are provided by the Air and Fixed-Wing Support Groups.

Distribution. After the worksheet is completed by Air Operations personnel (except item 11), the form is given to the Air Support Group Supervisor and Air Tanker/Fixed-Wing Coordinator personnel. These personnel complete the form by indicating the designators of the helicopters and air tankers assigned missions during the specified operational period. This information is provided to Air Operations personnel who, in turn, give the information to the Resources Unit.

AIR OPERATIONS SUMMARY		1. INCIDENT NAME		2. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (Date & Time)		3. DISTRIBUTION			
						HELIBASES _____ FIXED-WING BASES _____			
4. PERSONNEL AND COMMUNICATIONS		5. REMARKS (Spec. Instructions, Safety Notes, Hazards, Priorities)							
6. LOCATION/ FUNCTION	7. ASSIGNMENT	8. FIXED-WING		9. HELICOPTERS		10. TIME		11. AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED	12. OPERATING BASE
		NO.	TYPE	NO.	TYPE	AVAILABLE	COMMENCE		
AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH DIRECTOR									
AIR TACTICAL GROUP SUPERVISOR									
HELICOPTER COORDINATOR									
AIR TANKER/FIXED-WING COORDINATOR									
13. TOTALS									
		14. AIR OPERATIONS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT							
		15. PREPARED BY (include Date & Time)							

NFES 1351

Instructions for Completing Air Operations Summary Worksheet (ICS Form 220).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment applies. Record the start date/time and end date/time.
3.	Air Operations Distribution	Check the block and enter the time and date when ICS Form 220 and attachments were sent to all fixed-wing bases and helibases supporting the incident.
4.	Personnel and Communications	Enter the name of the individuals in Air Operations and the primary air/air and air/ground (if applicable) radio frequencies to be used.
5.	Remarks	Enter special instructions or information, including safety notes, hazards, and priorities for Air Operations personnel.
6.	Location/ Function	Enter area of incident where air resources will be assigned (i.e., Div. A, Branch II, Standby) or function (i.e., Air Tactical Group Supervisor, Situation Unit, MEDIVAC, etc.) to which they will be assigned.
7.	Assignment	Enter the specific assignment (e.g., water or retardant drops, logistical support, or availability status for a specific purpose, support backup, recon, MEDIVAC, etc.). If applicable, enter the primary air/air and air/ground radio frequency to be used.
8.	Fixed-Wing	Enter the number and type (1, 2, or 3) of air tankers allocated to the location/function.
9.	Helicopters	Enter the number and type of helicopters allocated to the location/function.
10.	Time Available/ Commence	As applicable, enter the time (24-hour clock), when allocated air resources should be available and when they should commence their assignment.
11.	Aircraft Assigned	Enter the designators of the aircraft assigned. Gather information from Resources Unit, helibases, and fixed-wing bases.
12.	Operating Base	Enter the base (helibase, helispot, fixed-wing base) that each air resource is expected to initiate operations from.
13.	Totals	Enter the total number of fixed-wing and helicopters assigned to the incident in the number columns. Enter the total number of each type <u>air tanker</u> and helicopter assigned in Type column.
14.	Air Operations Support	Enter the designators and location of other support resources (i.e., helicopter support units, engines, IR, etc.) assigned to Air Operations.
15.	Prepared By	Enter the name of the person in Air Operations completing the form. Enter the date and time form was completed.

DEMOBILIZATION CHECKOUT (ICS FORM 221)

Purpose. The Demobilization Checkout form provides the Planning Section information on resource releases from the incident to include destination, actual release time, and estimated time of arrival at destination.

Initiation of Form. The form is initiated by the Demobilization Unit Leader or the Planning section. The top portion of the form is completed by Demobilization Unit Leader after the resource supervisor has given written notification that the resource is excess to the needs of the incident.

Distribution. The individual resource will have the unit initial the appropriate checked (✓) boxes in section 11 prior to release from the incident. After completion, the form is returned to the Demobilization Unit Leader or the Planning Section.

Note: Prior to actual demobilization, Planning Section (Demobilization Unit) should check with the Command Staff (Liaison Officer) to determine any agency needs related to demobilization and release; if any, add to line Number 11.

DEMOBILIZATION CHECKOUT

ICS-221

1. INCIDENT NAME/NUMBER	2. DATE/TIME	3. DEMOB NO.
4. UNIT/PERSONNEL RELEASED		
5. TRANSPORTATION TYPE/NO.		
6. ACTUAL RELEASE DATE/TIME	7. MANIFEST YES NO NUMBER _____	
8. DESTINATION _____	9. AREA/AGENCY/REGION NOTIFIED NAME _____ DATE _____	
10. UNIT LEADER RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING PERFORMANCE RATING		
11. UNIT/PERSONNEL YOU AND YOUR RESOURCES HAVE BEEN RELEASED SUBJECT TO SIGNOFF FROM THE FOLLOWING: (DEMOB. UNIT LEADER CHECK <input type="checkbox"/> APPROPRIATE BOX)		
<u>LOGISTICS SECTION</u>		
<input type="checkbox"/> SUPPLY UNIT _____		
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATIONS UNIT _____		
<input type="checkbox"/> FACILITIES UNIT _____		
<input type="checkbox"/> GROUND SUPPORT UNIT LEADER _____		
 <u>PLANNING SECTION</u>		
<input type="checkbox"/> DOCUMENTATION UNIT _____		
 <u>FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION SECTION</u>		
<input type="checkbox"/> TIME UNIT _____		
 <u>OTHER</u>		
<input type="checkbox"/> _____		
<input type="checkbox"/> _____		
12. REMARKS _____ _____		
221	ICS	1/83

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE DEMOBILIZATION CHECK
(ICS FORM 221)**

Prior to actual demobilization, Planning Section (Demobilization Unit) should check with the Command Staff (Liaison Officer) to determine any agency-specific needs related to demobilization and release. If any, add to line Number 11.

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
1.	Incident Name/No.	Print Name and/or Number of incident.
2.	Date/Time	Enter Date and Time prepared.
3.	Demob No.	Enter Agency Request Number, Order Number, or Agency Demobilization Number if applicable.
4.	Unit/Personnel Released	Enter appropriate vehicle or Strike Team/Task Force I.D. Number(s) and Leader's name or individual overhead or staff personnel being released.
5.	Transportation Type/No.	Method and vehicle I.D. Number for transportation back to home unit. Enter N/A if own transportation is provided. *Additional specific details should be included in Remarks, block #12.
6.	Actual Release Date/Time	To be completed at conclusion of demobilization at time of actual release from incident. Would normally be last item of form to be completed.
7.	Manifest	Mark appropriate box. If yes, enter manifest number. Some agencies require a manifest for air travel.
8.	Destination	Location to which Unit or personnel have been released, i.e., Area, Region, Home base, Airport, Mobilization Center, etc.
9.	Area/Agency/Region Notified	Identify Area, Agency, or Region notified and enter date and time of notification.
10.	Unit Leader Responsible for Collecting Performance Ratings	Self-explanatory. Note, not all agencies require these ratings.
11.	Unit/Personnel	Demobilization Unit Leader will identify with a check in the box to the left of those units requiring check-out. Identified Unit Leaders are to initial to the right to indicate release. Blank boxes are provided for any additional check (unit requirements as needed), i.e., Safety Officer, Agency Representative, etc.
12.	Remarks	Any additional Information pertaining to demobilization or release.

* GPO 1985-0-593-005/14032

Instructions for Completing the Demobilization Checkout (ICS Form 221).

ITEM NUMBER	ITEM TITLE	INSTRUCTIONS
1.	Incident Name/No.	Print the name and/or number assigned to the incident.
2.	Date/Time	Enter date and time prepared.
3.	Demob No.	Enter Agency Request Number, Order Number, or Agency Demob Number if applicable.
4.	Unit/Personnel Released	Enter appropriate vehicle or Strike Team/Task Force ID. Number(s) and Leader's name or individual overhead or staff personnel being released.
5.	Transportation Type/No.	Method and vehicle ID. Number for transportation back to home unit. Enter N/A if own transportation is provided. *Additional specific details should be included in Remarks, block #12.
6.	Actual Release Date/Time	To be completed at conclusion of demobilization at time of actual release from incident. Would normally be last item of form to be completed.
7.	Manifest	Mark appropriate box. If yes, enter manifest number. Some agencies require a manifest for air travel.
8.	Destination	Location to which Unit or personnel have been released, i.e., Area, Region, Home base, Airport, Mobilization Center, etc.
9.	Area/Agency/Region Notified	Identify Area, Agency, or Region notified and enter date and time of notification.
10.	Unit Leader Responsible for Collecting Performance Ratings	Self-explanatory. Note, not all agencies require these ratings.
11.	Unit/Personnel	Demobilization Unit Leader will identify with a check in the box to the left of those units requiring check-out. Identified Unit Leaders are to initial to the right to indicate release.
		Blank boxes are provided for any additional check (unit requirements as needed), i.e., Safety Officer, Agency Representative, etc.
12.	Remarks	Any additional information pertaining to demobilization or release.

**Emergency Response to Terrorism:
Strategic Considerations for Command Officers
Student Manual**

**Appendix G:
Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 62 Fact
Sheet**



[Presidential Decision Directives - PDD]

May 22, 1998

FACT SHEET

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Annapolis, Maryland)

For Immediate Release
May 22, 1998

FACT SHEET

COMBATING TERRORISM: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 62

Since he took office, President Clinton has made the fight against terrorism a top national security objective. The President has worked to deepen our cooperation with our friends and allies abroad, strengthened law enforcement's counterterrorism tools and improved security on airplanes and at airports. These efforts have paid off as major terrorist attacks have been foiled and more terrorists have been apprehended, tried and given severe prison terms.

Yet America's unrivaled military superiority means that potential enemies -- whether nations or terrorist groups -- that choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government. They may try to attack our economy and critical infrastructure using advanced computer technology.

President Clinton is determined that in the coming century, we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should such an attack occur.

To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st century with the same rigor that we have met military threats in this century.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION FOR COMMAND OFFICERS

The National Coordinator

To achieve this new level of integration in the fight against terror, PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the broad variety of relevant polices and programs including such areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction. The National Coordinator will work within the National Security Council, report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and produce for him an annual Security Preparedness Report. The National Coordinator will also provide advice regarding budgets for counter-terror programs and lead in the development of guidelines that might be needed for crisis management.

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